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                                                     Summary 
Letter of Credit has been playing a leading role in the financing of international trade and 
commerce since the last half of the twentieth century. Its predominant role is not 
unconnected with its practical utility to international merchants and, arguably, marked 
enhancement of profit margin for the banks and financial institutions whose services the 
merchants might retain. Besides, the use of letter of credit to furnish security for 
performance in diverse areas ranging from construction industry to purely commerce 
sphere has grown remarkably since the past two and half decades. The wide popularity of 
letter of credit in the mercantile community, including its keen patronage by non-
commercial persons is mainly anchored in the instrument’s chief attributes, namely, 
assurance to the beneficiary that payment will be quick and unfailing. Unfortunately, 
however, in the last few decades, the torrent of litigation has put these attributes in 
jeopardy. In the vast majority of the cases, the litigants are locked in horns either over a 
claim of fraud allegedly practised or potentially committed by the beneficiary, or of 
discrepant presentation documents. The purpose of this thesis will be to do an extensive 
critiquing of these hotbeds of litigation.  
 Chapter 1 opens the discourse with the consideration of the legal structure of the 
relationships that may be created under a letter of credit transaction and the sources of 
letter of credit law, and the doctrine of autonomy of letters of credit. The question 
whether the beneficiary under a letter of credit is entitled to payment absent his 
furnishing consideration will not be pursued, not least because letter of credit is sui 
generis, and the mercantile practice is content to treat as valid the rights and obligations 
there created without embarking upon such a question. At any rate, the legal formalism 
 ix 
must give way to venerable mercantile practices. Chapter 2 examines the circumstances 
in which the account party or any interested party under a letter of credit may on a claim 
of fraud raise an action to enjoin payment or request for payment under a letter of credit.  
 Chapter 3 evaluates the principle of conformity of presentation documents and its 
corollary, namely the requirement of a valid notice conveying a rejection of tendered 
documents. Additionally, this chapter explores the circumstances in which payment may 
be exacted notwithstanding a discrepancy in a presentation document.  
 Finally, chapter 4 concerns itself with the problem that frequently arises where an 
account party under a letter of credit applies to the court for an interlocutory injunction to 
restrain the bank from honouring its payment obligation or to prevent the beneficiary 
from making a call under the credit. This chapter critiques the common law principle  
which preaches that an English court would not grant an interlocutory injunction to 
interrupt payment under a letter of credit  without the showing by the claimant of a fraud 
clear or obvious to the knowledge of the bank; questions the propriety of the requirement 
of a substantive cause of action to support an application for an interlocutory injunction 
to restrain the issuing bank from making payment; and proposes that the conventional  
balance of convenience test should not be applicable in the sphere of letters of credit and 
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                                          CHAPTER ONE 
 





Documentary credit1 constitutes one of the more significant, and perhaps the most 
frequently utilized devices for financing international trade2 transactions since over a 
century ago.3 In the main, documentary credit has sustained the wide patronage and 
attraction of the business community not only because of its role as “the life-blood of 
international commerce”4 but as “the crankshaft of modern commerce.”5  
 In this chapter it is proposed to examine the essential nature of documentary 
credit to see why international merchants as well as the banking community came to 
develop a keen interest in utilizing the trade financing mechanism in their transactions. A 
spectacular feature of documentary credit is its international nature; it is used to finance 
                                                 
1
 The expression “documentary credit” is variously referred to as “letter of credit”, “bankers’ commercial 
credit”, and “commercial credit.” Whilst the International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credit, article 2, adopts “documentary credit”, the Revised Article 5 of the 
American Uniform Commercial Code section 5—102(a) (10) as well as its forerunner code appears 
comfortable with the term “letter of credit.”  In this study both terminology will be used interchangeably. 
2
 As to the other financing schemes and their utility, see Hans Van Houte, The Law of International Trade 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) at 257; Clive M. Schmitthoff, Export Trade, 9th ed. (London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1990); C.M. Chinkin et al, Current Problems of International Trade Financing, 2nd ed. (Singapore: 
Butterworths, 1990). 
3
 E.P.Ellinger, Documentary Letters of Credit—A Comparative Study (Singapore: University of Singapore 
Press, 1970) at 24 et seq.  Semble, there is a consensus that letters of credit made its debut in international 
commerce about 150 years ago. Cf. Robert Bradgate, Commercial Law, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 
2000) at para. 34.1. It should be pointed out that letter of credit comprises many varieties, but the most 
common are the acceptance credit, standby credit, negotiation credit, and credit by guarantee.  
4
 Harbottle (R.D.) (Mercantile) Ltd. V. National Westminster Bank Ltd.[1977] 2 All E.R.862 at 870 per 
Kerr L.J. 
5
 A.G. Davis, The Law Relating to Commercial Letters of Credit, 3rd ed.(London: Sir Isaac Pitman &Sons 
Ltd, 1963) at ix. See also E.P.Ellinger, “Letters of Credit” in Norbert Horn and Clive M.Schmitthoff (eds.) 
The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law, 1982) 
241 at 263. 
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transnational commercial transactions6; all dealings in this regard cannot be under the 
singular control of national law, albeit domestic legislation may in one way or other 
impinge on such transactions.7 Consequently, this chapter will investigate the sources of 
letters of credit law in order to appreciate the possible law to which a defrauded buyer of 
goods in a sale contract financed by letter of credit may turn if he desires to utilize the 
fraud exception to enjoin the bank from making payment under the credit. In the United 
States it is often believed that a credit that incorporates the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) necessarily renders the Uniform Commercial 
Code inapplicable to the transaction inter partes. The matter may appear pedestrian. But 
it was exactly the occasion for arguments in Mid-Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd.8 a case 
that was fiercely contested from the trial Court of Common Pleas to the Supreme Court 
of Ohio. This chapter will put the matter in proper perspective. 
  The meaning and categories of documentary credit as well as the nature of the 
obligations assumed by the parties to the credit transaction will be evaluated. Further, we 
will undertake a detailed critiquing of the fundamental principle that the contract of sale 
between the buyer and the seller is autonomous of the credit contract, and, that the bank 
is not concerned with nor obligated to consider the sale contract in relation to the 
question whether the goods shipped to the buyer by the seller, are defective, 
commercially useless, inferior or that the goods have not been shipped at all.9 The chapter 
concludes that the autonomy principle is not, and cannot be absolute. This chapter will 
                                                 
6
 Arguendo, letter of credit featured prominently in financing domestic transactions in the United States: 
Henry Harfield, Letters of Credit (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1979) at 1—5. 
7
 As to the extent to which this is correct, see post. 
8
 95 Ohio St.3d 367, 768 N.E.2D 619 (Sup. Ct., Ohio, 2002).   
9
 The latter point may sound incredible contemporary international commerce, but it was precisely the 
subject in at least three Nigerian cases: Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa [1986] Nigerian Weekly L. 
Rep. 273; Attorney General of Bendel State v. United Bank for Africa [1986]2 N.S.C.C 1040; Union Bank 
of Nigeria Ltd. v. Osazua [1997] 2 Nigerian Weekly L.Rep.28.  
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identify at least three exceptions to the principle that the payment obligations of the bank 
under a credit cannot be enjoined. 
 
II. SOURCES OF LETTERS OF CREDIT LAW 
The source of documentary credit law consists in the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credit (promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce), the 
Revised Article 5 of the American Uniform Commercial Code, a huge accretion of case 
law principles, customs and standard practices of the international banking and 
mercantile community, national laws, and international conventions. For clarity of 
exposition, it is proposed to deal with them in seriatim. 
 A. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) 
 Prior to 1933, letter of credit was essentially governed and regulated by 
international lex mercatoria (the international law merchant).10 But, in that year the 
International Chamber of Commerce promulgated the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits.11 Perhaps, for the reason that the UCP deeply reflected the usages 
and practices12 of the international banking community, 13 it gained instant acceptability 
                                                 
10
 Perhaps, this explains the readiness of the courts, suo motu, to seek in aid the practice and usages among 
the international business community through the testimony of  expert witnesses, where, though the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit or the Reversed Article 5 of the American Uniform 
Commercial Code have been specifically incorporated into the credit contract, they are nonetheless silent 
on the point in controversy. 
11
 ICC Publication N0. 69. 
12
 See Intraworld Industries Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa.343 at 355 where the learned Judge 
expressed the view that “the UCP is by definition a recording of practice” of the mercantile community. 
13
 Quaere,the bankers, through careful provisions in the code,  assured  their protection in sharp contrast to 
provisions that relate to the rights and liability of the buyer and the seller beneficiary. Cf E.P.Ellinger, “The 
Uniform Customs and Practice—The 1983 Revision” [1984]L.M.C.L.Q.572 at 583-586; For strenuous 
defence against the charge that UCP 1974 Revision was nothing more than the bankers’ code, see Francis 
de Rooy Documentary Credit (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984) at 16-21. See 
also Clive M. Schmitthoff “International and Procedural Aspects of Letters of Credit” in Norbert Horn (ed) 
The Law of International Trade Finance (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989) at 229; 
E.P.Ellinger “The Law of Letters of Credit” in Norbert Horn (ed.) op. cit. at 203 et seq; 
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among merchants as the more significant financing device for international trade. The 
UCP have been revised six14 times since the maiden edition promulgated in 1933. The 
latest revision came into force in January 1994.15 It currently enjoys world-wide 
acceptability with its adoption by over 180 countries. At this juncture it is necessary to 
investigate the legal status of the UCP, in order to properly answer two important 
questions: the extent to which the UCP constitute a binding source of law and its 
character as rules that are heavily under laid by accretion of the customs and usages of 
the international commercial community.  
 By article 1, the UCP apply to all “documentary credit contracts where they are 
incorporated into the text of the credit. They are binding on all the parties thereto, unless 
otherwise expressly stipulated in the credit.” The implication of this provision is two 
fold. In the first place, the UCP do not enjoy an independent legal force unless the 
documentary credit contract, either explicitly or implicitly incorporates them by 
reference. It is only then that the UCP can take effect as part of the terms of the contract. 
And, like all other commercial contracts, where there is a dispute, the provisions of the 
UCP as they relate to the question before the court, will form part of what must be 
examined.16  
 Not infrequently, bankers either on individual basis or by association, declare that 
they adhere to the UCP. It should be pointed out that such individual or collective 
declaration of adherence is not worth the paper on which it is made. This is because, by 
                                                 
14
 The first revision was in 1951, then 1962, 1974, 1983, and 1993.   
15
 ICC publication N0. 500[hereinafter UCP, except otherwise indicated]. 
16
 As regards the canon of interpreting the contractual rights and liabilities there under, see Robert 
Bradgate, Commercial Law, 3rd ed.(London: Butterworths, 2000) at 798.  
 5 
the express provision of article 117 the UCP are only applicable to the credit contract that 
is made subject to them. This contention finds support in the statement by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, when it said that18 “[t]he application of the UCP 
needs to be agreed by the parties to the documentary credit… that  a party wants to apply 
the UCP, and the other party must recognize and acknowledge this intention.”19 
 It has been argued20 that the UCP “uses (sic) the term ‘custom’ and the related 
term ‘practice’ to refer to what are largely rules fashioned by representatives of a small 
segment of the commercial banking industry”, whereas  the UCP in most cases “conflict 
with industry practice.” The learned commentator relied on two grounds for his 
contention. First, Professor Boris Kozolchyk’s rhetorical question, “international 
banking practices? The UCP is creating it.”21  Second, composition of the working group 
appointed by the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice to draft the UCP 
1993 Revision, Dolan contends, has a lot of biases to recommend it: “Of the ten drafters, 
two were law teachers, one a bank lawyer, one an ICC representative, and the rest 
bankers.”22 
 These views have their attraction, although they tend to the extreme when they 
argue that the UCP is merely a collection of the wishes of a segment of the banking 
community simply because only three lawyers collaborated in the drafting. No doubt, the 
1933 edition as well as the 1962 Revision was completely inspired by an infinitesimal 
percentage of the banking community. But even then, it would be difficult to insist as 




 Hereinafter ICC. 
19
 ICC Publication N0. 633 at 14. 
20
 John F. Dolan “What is the matter with the UCP?” (1999/2000) B.F.L.R.501 at 508. 
21
 See Boris Kozolchyk Documentary Credit Insight (summer, 1997) at 16. Dolan reported that Kozolchyk 
was one of the principal drafters of the UCP 1993 Revision.  
22
 John F. Dolan, op. cit. at 509. 
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Professor Dolan does, that the UCP do no reflect the practical realities of the 
marketplace.23The various revisions of the UCP, it is true, is not free of drafting 
inelegance and infelicity of style. This should be expected having regard to the greater 
desire to codify the general practices and usages of the international business community. 
The UCP, it must be stressed, cannot be conceivably expected to represent a “mirror 
image” of the lex mercatoria.  
 It is not difficult to see the basis of the strictures to which the learned writer 
subjected the UCP. According to the Dolan, “[f]rom the very beginning … bankers, not 
lawyers, have chaired the working [committees] and have been the principal drafters of 
the UCP.”24It is certainly inaccurate to conclude on this ground that the UCP is nothing 
more than the wishes of a negligible segment of the banking community. 
 The UCP, in all its 49 articles, are silent25 on fraud as an exception to the principle 
that the bank is obligated to pay against documents apparently conforming to the terms of 
a credit. So, whether or not the documents tendered by the beneficiary are fraudulent or 
forged does not cut any ice on the payment obligation, provided always that such 
documents, ex facie, meet the requirements of the credit. In the conception of the 
Uniform Customs, though, the payment obligation of the bank is absolute. In this way, 
the Uniform Customs is not a very helpful source of the law on fraud as an exception to 
                                                 
23
 For an excellent survey of the grounds for the initial refusal of Britain and most of the commonwealth 
countries to accede to the 1962 Revision, see E.P.Ellinger, Documentry Letters of Credit—A comparative 
study (Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 1970) at 24. 
24
 See above, n 20, at 510. 
25
 However, the Banking Commission of the International Chamber of Commerce(ICC) has offered an 
explanation to the UCP  silence on the matter of fraud as exception to the autonomy doctrine. According to 
that body, “there is … [fraud] exception in many jurisdictions. … The ambit of the [fraud] exception and 
the ensuing consequences for the beneficiary and/or the nominated bank may differ from one jurisdiction to 
another. It is up to the courts to fairly protect the interests of all bona fide parties concerned.” (ICC 
Publication N0. 565). But the big question is, have the courts been forthcoming in meeting this 
expectation? This question constitutes part of the concern of chapters 2, 3, and 4.  
 7 
the autonomy principle. It appears that the promulgator of the Uniform Customs elected 
to leave the whole question of fraud and fraudulent call under the letters of credit for 
national laws, to which we will turn our attention a little later. If this presumption is the 
reality, it must be a very sensible decision, seeing that what amounts to a fraudulent act or 
forged documents varies considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.   
 
 B. Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
 Although the use of documentary credit was widespread in the United States for 
many years, it was not the subject of any legislation until 1952.26Prior to this period the 
law of documentary credit in all the states in the U.S. was essentially case law underlain 
by an accretion of the lex mercatoria .But, with the increasing use of documentary credit 
as a device for assuring and procuring payment in international sale contracts, the need 
for a regulatory code became obvious.27 So, in 1950, the American Law Institute and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws undertook the task of 
drafting a code that would not only codify the existing case law principles on 
documentary, but also clear away the loose ends of many conflicting and confusing 
judicial decisions.28   
                                                 
26
 See UCC Section 5---101, Official Comment 1. 
27
 See, e.g. James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, “Revision of UCC Article 5” (August, 1995) Bus. Lawyer 
1450, where the authors argue that at that time, in case of dispute, the bankers would ask “What is the 
practice?” and to receive an answer, they would consult other letter of credit bankers and international 
materials published by and for letter of credit bankers; in contrast, the lawyers tended to ask, “What will the 
court say?”, and then proceed to the US case law.  
28
 Wilbert Ward & Morris S.Rosenthal, “The need for the UCC in foreign trade” (1950) 63 Harv. 
L.Rev.509 at 592.  
 8 
 In the end, in 1952, the letter of credit law was codified by Article 5 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code.29 The primary objective of the Uniform Commercial Code 
was stated to be, “within its limited scope” to set an independent theoretical frame that 
describes the function and legal nature of letter of credit and further development and 
efficient use of letter of credit as a commercial device.30 In addition, it made clear “that 
the code is not intended to be exhaustive of the law applicable to letters of credit” 
transactions. 
 In contradistinction to the UCP, which, in the main, reflect international banking 
practice and mercantile usages, most of the provisions in Article 531 codify the case law 
principles prevailing at the time the UCC was drafted.32 In this connection, it is not 
surprising that in 1990 the Report by the American Bar Association Task Force33 on the 
UCC indicated that Article 5 did not reflect letter of credit practice among the 
commercial community. Thus began a revision process that crystallized into the Revised 
Article 5 of the UCC in August 1995. By individual legislation, the Code applies in all 
the states in the United States. 
 The Revised Article 534 reconnects case law and international commercial 
practice in many respects: The UCC expressly provides room for the courts to do a lot of 
gap filling by having regard to international practice and customs.35In the second place, 
                                                 
29
 The Uniform Commercial Code contain 11 articles covering different aspects of commercial law. Article 
5 relates to documentary credit exclusively. 
30




 See, ICC Publication N0. 633 at 120, n.70. 
33
 The Task Force Report was published under the title, “An Examination of UCC Article 5 (Letter of 
Credit) (1990) 45 Bus. Lawyer 1521. See also James G. Barnes & James E. Byrne, op. cit. at 1450, n.7. 
34
 Uniform Commercial Code[hereinafter UCC]. 
35
 See UCC, section 5—103, Official Comment 2: “Even within letter of credit law, the article is far from 
comprehensive … [i]t is appropriate for the parties and the courts to turn to customs and practice such as 
the UCP ……for documentary credit.” 
 9 
the UCC permits parties to a credit to adopt the UCP,36 and vary the effect of Article 5 by 
agreement.37 Thus, if the parties to the credit contract expressly incorporate the UCP in 
the agreement, it only governs the terms that differ from the UCC.38 Unfortunately, in 
spite of the Code some jurists39 entertain the view that the Code is completely overridden 
by the UCP where a credit contract specifically incorporates the latter. This is an 
unfortunate misconception. It is particularly tragic and painful for a defrauded buyer that 
seeks interdiction of the bank’s payment obligations on account of fraud or forgery 
perpetrated by the beneficiary. Indeed, this was precisely the sorry tale of the plaintiff 
buyer in the case to which we now turn.  
 In Mid-America Tire, Inc. v. PZT Trading Ltd.40  the account party buyer raised an 
action for an injunction to restrain payment under a letter of credit on the grounds that the 
seller beneficiary had committed material fraud. The credit was made subject to the 
UCP41 and, that being the case, the seller beneficiary argued, the provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 5, section 5—10942 which interdict realization of a 
credit on account of a material fraud43 were inapplicable.44 Unfortunately, the majority of 
the Court of Appeals of Ohio State accepted this submission and gave judgment for the 
defendant seller. 
                                                 
36
 This has been cynically described as legislative deference to the Uniform Customs” and practice for 
Documentary Credit: John F. Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit, and 1st ed., (Boston: Warren, Gorham & 
Lamont, 1983) at para. 4.05. The learned author reports that the states of Alabama, Missouri, and Arizona, 
by amendment of their UCC, provided that the states’ UCC is inapplicable in the event that the credit is 
subject, in whole or in part, to the UCP. 
37
 The competence to achieve this is severely limited; the parties cannot, for e.g. vary the obligations of 
good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care: UCC section 5—102(3). 
38
 UCC, section 5—116©. 
39
 See, e.g. the dissenting judgment of Pfeifer and Cook JJ. In Mid-America Tire, Inc. V. PTZ Trading Co., 
n.40 below. 
40
 2000 WL 1725415 (Court of Appeals of Ohio). 
41
 I.e UCP 500. 
42
 Formerly section 5—114(2), UCC. 
43
 For a fuller discussion, see chapter two, post. 
44
 This argument was found persuasive both at the trial court and the Court of Appeal. 
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 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and restored the 
judgment of the trial court. Delivering the court’s decision, Alice Robie Resnick J., 
pertinently observed: 
 Where a letter of credit expressly incorporates the terms of UCP, but the UCP does not 
 contain any rule covering the issue in controversy, the UCP will not replace the relevant 
 provisions of R.C. Chapter 1305.45 Since the UCP does not contain any rule addressing 
 the issue of injunctive relief where fraud occurs in either the credit documents or the 
 underlying transaction, R.C.Chapter 1305.08(B)46remains applicable in credit 
 transactions made subject to the UCP. 47 
 
 It appears that the occasion for the controversy whether specific incorporation of 
the UCP rendered inapplicable the UCC Article 5 was the provision of the latter under 
section 5—116(c)48 which enabled parties to a credit transaction in the United States to 
govern their credit contract by the UCP in spite of the Code.49 In truth, though, the 
passage just quoted is the correct statement of the law; where a letter of credit transaction 
is made subject to the UCP, the provisions of the UCC Article 5 are not thereby rendered 
inapplicable, save the very rare cases of conflict between the rules and the Code. In such 
a case, the UCP govern the credit transaction. Since the UCP have no provision on the 
fraud exception to the autonomy principle, the question of conflict between the codes 
does not arise. When the relationship between the UCC and UCP is so conceived, much 
of the confusion and misconceptions that pervade the decision of the Court of Appeals 
would disappear. 50  
                                                 
45
 The State of Ohio reenacted UCC Article 5 as R.C.Chapter 1305. 
46
 This section is identical with UCC Article 5, section5—109(b). 
47
 Mid-America Tire, Inc. v. PZT Trading Ltd , 95 Ohio St 3d 367 (2002) (Sup Ct, Ohio). 
48
 Revised version, 1995. 
49
 See also section5—103©,  by the provisions of the Code may be varied; however, certain subjects are 
non-variable.  
50
 See, e.g., the severe criticism  of  the interpretative approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Mid-
America Tire, Inc. v. PTZ Trading Ltd., 95 Ohio St. 3d 367(Sup.Ct., Ohio, 2002), per Alice Robie Resnick 
J. 
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 In contradistinction to the Code regime in the United States, the position in the 
United Kingdom is entirely governed by case law, to which we now turn.  
   
             C. Case law 
 The role of case law as a source of documentary credit law is best appreciated 
against the background to the formulation and eventual promulgation of the UCC Article 
5 as well as the UCP. In the United States, prior to 1952 when the UCC was enacted, in 
spite of its apparent popularity among the business community, letter of credit was not 
the subject of any statute; applicable law was chiefly developed from judicial 
decisions.51Indeed, in drafting the provisions of the UCC Article 5, the National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute 
were explicit that the code was not intended to be exhaustive, and a fortiori, a variety of 
standard practice and customs as well as a huge body of case law principles cannot 
effectively, or wisely, be codified without stultifying future development in letter of 
credit. The significance of case law in this regard is admirably captured by the decision of 
the Supreme Court of New York in Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation.52 
This case enunciated the inviolability of the principle of autonomy; unless there is fraud, 
the bank may not be enjoined from paying, accepting or negotiating the draft of the seller 
beneficiary under a credit contract. This became known as the fraud exception, with 
which this study is entirely concerned.53  
 In the United Kingdom, and perhaps the entire commonwealth, the relationship of 
case law to documentary credit is underpinned by three significant realities: there is 
                                                 
51
 As to this point, see ante 
52
 177 Misc. 719 31 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1941). 
53
 See chapters 2, 3, and 4 post. 
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virtual absence of legislation on documentary credit; in these jurisdictions much of the 
law on documentary credit is derived from case law.54 A significant example is furnished 
by the leading case of United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of 
Canada.55  The decision of the House of Lord in this case laid it down that unless the 
beneficiary commits wrong doing in, or knows of third parties’ fraud as regards, the 
documents that it tenders for payment, the bank is obligated to honour documents that 
apparently comply with the terms of the credit, and an application for injunction to enjoin 
payment in such a case will not avail the buyer account party. In many respects, this 
decision went a step further than the earlier decisions in the United States, England and 
the Commonwealth in that it blazed a new trail in the apportionment of liability or non-
liability of a beneficiary for the malfeasance of third parties in credit transactions. It must 
be reiterated that, against the foregoing background, the focus of chapter three is a 
detailed consideration of the approach the court should take when confronted with an 
innocent beneficiary that desires to draw on a credit when the documents it tenders, 
unknown to him, are a nullity. 
           D. National legislation 
 National legislation would constitute a source of credit law if a particular 
enactment requires credit contracts within her territorial jurisdiction, to be performed one 
way or other. For instance, the Central Bank of a State may promulgate certain 
regulations, pursuant to an enabling statutory instrument, which directly or indirectly 
                                                 
54
 The civil law jurisdiction similarly presents a spectacularly silent profile on making letter of credit the 
subject of statutory instruments. For an elaborate enumeration of the 170 countries without special national 
law on documentary credit, see ICC Publication N0. 633 at 47 et seq; A.N Oelofse, The Law of 
Documentary Credit in Comparative Perspective (Pretoria: Interlegal, 1997) at 290—291, nn.105—107. 
See further, Hardenberg, “First Demand Guarantees: Recent Developments in the Netherlands” [1996] Int’l 
Bus. Lawyer 380.   
55
 [1983] 1 A.C.168, HL.  
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impinge upon the bankers’ competence to transact in foreign currency. Indeed, this 
possibility is currently undergoing dramatic presentation in Nigeria: pursuant to the 
exercise of its powers under the Central Bank Decree56 the Central Bank of Nigeria has 
since February 2002, directed all the banks dealing in foreign currencies, to route such 
transactions through the Central Bank Department of Foreign Exchange Control. The 
directive added that any bank in disobedience would pay a fine of two million naira57  or 
suspension for three months or both. So, by such directive, a rigid limitation is placed on 
bank dealings in foreign currencies. And this would have obvious effect on, for example, 
direct transaction between an overseas issuing bank and an exporter beneficiary in 
Nigeria.   
 By and large, special national legislations on letters of credit are very few. Even 
such legislations are substantially consistent with the provisions of the UCP and the 
UCC. But others are significantly at variance with the codes, and may go a step further to 
expressly vary their effect. For instance, Kuwait and Columbia have special enactments 
on documentary credit that contain provisions on revocability of a credit58 in 
contradistinction to the provisions in the UCP, UCC and case law principles.  
 Finally, the view has been expressed that the provisions of the UCP encourage the 
hope that the law of documentary is heading in the direction of harmonization.59 This 
view is correct if other equally significant sources of documentary credit law are 
conveniently ignored. Outside the UCP this view runs into a storm of difficulties. In the 
first place, American case law on the question of a fraud necessitating a deviation from 
                                                 
56
 Decree N0. 24, 1991. 
57
 That is about US$20,000 (#130: $1) 
58
 See ICC Publication 633 at10. 
59
 E.P.Ellinger, “The Uniform Customs—their nature and the 1983 Revision” [1984] L.M.C.L.Q.578. 
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the fundamental principle of independence of credit contract vis-à-vis the underlying 
contract of sale, differ significantly from English courts approach to the same matter. 
Thus whilst the former adopts a broad approach, the latter prefers application of a narrow 
standard.60 Second, as has been seen, national laws differ from country to country, and so 
are legal systems which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In this connection, the 
quality of the contractual obligations assumed by parties to a credit contract may receive 
varying consideration by the courts.61 Third, the banks are required to observe 
international banking practice standard to determine whether a particular presentation 
conform to the terms of the credit or discrepant.62 Both the codes may have eased the 
problem with the entrenchment of certain standard practices and usages; their limitations 
consist in the fact that the codes have never pretended to exemplify statutory or 
regulatory exhaustiveness. So, the question, what is the international standard banking 
practices the banks are expected to observe, is open-ended. In light of the foregoing, it is 
submitted that it is not true that a uniform documentary credit law is fast emerging.   
          E. International convention 
 International convention may constitute a source of documentary credit law. In 
1995, the Working Group on International Contract Practices of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law63 prepared a draft Convention on Independent 
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit. On 11 December, 1995 the UNCITRAL 
adopted and deposited the Convention for signature with the General Assembly of the 
                                                 
60
 This point is treated in greater detail in later chapters. 
61
 Essentially, this problem will not arise between the buyer and the issuing bank because, they normally 
transact with each other in the same country. This position is similar to dealings between the confirming 
bank and the beneficiary.  
62
 See article 14(a), UCP; Section 5—108(e), UCC. 
63
 That is UNCITRAL, an inter-governmental body of the United Nations General Assembly. The body is, 
inter alia, saddled with the responsibility of preparing international commercial law instruments designed to 
assist the international community in updating and fine tuning laws dealing with international trade.  
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UN.64The Convention is designed to facilitate the use of independent guarantees and 
stand-by letters of credit.65 In addition to being essentially consistent with the UCP 
provisions, the Convention furnishes supplementary provisions in a very significant 
respect: to a limited extent, it fills in the unfortunate gap created by the UCP silence on 
the question of fraudulent or forged documents that are apparently in compliance, ex 
facie, with the terms of the credit.66 Quite apart from the elaborate provisions made to 
cover such matters,67 the Convention also made specific stipulations on the power of the 
court to enjoin the bank from making payment to the beneficiary pursuant to an 
application by a buyer. Further, there are other remedies the court may deem fit to order 
in favour of a defrauded party. The applicability of the Convention, as can be seen, is 
severely limited.68 Notwithstanding this short-coming, the Convention is significant in 




                                                 
64
 By Resolution 50/48. As of 13 September, 2004, six countries including the United States have signed 
the Convention. The Convention has taken effect in some these countries: Belarus, 2003; Ecuador, 2000; El 
Salvador, 2000; Kuwait, 2000; Panama, 2000; and Tunisia, 2000. 
65
 Stand-by letters of credit as has been indicated earlier is a variant of documentary credit, though the 
practical mechanism of the latter is different from the former. It is submitted that they attract the 
application of identical principles and rules of law. In any event, by article 2, the UCP also apply to stand-
by letters of credit. On this point, some insights may be gleaned in Barclays Bank D.C.O. V. Mercantile 
National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224; Dynamics Corporation of America v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 
356 F.Supp. 991(1973); Bolivinter Oil S.A. V. Chase Manhattan Bank [1984]1Lloyd’s Rep.251 at 255,per 
Sir John Donaldson M.R. For a detailed analysis of stand-by letters of credit, see Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 
6th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) at para.23—236 at et seq.; Eric E. Bergsten, “A  new regime for 
international independent guarantees and stand-by letters of credit” (1993) 27 Int’l Law. 859; Katherine 
A.Barski, “Letters of credit: a comparison of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform 
Customs for Documentary Credits” (Winter, 1996) 41 Loyola L.Rev.735, n.2.E.P.Ellinger, “Standby 
Letters of Credit” (1978) 6 Int’l Bus. Lawyer 504.    
66
 The UCC covered the matter under Article 5—114(2), now reenacted under Article 5—109 of the 
Revised UCC, 1995.  
67
 See article 20 of the Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, 1995. 
68
 See n.63, supra, for the countries that have ratified the Convention. 
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III. MEANING AND CLASSIFICATION OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 
 A. Definition 
Documentary credit may be defined as an arrangement whereby a bank (called the 
issuing bank) at the request of a buyer (called the applicant or account party), promises, 
either directly or through another bank (which may be called an advising or 
correspondent bank or where it adds its undertaking, confirming bank), a seller (called 
the beneficiary), that he (the beneficiary) will be paid, or that his draft will be accepted or 
negotiated if he presents certain documents that comply with the terms of the credit. 
By article 269 documentary credit means: 
 any arrangement, however named or described, whereby a bank (the “issuing 
           Bank”) acting at the request and in accordance with the instructions of a    
customer (the “Applicant”) or on its own behalf, 
(i) is to make payment to or to the order of a third party (the “Beneficiary”), 
or is to pay or is to accept and pay bills of exchange(Draft(s) drawn by the 
Beneficiary, or 
(ii) authorizes another bank to effect such payment or to accept and pay such 
bills of exchange (Draft(s)), or  
(iii) authorizes another bank to negotiate against stipulated documents, 
provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with. 
 
 By this definition, at least three contractual obligations arise in a credit contract. 
First, pursuant to a sale contract70 the buyer would proceed to a bank in his own country 
to open a letter of credit in favour of the seller exporter. Not infrequently, the bank would 
                                                 
69
 UCP. Section 5—102 (a) (10), Revised UCC, 1995 defines letter of credit as “a undertaking … by an 
issuer to a beneficiary at the request or for the account of an applicant or, in the case of a financial 
institution, to itself or for its own account, to honour a documentary presentation by payment or delivery of 
an item of value.” It appears that this definition is not as comprehensive as the one offered under UCP. 
70
 Usually, in an international contract of sale the buyer and the seller must agree on mode of payment. If 
they agree that payment be made by documentary credit, which is increasingly the case, the buyer would 
take steps to ensure that the type of credit (which in this case may be revocable credit, unconfirmed 
irrevocable credit, and confirmed irrevocable credit stipulated in the sale contract) is opened in favour of 
the seller. Where the buyer fails to meet this obligation under the sale contract, the seller is released from 
his obligation to ship the goods: Trans Trust S.P.R.L. V. Danubian [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 348, at 355—
356, per Denning L.J. (as he then was). See also Gutteridge & Megrah’ Law of Bankers’ Commercial 
Credits 8th ed. (London: Europa Publications, 2001) at 27—34; E.P.Ellinger, Documentary Letters Credit—
A Comparative Study (Singapore: University of Singapore, 1970) at 8  et seq; A.G.Davis, The Law Relating 
to Commercial Letters of Credit 3rd ed., (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd, 1963) at 24 ff. 
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request the buyer to complete an application form for the credit. The application form 
would normally require the buyer to indicate his own name and the name of the seller 
beneficiary, the amount of the credit, the documents71 that the beneficiary must present to 
the bank for payment or in accordance with the mode of realisation of the credit,72 credit 
expiry date, and destination of the beneficiary.73 Further, the application form will 
provide that the buyer will reimburse the bank all their expenses together with a certain 
service charge. 74 
 Once the application form is completed it must be handed in for the bank’s 
consideration. If it accepts, a binding credit contract immediately comes into effect 
between the bank and the buyer. The contract at this stage is to the effect that the bank is 
bound to issue the credit; and, the buyer is similarly obligated to reimburse the issuing 
bank if it transacts in conformity to the terms of the credit.75 The issuing bank, as it is 
now called, then proceeds to advise the opening of the credit, either directly or through a 
correspondent bank76 to the seller. Upon receipt of the advice, the seller—if he desires to 
realise the credit—is obligated to tender documents which conform to the terms of the 
credit; and, the advising or confirming bank is obligated to pay in accordance with the 
credit terms and conditions if it receives from the seller, apparently conforming 
                                                 
71
 Such documents may include bill of lading, invoice, and certificate of insurance, certificate of weight, 
certificate of quality, certificate of quantity, and certificate of inspection. As to an instructive and 
enlightening caution against use of ambiguous term, e.g. “certificate of inspection”, see E.P.Ellinger, 
“Strict compliance with the terms of a documentary credit”, Note (1964) 6 Malaya L.Rev.417 at 422.  
72
 This may be cash payment, deferred payment, payment by acceptance of bills or drafts drawn by the 
beneficiary, or payment by negotiation of the bills or draft so drawn.  
73
 Gutteridge & Megrah’s Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credits, op. cit. at 56. 
74
 Such service charge varies and substantially depends on whether the credit is revocable, irrevocable 
unconfirmed, or irrevocable confirmed. The latter is the costliest among the three types, and, as to the 
reasons, see post. 
75
 Note, “‘Fraud in the transaction’: enjoining letters of credit during the Iranian revolution” (1980) 93 
Harv. L.Rev.992 at 1000 
76
 Correspondent bank and advising bank mean the same thing, and they are used interchangeably 
hereinafter. 
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documents. At that stage, except on account of fraud, the advising or confirming bank 
cannot be enjoined from making payment in accordance with its undertaken to the seller, 
and, a fortiori, assurance of payment constitute the whole purpose of the entire credit 
transaction. 
 Arguably, the most critical obligation of the bank is the duty to pay against 
complying documents. Conversely, if the documents presented by the beneficiary are 
discrepant, and payment is made, the bank making the payment loses its right to seek 
reimbursement from the issuing bank.77However, the paying bank is protected if, 
unknown to him, the documents against which he made payment are tainted with fraud or 
forgery, provided the documents are on their face compliant with the requirements of the 
credit.78 But the bank is confronted with a bewildering dilemma at this point: if it 
wrongfully rejects the documents tendered, it is liable for damages at the instance of the 
seller beneficiary in that it is in breach of its undertaken to make payment against 
conforming documents. The amount in damages will be the sum the seller beneficiary 
ought to realise under the credit. Conversely, if the bank accepts non-conforming 
documents, the buyer may disown liability for the sum paid out under the credit.  
 Not infrequently, the bank may be notified by the buyer that the seller beneficiary 
has perpetrated fraud in the underlying contract of sale, and, that regardless of a 
conforming tender of documents, fulfilment of the bank’s payment obligation under the 
credit will oil the fraudulent engine of the seller beneficiary. Here again, the bank will be 
between the Scylla of a wrongful dishonour, if it turns out that the allegation of 
malfeasance has no basis, and the Charybdis of wrongful honour if subsequent events 
                                                 
77
 Article 14, UCP. 
78
 UCC Article 5 section 5—109(a). 
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show that the allegation of fraud ought not to have been neglected after all. The legal 
implications of the bank’s dilemma will be examined in greater details in chapter two.   
 B. Classification  
 Classification of documentary credits is necessary for a number of reasons: First, 
clear categorisation will make for a better understanding of the legal nature of the 
payment obligations of the bank in relation to whether the bank has assumed “a definite 
undertaking” to make payment under the credit in accordance with the credit terms. 
Second, an exposition of the documentary credit categories will furnish us a clear picture 
of the various modes by which payment may be effected, especially under the UCP. To 
be sure, this will provide us with the necessary background to a detailed critiquing of the 
circumstances that nurture the cardinal principle that the bank is only concerned with 
documents and not with the underlying contract of sale. Third, classification of 
documentary credit reveals the function, form, and practical mechanism of the credit 
transaction into which the parties have entered. 
1. Revocable and Irrevocable credit 
By article 6(a) of the UCP, a credit may be either 
i. revocable, or 
ii. irrevocable. 
All credits are required to clearly indicate whether they are revocable or irrevocable.79 In 
the absence of such indication, the credit will be presumed to be irrevocable.80 A 
                                                 
79
 Article 6(b), UCP. 
80
 This provision reversed the presumption of revocability under article 7(3) of the 1983 Revision, i.e. UCP 
400. Quaere ,prior to the enactment of the presumption under section 5—106(a) of the Revised UCC,  
American case law established the proposition that unless a credit indicated that it was revocable, all credits 
were presumed to be irrevocable: see, e.g. Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 216 N.Y.S. 225 (1926); Corpus Juris 
Secundum, N0.177, at 386. Canadian text writers agree with this position: Lazar Sarna, op.cit. 1—9. 
Perhaps for this reason, Ellinger argues that the presumption of irrevocability in the UCP derives from 
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revocable credit is subject to amendment or cancellation by the issuing bank at any 
moment and without prior notice to the beneficiary.81 Indeed, it has been held in Cape 
Asbestos Ltd. V. Lloyd’s Bank Ltd.82that a revocable credit did not create any contractual 
relationship between the issuing bank and the seller, and a fortiori the issuing bank owes 
no obligation to notify the beneficiary that the credit has been cancelled. In this 
connection, it may happen that a beneficiary has shipped goods pursuant to his agreement 
with the buyer applicant that the sale contract would be financed by a revocable credit. 
Having shipped the goods, the beneficiary seller proceeds to tender documents which the 
terms in the credit require. At the banking hall, the beneficiary may be confronted with 
the rude shock that the credit has been revoked.  This would leave the beneficiary with 
the painful choice of proceeding against the buyer for payment of the price in the buyer’s 
country. In this way, revocable credit offers little or no security and virtual absence of 
payment assurance to the beneficiary. For these reasons, revocable credit is considered to 
be “practically worthless”83 and, hence rarely utilised by international merchants.84 
Although a revocable credit may be amended or cancelled at any time, an issuing bank 
must reimburse another bank who has been instructed to make available for sight 
payment, acceptance or negotiation, a revocable credit in favour of a beneficiary, if such 
                                                                                                                                                 
American authorities: Chitty on Contracts, 28th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999)  para.34—407, 
n.41, citing in support of his view West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Sroka, 415 F.Supp. 1107 
(1976). See also Paget’s Law of Banking, 12th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) para. 35—38. 
81
 Article 8 (a), UCP. 
82
 [1921] W.N.274. See also International Banking Corp. V. Barclay’s Bank Ltd.(1925) 5 legal Decisions 
Affecting Bankers 1, CA; Sassoon & Sons. Ltd. V. International Banking Corp. [1927] A.C.711, PC. 
83
 Robert Bradgate, Commercial Law, (3 rd ed., London: Butterworth’s, 2000), 785 citing Bailhache J. in 
Cape Asbestos Co. Ltd. V. Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. [1921] W.N.274 at 278. See generally, Lazar Sarna, loc. cit.; 
Paget’s Law of Banking, (11 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 623.  
84
 It is noteworthy, however, that this study will not be concerned with revocable credits.   
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bank has made any payment as instructed prior to receipt of notice of cancellation or 
amendment of the credit. 85 
 By article 9(a)86, an “irrevocable credit constitutes a definite undertaking of the 
issuing bank”, provided that the beneficiary furnishes documents in conformity with the 
terms of the credit, to pay in accordance with the mode of payment stipulated in the credit 
contract. Thus, if the credit provides for payment at sight, the issuing bank undertakes to 
pay the beneficiary cash on presentation of the required documents;87 if the mode chosen 
is deferred payment, to pay on a determinable future date; if it is acceptance credit, to 
accept the bills(drafts) drawn by the beneficiary if the credit provides that they should be 
drawn on the issuing bank, or if the bills are to be drawn on another bank, the issuing 
bank undertakes to accept and pay such bills at maturity;88  or if the credit provides for 
negotiation, the issuing bank undertakes to pay bills drawn by the beneficiary without 
recourse to drawers.89 Further, an irrevocable credit cannot be amended or cancelled 
unless all the parties to the credit contract agree inter partes.90  
 
2. Confirmed and Unconfirmed credit 
Where the issuing bank instructs another bank, usually in the beneficiary’s country, to 
notify the opening of a credit to the beneficiary and to pay under the credit if the 
                                                 
85




 Art. 9(b)(i), UCP. 
88
 Art 9(a)(iii), UCP. 
89
 Art.9(a)(iv), UCP. 
90
 Art. 9(d)(i), UCP. In contradistinction to revocable credit, the beneficiary needs to consent to any 
amendment or revocation, otherwise it is invalid. The phrase underlined require some explanations:  article 
9(d)(i) does not consider the consent of the buyer applicant necessary for any amendment or revocation of 
the credit. It is submitted that this is an unfortunate omission, and indeed, it would be more commercially 
sensible to include the buyer applicant in the provision, since it is the buyer that will ultimately bear the 
cost of the credit: Raymond Jack, et al, Documentary Credits, (3 rd ed., London: Butterworths, 2001).  
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potentially tendered documents conform to the terms in the credit, either of two legal 
consequences may ensue: if the issuing bank only requests advising bank to advise the 
beneficiary of the opening of the credit, without engagement on its part to make payment, 
the credit is considered to be “unconfirmed.” In this case, the advising bank is merely 
acting as agent vi-a-vis the issuing bank, who is its principal. If the advising bank does 
not only advise the opening of the credit to the beneficiary but adds its promise that the 
beneficiary will be paid in accordance with the tenor of the credit, then the resulting 
credit is “confirmed.” Thus, it is apparent that the status assumed by the advising bank in 
documentary credit transactions essentially determines whether an irrevocable credit is 
confirmed or unconfirmed.91 
 By article 9(b)92 a confirmation by the advising bank constitutes a definite 
undertaking in addition to that of the issuing bank, to pay cash, or to accept, or negotiate 
bills against documents that meet the requirements of the credit. Given the confirmation 
of the advising bank, the beneficiary is assured of the reliable “paymasters”, one in his 
own country, and the other in the buyer’s country, that provided it tenders complying 
documents, it would be paid having regard to the mode of payment stipulated in the 
credit.93   
 A confirmed letter of credit is by far preferable to the unconfirmed version. But, 
in the majority of cases the latter is frequently utilized by the international merchants. 
The reason for this is that unconfirmed credit is far less expensive. However, where the 
size of the transaction is substantial, the seller beneficiary will most certainly desire a 
                                                 
91
 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (6 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) at para. 23—053. 
92UCP.  
93
 Depending on whether the credit provides for sight payment, deferred payment, acceptance payment or 
by negotiation. As regards the meaning of these terms, see discussions above. 
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confirmed credit, particularly where the financial status of the issuing bank is considered 
with a lot of reservation by the seller beneficiary.94 Notwithstanding the financial 
implication of opting for confirmed credit, its chief merit consists in affording the 
beneficiary a “potential debtor” in his own country.  
 It is interesting to note that a defrauded buyer who desires to make application to 
court for an injunction to enjoin payment under a confirmed credit will meet a procedural 
stone-wall in his way. The barricade is erected by the privity of contract doctrine. The 
contract between the confirming bank and the seller beneficiary, as already indicated in 
the foregoing, essentially creates a privity that shuts out the buyer account party. While 
the buyer account party is perfectly entitled to initiate litigation against the issuing bank, 
he will not be competent to do likewise against the confirming bank unless the buyer 
account party steps into the shoes of the issuing bank, which has direct contractual rights 
against the confirming bank. The most recent authority for this proposition is 
International Trade Relationship and Export v. Citibank, N.A.95A confirmed credit was 
opened at the instance of the plaintiff buyer by a Tunisian bank, in favour of a company 
in Florida, United States. The credit was confirmed by Citibank, the defendant. The 
objective of the credit was to finance the purchase of goods. The beneficiary seller was 
paid by the Citibank upon the presentation of documents which conformed to the credit 
terms. Citibank was duly reimbursed by the Tunisian bank. The goods were never 
delivered to the plaintiff buyer, whereupon he raised an action against Citibank for 
damages in the sum that had been paid out to the seller beneficiary. The plaintiff buyer’s 
argument was predicated on the grounds that the honour of the presentation was wrongful 
                                                 
94
 Francis Rooy, op. cit. at 37. 
95
 41 UCC Rep. Serv.2d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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having regard to their non-conforming character. In giving judgment for the defendant, 
the court held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against Citibank because 
there was no privity of contract between them; the only privity was between the issuing 
bank and the confirming bank.96 [This discussion will be further developed in chapter 
four.] 
 But the alternative of initiating litigation against the beneficiary seller in the 
latter’s country is fraught with a number of difficulties. First, the expense involved is 
terribly prohibitive. Second, the beneficiary’s country may not be renowned for 
adherence to the rule of law. Third, the seller beneficiary may have in the meantime gone 
into bankruptcy.  It may well be that these are natural risks which most commercial men 
take. But this can hardly be a consolation to the defrauded buyer. Perhaps, the obvious 
choice would be to proceed against the issuing bank. This course has merits if the claim 
of wrongful honour against discrepant tender is sustainable. Otherwise, the ultimate loss 
is solely for the buyer. In this connection, the law as it stands is rather hard on a 
defrauded buyer. What will be wrong if the law presumes the existence of privity, and 
thus enables the buyer to maintain a claim against the correspondent bank? It must be 
stressed that credit transaction is not a one-way traffic; it is often a three-way traffic: The 
seller beneficiary’s assured right to payment provided he complies with the terms of the 
credit—and where payment appears not forthcoming, he is entitled to recover from 
multiple sources;97 the bank’s right to a commission for their services.98 As regards the 
buyer, instead of taking solace in the assurance that if the proper goods  are not delivered 
                                                 
96
 There is also a privity between the seller beneficiary and the confirming bank as well as the issuing bank. 
97
 These include the issuing, and in some cases confirming bank, and the buyer. 
98
 The banks frequently take adequate security for their advances in a credit transaction, either way they 
relish enormous protection from the law. 
 25 
or  upon notice that the seller beneficiary set out, alia intuitu, to hood-wink it by the sales 
and credit contracts, there will be an opportunity to interdict payment, is confronted with 
the bewildering realisation that it is unprotected by the law.     
  
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMY 
The twin principles upon which documentary credit law rests are the principle of 
autonomy and the doctrine of strict compliance.99 By the autonomy principle, a 
documentary credit contract is independent of the contract to which it is related; the bank 
is obligated to pay against documents that comply with the terms of the credit. In this 
regard, the bank is not concerned nor affected by any allegation that the goods, the 
subject matter of the contract of sale, supplied by the seller beneficiary are inferior, 
defective or that they have not been shipped at all; 100the bank must pay in accordance 
with the mode of payment stipulated in the credit, once it is satisfied that the documents 
tendered for payment meet the requirements of the credit. Further, the bank is not 
required to inquire about the sale transaction between the buyer and the seller, to see 
whether the seller has performed the contract; that is not its business.  
 One of the early English cases that recognised the principle of autonomy is Malas 
(Hamzeh) & Sons v. British Imex Industries101 In this case, the buyer account party 
moved a motion for an interlocutory injunction restraining payment to the beneficiary 
seller under the credit on the grounds that the goods delivered were not consistent with 
stipulations in the underlying contract of sale. The motion was granted. But, upon expiry, 
the plaintiff prayed the court for an extension. Rejecting the prayer, Jenkins L.J. said: 
                                                 
99
 The strict compliance doctrine is discussed in chapter three below. 
100
 In that regard the bank is deaf to cries of default: Ibid, at 5—3. 
101
 [1958]2Q.B.127, [1957]2 Lloyd’s Rep. 549. 
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 [I]t seems to me to be plain enough that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit 
constitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods and which imposes 
upon the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute there may be 
between the parties as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. An elaborate 
commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers’ confirmed credits are of 
that character, and, in my judgment, it would be wrong for this court…to interfere with 
that established practice.102  
 
 The principle of autonomy as enunciated in Malas (Hamzeh) is acknowledged by 
the UCP103 and the UCC.104 Article 3(a) stipulates that documentary credits “are separate 
transactions from the sales or other contract(s) on which they may be based and banks 
are in no way concerned with or bound by such contract(s), even if any reference 
whatsoever to such contract(s) is included in the credit.” The banks are not concerned 
with  the underlying contract of sale because “[i]n  Credit operations all parties … deal 
with documents, and not with goods, services … or other performances to which the 
documents may relate.”105    
 But it should be point out that judicial recognition of the autonomy principle pre-
dates their entrenchment in the codes.106 The principle is not unknown in other several 
jurisdictions; it waxes strong in the United Kingdom,107 America,108 Canada,109 Hong 
                                                 
102
 Ibid, at 120. See also the American case of United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 
N.Y. 2d 254 at 259, per Gabrielli J.: “Banks issuing letters of credit deal in documents and not in goods 
and are not responsible for any breach of warranty or nonconformity of the goods involved in the 
underlying sales contract.” 
103
 See,e.g arts.3 and 4. 
104
 The principle is codified by section 5—103(d), UCC, formerly section 5—114(1), of UCC 1952. 
105
 Art.4, UCP. 
106
 That is the UCP and UCC. For an excellent survey of the historical basis of the autonomy principle, see 
Katherine A. Barski, “Letters of Credit: a comparison of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credit” (Winter, 1996) Loyola L.Rev. 735.  
107
 See, e.g. Urquhart, Lindsay & Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd.[1922]1 K.B.318; Malas(Hamzeh) & Sons v. 
British Imex Industries Ltd.[1958] 2 Q.B. 127 at 129, per Jenkins LJ.; Power Curber International Ltd. V. 
National Bank of Kuwait [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 394 at 400, per Griffiths L.J.; Intraco Ltd. V. Notis 
Shipping Corporation of Liberia, The Bhoja Trader[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 256 at 257 per Sir John 
Donaldson L.J;Gian Singh & Co Ltd. V. Banque de I’ Indochine [1974] 2 All E.R.754,PC;United City 
Merchants(Investments) Ltd. V. Royal Bank of Canada[1983] 1 A.C.168,HL. 
108
 See, e.g. Intraworld Industries, Inc.v. Girard Trust Bank 461, Pa. 343, 336 A. 2d 316, 323(1975); Sztejn 
v. J.Henry Schroder Banking Corp. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1941); Dulien Steel 
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Kong,110 Singapore,111 South Africa,112 and Nigeria.113 The principle is also recognised in 
the civil law jurisdictions.114 
 The courts have recognised a number of exceptions to the autonomy principle. 
Public policy of a jurisdiction may forbid the performance or enforcement of 
performance of a contract which underlies a letter of credit, although both contracts are 
separate from each other. Additionally, if the underlying contract is illegal under a 
national law, the principle that the bank is obligated to pay against documents which, ex 
facie, conform to the terms of the credit, and that such obligation cannot be enjoined, is 
displaced. It used be a popular view at one time that credit contract was enforceable by 
the beneficiary against the bank, notwithstanding that the underlying contract is tainted 
with illegality.115 In this regard, Professor Goode116 had expressed the view that “the 
illegality or nullity of the contract of sale does not affect the enforceability of the letter of 
credit” and cites in support Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi v. Finagrain Commercial Agricole 
                                                                                                                                                 
Products Inc v. Bankers’ Trust Co. 298 F. 2d 836, 841 (2nd Cir. 1962); Dynamics Corp. of America v. 
Citizens F.Supp.991, 995—996. 
109
 Global Steel Ltd. V. Bank of Montreal (1999) 50 B.L.R.(2d) 219 (Alta., CA); Lac du Bonnet (Rural 
Municipality) v. Lee River Estates[1999] M.J.N0.324, considered “faithful to the [established autonomy] 
principle” in John F. Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit,1st ed., (Arlington: A.S.Pratt &Sons, 1996) at 7—
8 , cited in Steven P.Jeffery, “Standby Letters of Credit and the fraud Exception—an update” (2002/2003) 
18B.F.L.R.67 at 71, n.9; Davies O’Brien Lumber Co Ltd v.Bank of Montreal [1951] 3 D.L.R.536; Royal 
Bank of Canada V. Gentra (2000) 1 B.L.R. (3 d) 170 (Ont.S.C.J.) [Commercial List], affd. (2001) 15 
B.L.R.(3d) 25, 147 O.A.C.96 (Ont.CA); Angelica—White Ltd  v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1987) 36 D.L.R. 
(4th) 161 (Sup. Ct. C.) ;  
110
 Hing Yip Fat Co Ltd v. Daiwa Bank Ltd v. Sonali Bank[1992] H.K.L.R.35. 
111
 Brody, White & Co Inc v. Chemet Hendel Trading(s) Pte Ltd. [1993] 1 S.L.R.65; Agritrade 
International Pte Ltd. V. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China [1998] 3 S.L.R. 211, where Selvam J. 
said: “The law erects a wall of separatin between the credit contact and the sale contract, so as to facilitate 
the smooth operation of international trade.” 
112
 B & H Engineering v. First National Bank of South Africa Ltd.(1995) 2 S.A 279, per Grosskopf J. 
113
 For e.g., see Union Bank of Nigeria plc. v. Sparkling Breweries[1997] 5 Nigerian Weekly L.R. 344, CA; 
Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa Ltd.[1986] 4 Nigerian Weekly L.R. 273, SC; Union Bank of Nigeria 
Ltd. v. Simon Osazua [1997] 2 Nigerian Weekly L.Rep. 28, CA; Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. B.U. Umeh 
& Sons Ltd.[1990] Nigerian Weekly L. Rep. 565.  
114
 See, e.g Giampieri & Nardulli, “Enforceability of international documentary letters of credit: an Italian 
perspective” (1993) Int’l Lawyer 1013. 
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et Financiere S.A.117  and the decision of Mocatta J. in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd. V. Royal Bank of Canada.118  With respect, the view of the learned 
writer is inaccurate, and Toprak itself no longer represents the law. 
 If there was any grey area on the matter, such was unambiguously cleared in 
Group Josi v. Walbrook Insurance Co. Ltd.119In this case the plaintiff raised an 
application for an order of interlocutory injunction to restrain the beneficiary from 
presenting documents under the credit because the underlying contract was illegal and 
unenforceable under English legislation.120 The principal question before the Court of 
Appeal was: “Can a letter of credit be affected by illegality of the underlying 
transaction?” Their Lordships were invited by the counsel to the defendants to take 
account of the dictum of Lord Diplock in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. V. 
Royal Bank of Canada121 when he said, “there was one established exception” to the 
principle of autonomy, i.e. fraud. Their Lordships retorted that “fraud was not necessarily 
the only exception.”  Delivering the judgment of the court, reversing the decision of 
Clark J., and holding that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment ex debito justitiae, 
Staughton L.J. said: 
  It seems to me that there must be cases when illegality can affect a letter of 
 credit. Take for example a contract for the sale of arms to Iraq at a time when 
 such a sale is illegal. The contract provides for the opening of a letter of credit, to 
 operate on presentation of a bill of lading for 1000 Kalashnikov rifles to be 
 carried to the port at Basra. I do not suppose that a court would give judgment for 
 the beneficiary against the bank in such a case [should the bank decline payment 
 under the credit]. 
 
                                                 
117
 [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.98. 
118
 [1979]2 Lloyd’s Rep.498. 
119
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 345. 
120
 The legislations were the Insurance Companies Act 1982, s. 2,  and Financial Services Act 1986, 
s.132(6). 
121
 [1983] A.C.168 at 182—183. 
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The view of Staughton L.J. was followed in the recent case of Mahonia Ltd. V. Morgan 
Chase Bank.122 
 The more significant and frequently litigated of the exceptions123  is fraud. This 
study will be concerned only with this exception, i.e. that the ground upon which the 
banks’ obligation to make payment against apparently complying documents can be       
enjoined is fraud. What we, therefore, propose to consider in the next chapter are: the 
nature, scope and rationale of the fraud exception, in relation to United States, United 















                                                 
122
 [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 911, per Colman J. See also Marconi Communication International Ltd. V. PT 
Indonesia Bank Ltd.[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.594, David Steel J. 
123
 The exceptions are illegality,  public policy, and fraud. 
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                   CHAPTER TWO 
                       THE FRAUD EXCEPTION 
                          
I. BACKGROUND 
The principle is well established that letter of credit transaction is autonomous of the 
original contract which gives rise to it. The obligations of the parties under the former is 
unaffected by performance or mis-performance of the latter. The chief obligation of the 
bank under the credit transaction is to pay the beneficiary against presentment of 
documents specified in the credit. His function is essentially ministerial, i.e. to examine 
the tendered documents and pay once it is satisfied about their conformance. It has no 
duty vis-à-vis the account party to verify the state of affairs the documents purport to 
represent, by departing from the four walls of the tendered documents to consider 
whether indeed the goods alleged to have been shipped conform to the assertions in the 
tendered documents.1 For this reason, the transaction between the bank and the 
beneficiary has been recognized as document transaction.2 
 Although the beneficiary has no duty to present documents under letters of credit 
transaction, it is settled law that if he desires payment under this facility he must present 
documents that answer the conditions and terms of the credit. The absolute promise of the 
bank to pay in accordance with the dictate of the credit is conditioned upon the 
fulfillment of the correlative obligation of the beneficiary to make a proper tender. Once 
                                                 
1
 Maurice O’Meara Co v National Park Bank of New York, 239 NY 386, 396 (1925). 
2
 “The banker knows only the letter of credit … and the documents which are presented under it. If these 
documents conform to the terms of the letter of credit he is bound to pay. If not he is equally bound not to 
pay”: National City Bank v Seattle National Bank, 121 Wash 476, 483 (1922). 
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he makes conforming presentation3 his right to realize the fruit of the credit is thus 
triggered.  
 But where the buyer alleges fraud, the autonomy principle may be displaced, and 
the aggrieved buyer may request the bank to withhold payment or apply to the court for 
an injunction to enjoin payment under the credit.4 In such a case, the courts’ approach has 
been that “there is as much public interest in discouraging fraud as in encouraging the use 
of letters of credit,”5 and “the courts will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest 
person to carry out a fraud.”6 So, in appropriate cases the court will enjoin payment under 
a credit transaction. A question that has perplexed jurists,7 bewildered text writers,8 and 
                                                 
3
 Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyers’ Title & Trust Co, 297 F 152, 154 (1924). 
4
 His application to the court may be for an injunction to restrain the beneficiary from making a draw on the 
credit. This however does not lower the hurdle for obtaining injunctive order, since, conceptually, an 
injunction against the bank constitutes as much danger to the efficacy, integrity, and reliability of letter of 
credit as an injunction against the beneficiary. See, e.g., Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard 
Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187; Deustsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co 
Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 153, per Philip J, affd sub nom Group Josi (Re) v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd 
[1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345, 361 per Staughton LJ. The contrary view expressed in Themelp Ltd v West 
[1996] QB 84, per Wait LJ is no longer, if ever it were, considered to represent the law, as to which see 
Czarnikow-Rionda, ibid., 190, 197—198, per Rix J. In any event, this point was not brought to Themehelp 
court for determination, and the instant view of Wait LJ does not seem to have inclined the majority to the 
conclusion it reached.      
5
 Dynamics Corporation of America v Citizens and Southern National Bank, 356 F Supp 991, 1000 (1973). 
6
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 184 (HL). 
7
 See, e.g., Malas (Hamzeh) v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 All ER 262; Discount Records Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 1071; Harbottle (RD) (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank 
Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 862; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank Int’l Ltd [1978] 1 All ER 976; 
United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168; Montrod Ltd v 
Grundkotter Fleischvertries GmbH [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 368. As to Canadian cases, see, e.g., Bank of 
Nova Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear Ltd (1987) 36 DLR (4 th) 161; Re New Home Warranty of British 
Columbia Inc [2004] ACWSJ LEXIS 2973, (2004) 130 ACWS (3d) 454; Landmark Leaseholds Ltd v 
Royal Bank (1989) 46 BLR 284, 79 Sask R 38 (Saskatchewan, Queens Bench); Global Steel Ltd v Bank of 
Montreal (1999) CarswellAlta 1008, 50 BLR (2d) 219. Notable American cases include Intraworld 
Industries Inc v Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa 343 (1975); United Bank Ltd v Cambridge Sporting Goods 
Corp, 41 NY (2d) 254 (1976); Ground Air Transfer Inc v Westates Airlines, 899 F 2d 1269, UCC Rep Serv 
2d 177 (1990); Cromwell v Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So (2d) 721(1985); Roman Ceramics Corp of 
America v Citizens and Southern National Bank, 356 F Supp 991 (1973).  
8
 Leading jurists include, E P Ellinger and RJA Hooley, “Bills of Exchange and Banking” in Chitty on 
Contracts vol 2 (29 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), ch 34; E P Ellinger, “Documentary Credits 
and Finance by Mercantile Houses” in Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (6 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002), ch 23; Roy Goode, Commercial Law (3 rd ed., London: Lexis Nexis, 2004), ch  35; Raymond Jack, 
Ali Malek & David Quest (eds) Documentary Credits (3 rd ed., London: Butterworths, 2001), ch  9; 
Schmitthoff’s Export Trade, Leo D’Arcy et al (eds) (10 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), ch 22;  
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learned commentators9 is defining the appropriate circumstances that justify judicial 
intervention by way of injunction or oblige the bank to refuse to pay the beneficiary.10 
 The chief concern of this chapter is threefold. It seeks to explore the ambit of the 
fraud exception, and argue that, in America, contrary to the thinking of some 
commentators, the broad reach of dicta in early cases, and the relevant provisions of the 
UCC Article 5, a beneficiary who in good faith presents requisite documents tainted by 
fraud, has an indefeasible right to demand payment under the letter of credit.  
 Second, the chapter seeks to probe into the proposition that a bank is obliged to 
withhold payment when it knows, by whatever means, that a tendered document is a 
nullity on account of forgery, notwithstanding the innocence of the seller beneficiary. The 
Singapore Court of Appeal has accepted this proposition on the basis, according to the 
court, of “reason and good sense,”11 and thereafter proceeded to create the so-called 
narrow nullity exception. In this respect, the argument canvassed in this chapter has the 
aim of showing that the establishing of a nullity exception, albeit a “limited one,”12 might 
have overlooked certain commercial realities as well as the policy foundation for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gutteridge and  Megrah’s Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credit, Richard King (ed) (8 th ed., London: 
Europa Publication, 2001), chs 4 & 6; Paget’s Law of Banking (11 th ed., London: Butterworths, 1996), 
Chs 37 & 38. 
9
 See, e.g., Stephen J Leacock, “Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of 
Credit” [1980] JBL 291; Robert S Rendell, “Fraud and Injunctive Relief” [1990] Brooklyn LR 111; Clive 
Schmitthoff, “Fraud in Documentary Credit Transactions: Obligation of Bank to pay with Knowledge of 
Fraud” [1982] JBL 319; Steven P Jeffrey, “Standby Letters of Credit and the Fraud Exception—An 
Update” (2002/2003) 18 B&FLR 67; Guy W Lewin Smith, “Irrevocable Credit and Third Party Fraud: The 
American Accord” (1983-84) 24 Virginia J Int’l 55; Dora SS Neo, “A Nullity Exception in Letter of Credit 
Transactions?” [2004] 1 Sing JLS 46; Richard Hooley, “Fraud and Letters of Credit: Is there a Nullity 
Exception?” [2002] Camb LJ 279; “Fraud and Letters of Credit” [2003] 3 JIBFL 91. 
10
 For example, if the account party alleges that the beneficiary is in breach of the underlying contract by 
shipping substandard goods, and that for this reason payment should be restrained, his application for 
equitable relief might be dismissed;  his appropriate remedy is to seek damages against the party in breach, 
and the court might not intervene by injunction to disrupt the bank’s payment obligation under the credit: 
Frey & Son Inc v Sherburne, 184 NYS 661, 664 (1920); Laudisi v American Exchange National Bank, 239 
NY 234, 243 (1924); Benecke v Haebler, 58 NY Supp 16, affd 116 NY 631(1924).    
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narrowing the cases that require the bank to withhold payment. The nullity exception has 
not found favour in the English courts, and the point has not yet specifically arisen for a 
decision in America, Canada, and Australia jurisdictions. But dicta in support of the 
approach taken in England are legion in American and Canadian case laws. 
 A related but more complex problem for inquiry is the right of the bank to recover 
moneys paid out against fraudulent documents, tendered by a party other than an innocent 
beneficiary or immune presenters. The circumstances that entitle the account party or the 
bank to raise an action in restitution will be considered. Where the bank desires to initiate 
a claim for the tort of deceit or for money had and received, the ingredients that will 
make the action competent will be accorded extensive critiquing. The authorities seem to 
suggest that the account party and the bank have a right to recover from the fraudulent 
payee beneficiary. Probably, English and Singapore case law have not distinguished the 
cases where the bank, rather than the account party has the right to maintain a claim in 
restitution. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the cases and draw the requisite 
distinctions in appropriate situations. Where the law appears to be at the crossroad 
specific reform will be suggested.  
 It is proposed to examine, first, the scope of the fraud exception enunciated in 
Sztejn case and its subsequent codification in the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 5 






II. EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF THE FRAUD EXCEPTION 
 A. The Sztejn Case 
Up until 1941 the fraud exception to the autonomy rule was considerably inchoate. The 
more significant cases decided prior to this time conceived of the bank’s payment 
obligation under a letter of credit as a mandate13 given by the account party to make 
payment against a tender of documents stipulated in the credit. In this sense, a tender of 
false documents did not constitute compliance with the terms of the credit,14 and thus 
eroded the authority of the bank to make payment.15 Interestingly, besides the question of 
nonconformity, a tender of false warehouse receipts and bills of lading was in itself 
fraudulent. This point was not emphasized in these cases, and it took the landmark 
decision in Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp to explain the possible grounds that 
might warrant judicial interference with parties’ obligations under letters of credit 
transactions.  
 In Sztejn the facts were that the plaintiff buyer contracted to purchase a quantity 
of hog bristles from Transea Traders Ltd, a corporation based in India. Transea was 
required under the credit to present for payment, upon shipment of the merchandise, an 
invoice and a bill of lading covering the shipment. Transea placed fifty cases of materials 
on board a steamship company and obtained a bill of lading. This document together with 
                                                 
13
 Orr v Union Bank of Scotland, 1 Macq 513 (HL); Bank of Montreal v Recknagel, 109 NY 482, 
 492—493  (1888), where the Court of Appeals of New York explained in the instant case that the mandate 
of the bank was to pay against documents attesting shipment of “manila hemp” and not documents bearing 
shipment of “bales of merchandise” and “bales of hemp”.  
14
 “Obviously, when the issuer of a letter of credit knows that a document, although correct in form, is, in 
point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a document as complying with the 
terms of a letter of credit”: Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyers’ Title & Trust Co, 297 F 152, 158 (1924). 
15
 Higgins v Steinhardter, 106 Misc 168 (1919), where the credit required shipment to be made on or before 
November 7, 1918. Although the goods were shipped in December 1918, the seller procured a bill of lading 
falsely stating that shipment was made on October 30, 1918. In holding for the plaintiff, Finch J observed: 
“It is clear that the plaintiff authorized a credit to apply only to a shipment made on or before November 7  
and …if shipment was made subsequent to that date…payment …would be unauthorized”:Ibid.,169  
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the requisite invoices apparently conformed to the terms and conditions of the credit, and 
was presented to the issuing bank for payment. In an action for a declaration that the 
letter of credit and the draft were void, and for an order of injunction restraining payment 
under the credit, the plaintiff argued that Transea “filled the fifty crates with cow hair, 
other worthless materials and rubbish with intent to simulate genuine merchandise and 
defraud the plaintiff.”16 The Chartered Bank prayed the court to dismiss the complaint of 
the plaintiff on the ground that it failed to disclose a cause of action. After an extensive 
review of the authorities, Justice Shientag reasoned that a letter of credit transaction is 
independent of the contract from which it emanates. This principle does not allow the 
court to injunct the payment obligation of the bank where the buyer account party alleges 
a shortfall or defects in the goods shipped. This rule is necessary to preserve the integrity 
of the trade financing device. However, “the application of [this principle] presupposes 
that the documents accompanying the draft are genuine and conform in terms to the 
requirements of the letter of credit.”17 
 In the instant case, though, the “controversy between the buyer and the seller was 
not concerning a mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of the merchandise.”18 
Rather it was a case of a “seller who has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered by 
the buyer.”19  Continuing, Justice Shientag said: “In such a situation, when the seller’s 
fraud has been called to the bank’s attention before the draft and documents have been 
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 Ibid., 633. 
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 31 NY 2d 631, 634 (1941). 
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presented for payment, the principle of the independence of the bank’s obligation under 
the letter of credit should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.”20 
 The Sztejn decision is, in the first half of the twentieth century, the most eloquent 
articulation of the fraud exception in the law of letter of credit. The Sztejn court did not 
envision a broad rule; the rule does not apply to a situation in which the account party 
merely alleges breaches of warranty in the underlying contract of sale. The complaint of 
the account party was that the seller beneficiary was practising active intentional fraud on 
the issuer by presenting the issuer with fraudulent documents.21  
 It is significant to note that for the purposes of the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of a cause of action, the allegations in the complaint was 
assumed to have been established by the pleadings to test the sufficiency of the facts 
stated in the complaint. The learned judge refused to dismiss the complaint because the 
facts deemed established did indeed, sufficiently constitute a cause of action against the 
defendant. It suffices to stress that although the fraud alleged by the account party was 
established by the pleadings, the Sztejn decision requires allegation of fraud to be 
established to justify interruption of the bank’s payment obligation. 
 More importantly, it seems legitimate to assert that the chief policy underpinning 
of the Sztejn decision is the eschewal of rewarding a fraudulent beneficiary under a letter 
of credit transaction. This is apparently underscored in Ashbury Park & Ocean Grove 
Bank v National City Bank22decided by Justice Shientag a year after he adjudicated Sztejn 




 John F Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit (Revd ed., Arlington, VA: A S Pratt, 2003), para 7.04[2], 7-
58. 
22
 35 N.Y.S 2d 985 (1942). 
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case. Noting23 that “[t]he efficacy of the letter of credit as an instrument for financing 
trade is the primary consideration” for divorcing credit from the contract between the 
seller and buyer, his Lordship asserted that “any other rule would destroy the 
effectiveness of [the] commercial device.” So, the veil of autonomy may not be lifted 
“unless there was such a fraud on the part of the seller that there were no goods shipped 
even though [conforming] shipping [documents] were presented.”24 
 Remarkably, the Sztejn court reaffirmed the pre-existing common law rule that, 
notwithstanding fraud, a presenter who takes the draft in good faith and in circumstances 
that constitute him into a holder for value, is perfectly entitled to receive payment under 
the credit.25 
 
 B. Uniform Commercial Code, Article 5 
  In enacting the common law exception to the autonomy doctrine, UCC Article 5—
114(2) stipulate that:  
 when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of a credit but a 
 required document…is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the 
 transaction…an issuer acting in good faith may honour the draft or demand for 
 payment despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery or other defect 
 not apparent on the face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction 
 may enjoin such honour. 
 
 The main source of difficulties in the above provision has been said to concern the 
identity of the fraudulent party and the locus of fraud. It would seem that the identity of 
the wrongdoer was immaterial; the bank is entitled to refuse to honour a presentation if a 
required document is fraudulent, regardless of whether or not the seller beneficiary is 
                                                 
23




 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp, 177 Misc 719 at 723, 31 NYS 2d 631 at 635 (1941). 
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complicit. In this regard, the UCC fraud exception is broader than the Sztejn fraud 
exception.26It is significant to note, though, the dictum of Mayer Circuit Judge in Old 
Colony Trust Co v Lawyers’ Title & Trust Co,27 cited with approval in Sztejn, which in 
effect is in accord with the fraud exception confines contemplated under that Article 5—
114(2). 
 Essentially, the Code recognised two types of fraud exceptions. First, payment 
under letters of credit may be enjoined if there is “fraud in the transaction.”28 The 
question what this phrase contemplated crystallised into a hotbed of controversies, 
splitting both the courts and learned commentators. One view, i.e. the independent 
obligation disciples, argues that the provision only permits the bank to refuse to pay if 
allegation of fraud is found in the credit transaction.29 In contrast, the broad view 
proponents stressed that the phrase directs that the bank is not privileged to pay if there is 
fraud either in the underlying contract or in the credit transaction or both.30 The upshot of 
                                                 
26
 See, e.g., Stephen J Leacock, “Fraud in the International Transaction: Enjoining Payment of Letters of 
Credit in International Transactions” (1984) 17 Vanderbilt J Int’l L 885, 921. 
27
 297 F 152, 158 (1924). For the dictum, see above, n 15. 
28
 Under Article 5—109(a) and (b), Revised Article 5, this phrase has now been replaced as follows: “If a 
presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of 
credit…but…honour of the presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or 
applicant,” payment may be enjoined. 
29
 Leading light includes Henry Harfield, “Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions” (1978) 95 Banking LJ 
596; John F Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit (Revd ed, 2003), ch 7.  For the cases, see e.g., Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp v Bank of San Francisco, 817 F 2d 1395, 1399 (1987): “[The Bank contends that] 
‘fraud in the transaction’ must mean fraud in the underlying transaction’…It is open to us to reject such 
[submission] and confine ‘fraud in the transaction’ to fraud in the presentation of the required documents”; 
Xantech Corp v RAMCO Industries Inc, 643 NE 2d 918, 921 (1994): “We agree…that the  fraud in the 
transaction’ exception …applies only to those circumstances where a fraudulent credit transaction is 
alleged, as opposed to fraud in the underlying contract”.   
30
 See, e.g., Bossier Bank & Trust Co v Union Planters National Bank of Memphis, 550 F 2d 1077, 1083 
(1977): “The [phrase] seems to cover fraud in the factum and not fraudulently calling the letter of credit”; 
Banque Worms v Banque Commerciale Privee, Irving Trust, 679 F Supp 1173, 1182 (1988): “Fraud in the 
transaction …is limited to situations in which the wrongdoing of the beneficiary has permeated the entire 
transaction” citing Itek Corp v First National Bank, 730 F 2d 19, 25 (1984); TEMTEX Products Inc v 
Capital Bank & Trust Co, 623 F Supp 816, 821(1985): “Fundamentally, ‘fraud in the transaction’…must 
stem from conduct by the beneficiary of the letter of credit as against the customer of the bank”, citing 
Cromwell v Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So 2d 721, 732 (1985) (Sup Ct, Louisiana); NMC Enterprises 
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it is that the position advocated by the broad view adherents found favour with the 
majority of the American courts.31 
 Second, the bank is justified to restrain payment if a document called for under 
the credit is forged or fraudulent,32whether or not the presenting beneficiary is implicated 
in the fraud. The result is that, in relation to forged or fraudulent documents, the Code 
exalts the innocent applicant over the innocent beneficiary.33As will be seen shortly, this 
position does not seem to appeal to some American courts.   
 Practical application of the forged or fraudulent document exception has 
produced three classes of case with considerably disparate problems. In category one, a 
draft is required under a credit to be accompanied by a beneficiary’s certification that the 
account party has defaulted under the contract to which the credit transaction related. 
Often, the beneficiary’s assertion in the certification is clearly untenable and ill-
founded.34 In such a case, the beneficiary’s certification is considered fraudulent, and 
payment under the credit may, therefore, be enjoined.35 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, 14 UCC Rep Serv 1427, 1429 (1974): “[The defendant seller’s 
argument that ‘fraud in the transaction’ is ‘fraud intrinsic to the documents and not to the sales contract 
between the buyer and seller is specious”; Intraworld Industries, Inc v Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa 343, 359 
(1975); Township of Burlington v Apple Bank for Savings, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 8878 (DNY, 1995): “[T]he 
beneficiary’s…active intentional fraud that has permeated the entire transaction”.  See also Note, 
“Enjoining Letters of Credit during the Iranian Revolution, (1980) 93 Harv L Rev 992, 1004: “[T]he 
legislative history of section 5—114(2) indicates that ‘fraud in the transaction’ …meant …the beneficiary’s 
misperformance of the underlying contract.”  
31
 See, John F Dolan, above, n 29; Ho Peng Kee, “The Fraud Rule in Letters of Credit Transactions” in Ho 
Peng Kee and Helena HM Chuan (eds) Current Problems of International Trade Financing (2 nd ed., 
Singapore: Butterworths, 1990), 193; Note, “Letters of Credit: Injunction as a Remedy for Fraud in UCC 
Section 5—114” (1979) 63 Minn LR 487, 501 et seq. 
32
 By Article 5—109(a) and (b), Revised Uniform Commercial Code, “If a presentation is made that 
appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the credit, but a required document 
is forged or materially fraudulent,” the issuer or the court may interdict payment. 
33
 Brooke Wunnick, Diane B Wunnick & Paul S Turner, Standby and Commercial Letters of Credit (New 
York: Wiley Law Publications, 1996), para 7-8, 177. Cf James J White and Robert S Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, Practitioner Treatise Series, vol 3 (4 th ed., West Law Publishing Co, 1995), 185. 
34
 See, e.g., Roman Ceramics Corp v Peoples National Bank, 714 F 2d 1207 (1983), where the certificate 
asserts that invoices are unpaid when they were in fact, paid; Dynamics Corporation of America v Citizens 
and Southern National Bank, 356 F Supp 991 (1973), where the court found that the beneficiary’s 
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 In the second and more complex category, the credit calls for a draft accompanied 
by documents such as a bill of lading, certificate of inspection, certificate of quality, or 
invoice. Assuming that the tendered documents were fraudulent in that they falsely 
misrepresented a state of affairs, e.g., antedating the bill of lading so as to make shipment 
date comply with the terms of the credit, and that the bank had adequate notice of that 
fact before it paid the beneficiary. Indisputably, the bank may be unable to obtain 
reimbursement. This is because presentation of fraudulent documents to the bank 
subverts the commercial viability, utility, and reliability of letter of credit, and what is 
more falsified documents are the same as no documents at all.36  
 The third type of fraudulent presentation concerns circumstances where the credit 
stipulates that payment will be made against presentation of draft accompanied by 
documents evidencing shipment of goods pursuant to the underlying sales contract. 
Fraudulent document exception may apply if the goods are so mis-described by the 
presented documents as to raise the inference that the purpose of the entire transaction 
has been destroyed.37  
                                                                                                                                                 
certification of default “has absolutely no basis in fact” because the equipment the account party contracted 
to supply has indeed been supplied as agreed; Itek Corp v First National Bank of Boston, 730 F 2d 19 
(1984), certification of default in the underlying contract was fraudulent because, pursuant to a force 
majeure clause, the account party was excused from performance owing to the political revolution in Iran, 
and the beneficiary knew this fact; Rockwell Int’l Systems Inc v Citibank, NA and Bank Tejarat, 719 F 2d 
563 (1983), a preliminary injunction was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 
because the beneficiary provoked the default in the original transaction, and attempted “to reap the benefit 
of the guarantee” by making a demand for payment. 
35
 Offshore Trading Co v Citizens National Bank of Fort Scott, Kansas, 650 F Supp 1487, 1492 (1987): 
“The court is of the opinion that a document presented by a beneficiary seeking payment under a letter of 
credit because of a claimed default can be dishonoured as fraudulent if there was in fact no default, and 
that no duty of the customer had even become due. Such a document is patently fraudulent and dishonour 
is therefore appropriate.” See also Emery-Waterhouse Co v Rhode Island Hosp Trust Nat’l Bank, 757 
F 2d 399, 404-405 (1985) (Emphasis supplied). 
36
 Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyers Title & Trust Co, 297 F 152, 156 (1924); Vest-Alpine International Corp 
v Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F 2d 680, 686 (1983). 
37
 See, e.g., Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp, 177 Misc 719, 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941). See also, 
United Bank Ltd v Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp, 41 NY 2d 254 (1976): Seller “shipped old, unpadded 
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 In all these classes of forged or fraudulent documents, payment under the credit 
may be interrupted. Thus, if the account party urges the court to injunct payment on 
account of fraudulent falsification of the specified documents, it, by implication invites 
the court to displace the autonomy principle, and dig into the underlying contract. As has 
been admirably emphasised in Rockwell International Systems v Citibank NA and Bank 
Tejarat:38  
 Fraud…marks the limit of the generally accepted principle that a letter of credit is 
 independent of whatever obligation it secures. No bright line separates the rule 
 from the exception, to be sure, but we agree…that ‘fraud’ embraces more than 
 mere forgery of documents supporting a call…The logic of the fraud exception 
 necessarily entails looking beyond supporting documents…to the 
 circumstances surrounding the transaction and the call to determine whether the 
 call amounted to an outright fraudulent practice.39  
  
  Quite evidently, the fraudulent document exception does not apply where, in 
relation to category one and three, there is legitimate dispute about the quality or quantity 
of goods shipped or there exist some doubt as to whether the event contemplated in the 
underlying transaction has materialised, justifying the beneficiary’s call on the credit. 
Further, in relation to category one, in determining the right of the beneficiary to demand 
payment, the critical factor to consider is whether, in the circumstances, the beneficiary is 
or ought to be aware that it is not entitled to make a draw40 having regard to the original 
                                                                                                                                                 
ripped and mildewed gloves, but presents documents which, nevertheless, represent them as new gloves 
manufactured in accordance with order.  
38
 719 F 2d 583,588—589 (1983), per Oakes, Circuit Judge. See also Eastland Bank v Massbank for 
Savings, 767 F Supp 29, 34(1991) (Dist, Rhode Island): “Massachusetts [Uniform Commercial Code] 
permits, as a narrow exception to the independence principle, an inquiry into the underlying contract to 
search for fraud.”   
39
 This dictum has been followed in Reckon/Optical Inc v Government of Israel, 816 F 2d  854, 858 (1987) 
(US Ct App, 2nd Cir), and quoted with approval in SEMETEX Corp v UBAF Arab American Bank, 853 F 
Supp 759, 773—774 (1994) (Dist, NY). 
40
 See, e.g., Eastland Bank v Massbank for Savings, 767 F Supp 29, 33 (1991): “[I]n order for a document 
to be fraudulent the beneficiary must know that it is false when he presents it to the issuer…Knowledge 
transforms an erroneous document into a fraudulent one”, citing John F Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit 
(2 nd ed., 1991), para 7.04[3]. 
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transaction.41 Second, and most importantly, as regards category two, the perplexing 
question is whether the beneficiary is not entitled to draw down on the credit in all cases 
and in any circumstances where the presented document is forged or fraudulent. The 
American courts have come to grips with these problems.  
 In the New York Supreme Court case of Merchants Corp of America v Chase 
Manhattan Bank42the plaintiff made an application to the court for an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain payment under the credit because the presentation documents, 
including bill of lading falsely showed that shipment was made on January 31, 1968, 
when in point of fact the specified ship only called for loading about February 13, 1968. 
Relying heavily on the decision in Sztejn and the dictum expressed in Old Colony Trust, 
Nunez J granted the plaintiff’s application on the ground that the allegation of forged 
documentation was  not a mere suspicion nor did it involve breach of a warranty in the 
sales contract between the seller and buyer.  
 Regrettably, the learned judge did not expatiate on the reasons for the conclusion 
it reached. Interestingly, in Prutscher v Fidelity International Bank43Bonsal J 
perspicuously observed: “The [Chase Manhattan] court noted that because it was 
doubtful that the beneficiary of the letter of credit could in good faith claim compliance 
                                                 
41
 The courts have not been remiss in holding in deserving cases that a draw on the credit is legitimate, as to 
which see, e.g., 3Com Corp v Banco Do Brasil, SA, 171 F 3d 739, 748 (1999) (US Ct App, 2nd Cir); 
Offshore Trading Co Inc v Citizens National Bank of Fort Scott, Kansas, 650 F Supp 1487 (1987); 
TEMTEX Products Inc v Capital Bank & Trust Co, 623 F Supp 816 (1985); Eastland Bank v Massbank for 
Savings, 767 F Supp 29 (1991), demand for payment was not fraudulent on account of the uncontested facts 
that the account party was in default, and that the beneficiary’s certificate did not seek to draw down funds 
in excess of the maximum sum nominated in the original transaction. 
42
 5 UCC Rep Serv 196 (1968). 
43
 502 F Supp 535 (1980). 
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with the date fixed in the [credit] contract, an express condition of the letter of credit had 
not been [met].”44 
  In Prutscher, the credit required shipment of certain laboratory furniture on one 
ship and specified July 6, 1974 as the latest date of shipment. The seller plaintiff 
presented the requisite bill of lading to the defendant bank for payment. The presentation 
was dishonoured on the ground that the bill of lading was fraudulent in that it asserted 
that the goods were shipped in one vessel whereas shipment was made in three vessels; 
and, contrary to assertions in the document, one of the vessels sailed after the date 
stipulated in the credit. Drawing inspiration from the leading cases,45 and holding for the 
bank, the court opined that “[a] bank which has confirmed a letter of credit is not required 
to honour a draft presented thereunder if the bank receives information to the effect that a 
bill of lading required by the letter is forged or fraudulent and that the presenter is the 
original46 beneficiary or is otherwise chargeable with participation in the alleged 
fraud.”47  
 Significantly, the statement just quoted amply underpins the basis for Judge 
Bonsal’s judgment. It is legitimate to argue that this case exemplifies a watershed in 
mapping the ambit of forged or fraudulent document exception. The spirit of Prutscher is 
discernible in many subsequent cases.48  
                                                 
44
 Ibid, 536. 
45
 Old Colony Trust Co v Lawyers’ Title & Trust Co, 297 F 152 (1924) (Ct App, 2nd Cir); Sztejn v J Henry 
Schroder Banking Corp, 177 Misc 719, 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941); Merchants Corp of America v Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 5 UCC Rep Serv 196 (1968) (Sup Ct, NY County). 
46
 Semble, a comparison is being drawn between an original beneficiary and subsequent presenters, e.g., a 
holder in due course. 
47
 502 F Supp 535 (1980) (Dist, NY). 
48
 See, e.g., American Nat’l Bank v Hamilton Industries Int’l, Inc, 538 F Supp 164, 172 (1984): “A party 
who has knowingly submitted false documents to the issuer presents a classic case of a party with unclean 
hands”. Noting that “American National Bank is still valid authority,” Tauro, Chief Judge, Dist of 
Massachusetts remarked “Boston Hides presents a similar case of ‘unclean hands’” in that the beneficiary 
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 Semetex Corp v UBAF Arab-American Bank 49furnishes the most interesting 
perspective on the proposition that fraudulent documents exception has no application 
where the fraudulent intent of the seller beneficiary is not established. The plaintiffs 
prepared the requisite air waybill issued in blank by the Iraqi Airways. Although the 
defendant bank conceded that the document complied with the credit terms, it 
nevertheless argued that it was privileged to withhold payment because the plaintiffs 
misrepresented the flight information on the air waybill and forged the signature of an 
Iraqi Airways representative by signing the air waybill as agents of the latter, in a 
fraudulent effort to obtain payment under the credit. Having found that in signing the air 
waybill as agents of the Iraqi Airways “evidence of plaintiffs’ fraudulent intent is 
lacking,”50and that the alleged forgery was immaterial, Judge Leonard B Sand 
proceeded to distinguish the instant case from Prutscher as follows: “Central to the 
holding in Prutscher was the fact that one of [the seller beneficiary’s] shipments 
sailed…after the latter of credit’s expiration date, and that [the seller beneficiary] 
falsified [the] bill of lading in order to make it appear that the ship had sailed on time so 
that he could obtain payment under the letter of credit.” 
 Perhaps heeding the caution sounded in Rockwell Int’l Systems,51the learned judge 
observed: “There is no dispute that [seller beneficiary’s supplier] manufactured [the 
                                                                                                                                                 
tendered bills of lading showing consignment of six trailer loads of cowhides to the bank when in fact the 
original shipping documents indicated consignment to some other party: Boston Hides & Furs Ltd v 
Sumitomo Bank Ltd, 870 F Supp 1153, 1163, 1164—1165 (1994). The point has been reaffirmed relatively 
recently in Hyosung America, Inc v Sumagh Textile Co Ltd, 25 F Supp 2d 376 (1998). Cf Siderius, Inc v 
Wallace Co, 583 SW 2d 852 (1979) (Tex Civ App), where the beneficiary obtained a bill of lading reciting 
that goods were loaded on board a vessel by January 15, 1975, when, in fact, loading took place much later 
than this date, and most importantly, evidence established the complicity of the beneficiary in the 
fraudulent documentation, and the court correctly enjoined payment to him.  
49
 853 F Supp 759 (1994). 
50
 Ibid., 775. 
51
 719 F 2d 583, 588-589 (1983), per Oakes, Circuit Judge. As to the caution, see above, at 12. 
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purchased equipment] to [the buyer’s] specifications, and there is likewise no dispute 
that, had it not been for the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Iraqi sanctions orders, 
the equipment would have reached its destination in Baghdad” and ultimately the 
buyer.52It is plain from the forgoing that fraudulent document exception is inapplicable to 
beneficiary who in good faith fills up the requisite documents with information that turn 
out to be false.53 
 A presentation document may be fraudulent without being forged. The cases 
examined thus far are of this variety. It is not certain, though, what effect the American 
courts will accord a forged presentation document, when payment is desired by an 
innocent seller beneficiary. The emerging picture from the cases considered seems to be 
inclined to the direction of allowing a draw in such circumstances. It is safe to advance 
the proposition that, in spite of the overly broad reach of the relevant provision of UCC 
Article 5, some American courts will not interrupt payment to a seller beneficiary that 
nether have knowledge of, nor participated in, forgery of presentment documents.   
 
  C. The Position in the United Kingdom 
English courts have recognised the common law fraud exception enunciated in Sztejn 
case.54 But the first significant attempt to draw the boundaries of the exception was made 
by Megarry J in Discount Records v Barclays Bank.55In this case, the plaintiff buyer 
                                                 
52
 853 F Supp 759, 775 (1994). 
53
 This approach is significantly in harmony with the conclusion reached in a similar situation in England: 
Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH [2001] All ER (Comm) 368.  
54
 See, e.g., Hamzeh Mala & Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd [1958] 2 QB 127, 130 per Seller LJ; 
Harbottle (RD) Mercantile Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146; Edward Owen 
Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1978] QB 159; Gian Singh & Co Ltd v Banque De L’Indochine 
[1974] 1 WLR 1234, PC; Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank [1984]; United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] 1AC 168, HL. 
55
 [1974] 1 WLR 315. 
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sought to restrain the bank from making payment to the seller beneficiary under a letter 
of credit on account of a shortfall in the goods supplied.56Counsel for the plaintiff invited 
the court to take notice of Sztejn case, and hold that the seller beneficiary had set out on a 
mission to defraud the plaintiff buyer by shipping what the plaintiff did not order in the 
underlying contract of sale. Megarry J accepted the invitation but reminded the counsel 
that as in Sztejn, it was necessary to “distinguish between mere breaches of warranty of 
quality from cases where the seller has intentionally failed to ship any of the goods 
ordered by the buyer.”57 His Lordship reasoned that whereas in Sztejn case the seller 
intentionally shipped garbage instead of bristles, “[i]n the [instant] case there is…no 
established fraud, but merely an allegation of fraud.”58Accordingly, the fraud exception 
was unavailing; the court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion with cost in favour of the 
defendant bank. 
 It is noteworthy that another reason for Megarry J’s refusal to issue an injunction 
to restrain payment under the credit is that the draft might have passed into the hands of 
holder in due course. The implication of this is clear: Discount Records court recognised 
the important limitation to the fraud exception articulated in Sztejn as well as cases 
decided much earlier.59 
 Arguably, one of the early English cases to make the most significant 
pronouncement on the scope of the fraud exception is the Court of Appeal decision in 
                                                 
56
 According to the plaintiff, the following were discovered as regards the goods supplied: Two out of 94 
cartons were empty; five cartons were filled with rubbish or packing; 25 of the record boxes and three of 
the cassette boxes were only partly full; two boxes labeled as cassettes were filled with records; instead of 
8,625 records, 825 cassettes ordered, 275 and 518 respectively were delivered.  
57




 As to the cases, see discussion above, 5-6. In relation to a detailed analysis of the rights of a holder in due 
course to demand payment, notwithstanding fraud, see below, chapter four. 
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Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd.60The dispute involved 
reinstatement of an injunction issued to enjoin payment under performance bond61 but 
subsequently vacated by the trial court. In the course of giving the leading judgment, 
Lord Denning MR said: “[The] Sztejn case shows that there is this exception to the strict 
rule [of autonomy]: the bank ought not to pay under the credit if it knows that the 
documents are forged or that the request for payment is made fraudulently in 
circumstances when there is no right to payment.”62This dictum together with the later 
formulation of the fraud exception by the House of Lords in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada63has been considered by some commentators64 
to produce uncertainty on the question whether fraud exception is in England restricted to 
fraudulent documentation or to the underlying contract. A possible suggestion, though, is 
that the words, “request for payment made…in circumstances when there is no right to 
payment”, in Lord Denning, M.R.’s statement just quoted, seems to lead to the 
conclusion that the fraud exception, may well embrace instances of unjustified demand 
for payment unconnected to presentation of documents, and this would cover a fraudulent 
draw under the so-called “clean” letter of credit.  
 Still, as late as 1997 Professor Oelofse took the view that “this aspect seems to be 
far from settled.”65For good measure, this view echoes Lazar Sarna’s sentiments 
                                                 
60
 [1978] QB 159. 
61
 Interestingly, Lord Denning MR noted “that the performance guarantee stands on a similar footing to a 
letter of credit.” And they are governed by the same legal principles. 
62
 Ibid, 169. 
63
 [1983] AC 168, 183, per Lord Diplock, delivering the decision of the House: “[T]here is one established 
exception: that is, where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the 
confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact that 
to his knowledge are untrue.” 
64
 See, e.g., Lazar Sarna, Letters of Credit (3 rd ed., Toronto: Carswell, 1989), para 5—14. 
65
 An Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (Pretoria: Interlegal, 
1997), 406. 
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expressed nearly eight years earlier, that “it was too early to tell whether the English case 
law will evolve in such a way as to restrict the Sztejn principle purely to matters of 
documentary fraud or will permit consideration of fraud in relation to the underlying 
contract.”66 It is true that a literal reading of Lord Diplock fraud exception will sustain the 
doubt expressed by these commentators. But beyond this, the views tend to have the 
capacity to regenerate the anachronism spawned by the debate on the confines of the 
phrase “fraud in the transaction.” If it is remembered that the fundamental policy basis 
for the establishing of the fraud exception is mainly to defeat the consummation of 
fraudulent practice, then it becomes plain that it is impractical to restrict the scope of the 
exception exclusively to either fraudulent document or the underlying transaction. Hence, 
practice of fraud, whether in the credit transaction or the original contract, deserves to be 
checkmated. If the beneficiary ought to be deprived of realising the fruit of the credit 
because to permit him will be to oil his machinery of fraud, then payment under the credit 
must be enjoined. This, it is submitted, furnishes a compelling basis for the proposition 
that the confines of the fraud exception ought not to be so straight jacketed as to 
unwittingly create a loose net for fraudulent design to escape unimpeded.  
 In any event, the Court of Appeal has taken a reassuring step in Themehelp Ltd v 
West.67The plaintiff’s submission that he was induced to enter into the underlying 
contract through fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendant, and that an injunction 
should issue to restrain the beneficiary from drawing down the performance guarantee 
was upheld by the majority judgment. 
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 See above, n 65. 
67
 [1996] QB 84.      
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 A slightly more interesting issue concerns the definitive pronouncement of the 
House of Lords68 on the ambit of the fraud exception regarding a beneficiary who 
presents conforming documents which, unknown to him, have been tainted by the fraud 
of a third party. According to Lord Diplock, the fraud exception only applies “where the 
seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to the confirming 
bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material representations of fact 
that to his knowledge are untrue.”69Notably, the Scottish courts have adopted this 
reasoning.70 
 It is significant to note that in the Court of Appeal the proposition was accepted, 
that if a document although conforming to the credit, is in fact forged by a person other 
than the beneficiary, the bank must restrain payment, and that this applied as well to 
documents which contain false information to the knowledge of the person who issued 
the document, intended by him to deceive persons, including the beneficiary who might 
desire to rely on it.71Lord Diplock rejected this approach which ascribe the same 
consequences to documents rendered a nullity by forgery and documents merely 
fraudulent in that it contain false information. His Lordship felt that the bill of lading in 
the instant case was far from being a nullity, and could appropriately trigger payment 
under the credit. On the question whether a worthless document could attract the same 
result, Lord Diplock hinted that the beneficiary who is not complicit in the forgery should 
not be in any worse position than a person who has taken a draft in circumstances that 
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 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 169. The loading brokers, 
not acting for, and unknown to, the beneficiary, fraudulently represented in the bill of lading required under 
the credit that shipment was made on December 15, when in fact the ship did not sail with the goods until 
December 16. Also, the document asserted that the goods were shipped in London instead of Felixstowe.    
69
 Ibid, 183. 
70
 Centri-Force Engineering Ltd v Bank of Scotland [1993] SLR 190. It was followed seven years later by 
the Court of Session in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Holmes [1999] SLR 563.  
71
 United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] 1 QB 209, 239. 
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make him a holder in due course. Nevertheless, the precise character of the right of an 
innocent beneficiary to call on a credit, when the presented document is a nullity because 
unknown to him it was forged by some third party, remained a moot point for nearly 
twenty years until the decision in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH72 
was passed. The implication of this decision and the extent to which it has reverberated in 
other jurisdictions will be analysed in greater detail a little later. Suffice it to say, though, 
that several American cases considered earlier frown upon restraining payment against a 
presentation that is tainted by fraud when the beneficiary’s bona fides is established and 
his fraudulent intent is completely lacking. In this connection, it is arguable that the 
decision of the House of Lords in United City Merchants on the question as to the right of 
an innocent beneficiary to realise a credit when the documents he tenders are fraudulent 
appears to have support, rightly in my view, in some American courts. 
 
 D. Canadian Cases      
 The emergence of the fraud exception in Canadian courts owes much to its development 
and application by a long line of American and English cases. As in the American and 
English courts, the Canadian judges continue to wrestle with defining the precise ambits 
of the fraud rule. The Canadian courts have been concerned to ensure that the autonomy 
of the bankers’ payment undertaking undertakings under letters of credit is not exploited 
to perpetrate fraud. Cases on standby letters of credit, performance bonds and guarantees, 
have prominently displayed this objective, especially in relation to answering the 
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 [2002] 1 All ER (Comm)257, affg in part [2001] All ER (Comm) 368. 
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complex question of mapping out the circumstances that constitute a fraudulent demand 
for payment.73 
 Prior to 1987, the Canadian courts seemed to have doubted the proposition that 
the fraud exception is limited to fraudulent documents tendered by the beneficiary to the 
bank to obtain payment in accordance with the terms of the credit. The British Columbia 
case of Henderson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce74 is directly in point. The 
plaintiff arranged an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of Catalina Productions Inc, as a 
collateral security for the plaintiff’s obligation to pay the purchase price of a unit 
entitlement in twenty episodes of two television shows. The beneficiary attempted to 
draw down on the credit notwithstanding that the television shows failed to hold. In a 
motion to enjoin payment, Berger J accepted the “classic statement of the [fraud] 
exception espoused in Sztejn  together with the interpretation given to it in Edward Owen 
Engineering Ltd, and  held that  since “the shows had not been produced,” the receiver’s 
call on the credit was “utterly without justification.” The learned judge thought that the 
ambit of the fraud exception as decided by the House of Lords in United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada75 denotes unduly narrow confines which he 
would not follow. His Lordship explained:  
Lord Diplock [i.e. in United City] has rendered the [fraud] exception in language 
that would limit it to cases where there is material misrepresentation of fact in the 
call documents. If the exception is to be understood in this way it means that the 
exception will be narrowed to the point of virtual insignificance…and [thus] 
becomes illusory. 
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That statement sounds reasonable and compelling. But the point must be made that unlike 
the situation before Berger, J., Lord Diplock was concerned with a documentary letter of 
credit where documents play a prime role. Moreover, the English Court of Appeal in the 
Themehelp case leaves no doubt that the beneficiary is disentitled to receive payment if a 
an allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation of facts in the underlying contract is 
established against him. 76   
 Perhaps, the most significant illustration of the scope and nature of the fraud 
exception in Canadian jurisprudence on letters of credit transactions is Bank of Nova 
Scotia v Angelica-Whitewear.77 G issued an irrevocable letter of credit at the request of B 
in favour of S to finance supply of certain goods. The letter of credit was a negotiation 
credit. D was the negotiating bank. After the payment of the first draft, B informed G on 
August 2, 1974 that the signature on one of the documents was a forgery. G in turn 
requested D to withhold payment. Nevertheless, D replied that it had negotiated the 
second draft as of July 30, 1974. After repeated demands, G, through its correspondent 
bank paid D, the negotiating bank. Thereafter, G initiated an action against B to recover 
the value of the draft it had paid. B rested his counter-claim on the grounds, among other 
things,78 that the prices in the invoice were fraudulently inflated, and, having received 
notice of fraud, G ought to withhold payment of the second draft. 
 After an extensive review of the authorities including English and American 
cases, Le Dain J acknowledged that the “international commercial utility and efficacy” of 
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letters of credit underpinned the doctrine of autonomy,79 but asserted that the exception to 
this rule requires that the bank need not pay or it may be injuncted on the ground of 
fraud. His Lordship determined that the success of a claim based on allegations of fraud 
turned on several issues. The most important of the issues seem to be: first, whether the 
exception should be limited to the letter of credit contract or extended to the underlying 
transaction; second, the standard of proof of fraud;80 three, the immune status of a holder 
for value;81 and, finally, the effect of fraud on the beneficiary. 
 In relation to the first question, Le Dain J stated, “the fraud exception to the 
autonomy of documentary letters of credit should not be confined to cases of fraud in the 
tendered documents but should include fraud in the underlying transaction of such a 
character as to make the demand for payment under the credit a fraudulent one.”82 His 
Lordship pointed out that this conception of the exception would embrace any act of the 
beneficiary of a credit which, if he is allowed to draw down on the credit, would be to 
reward fraud.   
 The proposition is on the surface salutary. A close look will reveal that it poses 
complex problems for the bank, which, upon receipt of allegation of fraud, has to decide 
within a limited time, whether to disregard the allegation and honour the credit or respect 
the allegation and deny payment. It is not certain how the bank will determine whether 
the beneficiary, in requesting for payment, is acting fraudulently or that he has no right to 
make a demand for payment. It would seem that the answer to this difficulty would be to 
eliminate the power of the bank to dishonour payment. If the buyer desires restraint of 
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payment upon allegation of fraud, it ought to be that the only route open to him is an 
injunction.  
 A slightly more interesting but less troublesome development in the Canadian 
jurisprudence is the restriction of fraud exception to the fraudulent beneficiary. A 
beneficiary is entitled to draw down on the credit regardless of fraudulent documents 
unless such documents were prepared in circumstances that question the innocence of the 
beneficiary.83 The Alberta Court of Appeal dramatically applied this proposition in 
Global Steel Ltd v Bank of Montreal.84 The seller beneficiary, Cadogan, was required 
under the credit to present, among other things, mill test certificates. Cadogan obtained 
by purchase from one The Republica (the manufacturer) the goods, steel piping, together 
with the mill certificate which attested that the product complied with the requisite 
international standards and specifications. Global Steel Ltd subsequently discovered that 
the mill test certificate misrepresented the quality of the steel piping. In an application to 
vacate the injunction enjoining payment under the credit, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
thought that the only issue for determination was whether Cadogan had been fraudulent 
in the underlying transaction to deprive him of the fruits of the credit. Relying on United 
City Merchants85 as explained in Angelica-Whitewear,86 their Lordships determined “that 
the fraud exception did not apply to fraud by a third party of which the beneficiary of the 
credit was innocent.” Specifically, they noted that “the fraud alleged was falsification of 
the mill test certificates [by the manufacturer]. There was no evidence that [the 
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beneficiary] was involved in any way in their preparation.” In the circumstance, “[i]n the 
absence of any relationship which would have the result of tainting [the beneficiary] with 
the alleged fraud of Republica…there is no foundation for the injunction granted” in the 
court below.  
 It seems plain that the Canadian court will only interfere with the payment 
obligations of the bank within narrow confines: The bank is only privileged to withhold 
payment against presentation of fraudulent documents, when the presenter is complicit in 
the fraud. Further, the fraud in the documentation must be material to have a nullifying 
effect on the bank’s payment obligation. The Bank of Montreal court hinted this point 
when it found that “some of the tubing supplied…had ruptured under pressure that were 
substantially lower than the pressure for which [it had been certified]”87 Unfortunately, 
the court failed to determine the materiality of the fraud. The fraud alleged concerned 
“some of the tubing”, not “all of the tubing.” Consequently, it is difficult to assert the 
materiality of the fraud that warranted the refusal of the Court of Appeal to vacate the 
injunction. For the future, it is suggested that the court should ascertain the weight of the 
allegation of fraud. Otherwise, cases of mere breach of warranty, as in Bank of Montreal, 
will be wrongly transposed to fraudulent misperformance of the original contract. 
 
 III. THE RIGHT OF THE BENEFICIARY WHEN A PRESENTATION 
DOCUMENT IS FORGED AND A NULLITY 
Presentation document under letter of credit may be a nullity for a variety of reasons. 
Typically, a document may purport to be issued by a third party that is fictitious, or exist 
but did not execute or authorize the execution of the document. For example, a bill of 
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lading or an air waybill bearing the letterhead of an existing shipping office or airline 
would be a nullity if it is created by a third party having no authority.88 Where the credit 
calls for a certificate of inspection, certificate of quantity or quality, the document will be 
a nullity if it purports to have been executed by an agency whose signature is forged. In 
such cases, the document lacks any legal force; it is a waste paper. Nevertheless, in 
United City Merchants, Lord Diplock thought that such a document might trigger 
payment to a beneficiary who is innocent of the forgery. Nearly twenty years later, it took 
the decisions in Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH89to convert this 
possibility into a legal certainty.  
 In Montrod the credit called for a certificate of inspection executed by the 
plaintiff account party. But, the seller beneficiary, acting in good faith, signed the 
document, and proceeded to tender it for payment. In an action to deny liability for 
payment made under the credit, the plaintiff account party contended that the requisite 
document was a forgery and a nullity in that he did not sign it. In making a submission 
for the establishing of nullity exception, counsel for the plaintiff raised the argument that 
the bank is not obliged to pay against a document which by reason of forgery, is a nullity, 
regardless of the beneficiary’s innocence or knowledge of the fraud. Judge Raymond QC 
unhesitatingly dismissed this submission, and ruled that “the nullity exception should and 
does form no part of English law.”90 The Court of Appeal affirmed, in part91 the trial 
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court’s decision. However, drawing inspiration from the Singapore case law,92 Potter LJ 
stated that in certain cases payment might be enjoined if the conduct of a seller 
beneficiary in connection with the creation of the fraudulent documents, though not 
amounting to fraud, could impair his right to call on the credit.93 It is submitted that the 
approach taken by the English courts is to be welcomed in letter of credit law. 
 In a relatively recent criticism of the English courts approach to the effect of a 
forged document in letters of credit transactions, a learned commentator argues that “the 
Montrod decision seems to tolerate the circulation of forged documents in international 
trade.”94With respect, this view is unsound for at least two reasons. First, the sentiment 
that it is more important to prevent “circulation of forged documents” than encourage the 
bank to honour its absolute payment commitment to an innocent beneficiary, however 
pious that sentiment may be, completely wrong foot the fundamental principle that 
govern letters of credit transactions.95 One of such established principles is that the 
beneficiary will receive payment provided he presents specified documents, which, ex 
facie, conform to the terms and conditions of the credit. Perhaps for this reason, and in 
spite of the apparently broad provisions in the UCC, a fair stream of American 
decisions96 insist that the bank is privileged to withhold payment against a forged 
document only if the circumstances show that the beneficiary has no right to realize the 
credit. The essence of the fraud exception is to prevent unjust exploitation of the device 
by a dishonest beneficiary. The learned writer seems to have overlooked the emerging 
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trend correctly endorsed by the English courts, that in letters of credit litigation involving 
presentation of forged documents, the paramount question is not whether the presentation 
ought to be “tolerated”, but whether the beneficiary presenting the forged document has 
an ethical97 and legal basis98 for calling on the bank to make payment. Second, generally, 
the bank is not entitled to pay against fraudulent documents. But he is obliged to pay if a 
certain class of presenters demands payment.99For example, the bank cannot resist 
making payment to a nominated person who has given value in good faith and without 
notice that the documents are forged or fraudulent. Surely, the essential nature of letters 
of credit requires toleration of “circulation of forged documents” in certain 
circumstances. It is submitted that one of such circumstances justifiably embraces a 
request for payment by an innocent seller beneficiary. In any event, to assert that 
presentation of forged documents invite restraining payment regardless of the guilt or 
innocence of the beneficiary is to exalt fussy legalism above the commercial expedience 
of preserving the narrow basis for enjoining payment under letter of credit; it constitutes  
undue incursion into the autonomy principle.  
 Apparently, the Singapore courts have affirmed the policy considerations 
underlying narrowing the cases for precluding payment to the beneficiary. It is 
recognized in this jurisdiction, therefore, that the court has a duty to foster unhindered 
flow of finance through the utility of letters of credit, unless the result will be to reward 
fraudulent conduct. But the recent case of Beam Technology (mfg) Pte Ltd v Standard 
Chartered Bank100 seems to have whittled such judicial perception of the role of letters of 
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credit in international commerce. Because of the centrality of the case in the Singapore 
jurisdiction, a detailed consideration of that case is warranted. 
 In Beam Technology101 the credit, issued to finance purchase of certain electronic 
components, called for presentation of full set of clean air waybill, issued by a freight 
forwarding company known as “Link Express (S) Pte Ltd.” The seller beneficiary 
tendered the requisite documents. The bank rejected them by asserting that the air waybill 
was a “fabricated document” issued by a non-existent company. The plaintiff initiated an 
action against the bank. The principal question before the Court of Appeal for 
determination was whether the defendant bank was entitled to withhold payment under 
the credit when the requisite document, an air waybill, purportedly issued by a freight 
forwarding company called “Link Express (S) Pte Ltd” was a pure fabrication because no 
such issuing company existed. 
 Delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal, Chao Hick Tin JA reviewed the 
leading English cases102 on the effect of forged documentation in letters of credit 
transactions, and proceeded to distinguishing the instant case from the conclusion reached 
in Montrod case, thus: “[In Montrod] the certificate required was not an essential 
document but one touching on the question as to the quality of the goods sold.” With 
respect, this is not true. Although named an inspection certificate, the fact of the matter is 
that the document had nothing to do with certifying quality of goods. Rather, the account 
party had intended to utilize the document “as a ‘locking clause,” i.e. to be put in fund by 
the buyer as a condition precedent to creating and executing the certificate. Insofar as the 
                                                 
101
 [2002] 2 SLR 155. 
102
 See, e.g., Gian Singh & Co Ltd v Banque de L’Indochine [1972-74] SLR 16; United City Merchants 
(Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada [1982] 1QB 208, CA, revd [1983] AC 168, HL; Montrod Ltd v 
Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs-GmbH [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 368, revg in part, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 
257, CA. 
 60 
parties were concerned, the document was perfectly material. Absent a tender of the 
document, the seller beneficiary would be unable to call on the credit. 
 Perhaps, the feature that best distinguishes Montrod from the instant case is the 
character of the creating entity. In the former situation, the document was not a nullity 
but merely unauthorised103 whilst in the instant case the document is a product of a non-
existent company.104 
 The result is that the Court of Appeal did not question any of the English 
decisions cited before it, but considered that “the issue [for determination] must be 
approached on first principles.”105 According to the court,  
 While the underlying principle is that the negotiating/confirming bank need not 
 investigate the documents tendered, it is altogether a different proposition to say that the 
 bank should ignore what is clearly a null and void document and proceed nevertheless to 
 pay. … [T]o say that a bank, in the face of forged null and void document (even though 
 the beneficiary is not privy to that forgery), must still pay on the credit, defies reason and 
 good sense. It amounts to saying that the scheme of things under the UCP 500 is only 
 concerned with commas and full stops or some misdescription, and that the 
 question as to  the genuiness or otherwise of a material document, which was the cause 
 for the issue of the [letter of credit] is of no consequence.106 
 
Finally, the brand of nullity exception the court appears to enunciate “is a limited one”107 
which does not obligate the bank to investigate into (sic) any document tendered, but 
“would only permit a bank to refuse [to pay] if satisfied that a material document is a 
nullity.”108  
 The reasoning of the Court of Appeal for establishing a “limited nullity 
exception”, though attractive, is open to several objections. In the first place, it is said 
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that the “limited” nullity exception would only permit a bank to refuse payment if it is 
satisfied that a material document is a nullity. The difficulty with this proposition is self-
evident in ascertaining when a document is nullity. Is the bank competently equipped for 
this task? How does the bank resolve the question without going outside the banking hall, 
an undesirable situation in respect of which the UCP are anxious to furnish a shield? For 
example, the resolution of the exact character of the air waybill as well as their author 
“troubles” the Court of Appeal. The result is that the court felt unable to separate the 
wheat from the chaff unless the case goes to full trial for “further exploration.”109 The 
Court of Appeal is ill at ease to see the woods for the trees, how much more the bank!   
 Secondly, the nullity exception enunciated by the Court of Appeal is to the effect 
that innocence of the seller beneficiary is immaterial; a bank need not pay if it knows that 
the tendered documents are waste papers. As noted above, such a broad proposition loses 
sight of the fundamental policy basis for denying payment under letters of credit 
transactions. 
 Most importantly, establishing a nullity exception in letters of credit is 
superfluous; the question for determination by the Court of Appeal in Beam Technology 
was at best a fiction in that it required their Lordships to presume the innocence of the 
seller beneficiary when the circumstances clearly dictate a contrary course. Perhaps, a 
little illustration will serve. It is worth recalling that the original contract in Beam 
Technology involved sale of electronic components to a buyer who nominated “Link 
Express (S) Pte Ltd” as the freight forwarder to whom the seller beneficiary should 
consign the merchandise. The credit required full set of clean air waybill issued by this 
entity. These were precisely the documents the seller beneficiary tendered for payment. 
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To the bank’s assertion that the documents were a forgery because no such entity existed, 
the proper question should be from whom did the seller beneficiary procure them? The 
sale contract required the seller beneficiary to consign the goods to the freight forwarder 
required to issue the tendered documents. So, the presentation of the required document 
logically presumes that the seller beneficiary has complied with its obligation under the 
underlying sales contract. 
 Curiously, it was established in evidence110 that goods on the air waybill 
described as loaded on board a Singapore Air flight SQ 162/13, was far from true; the 
airline authorities were on hand to deny receipt of any cargo. In the event, it is impossible 
to assume the seller beneficiary’s innocence. Further, it is most improbable that a forgery 
rendering documents a nullity will leave the seller beneficiary’s performance of the 
underlying sales contract unaffected. Put differently, the facts of Beam Technology raise a 
strong presumption against the seller beneficiary of a charge of fraud that destroys the 
very purpose of the letter of credit. In which case, the seller will have no practical and 
legal basis, or even a colorable right, to demand payment from the bank. If this analysis is 
correct, then the traditional fraud exception will apply, and it would become unnecessary 
to establish the so-called nullity exception. Given these possibilities, the Court of Appeal 
correctly remanded the case for a full trial, while allowing the appeal of the seller 
beneficiary. 
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 In quoting with approval the dictum of Rajendran J,111 the Beam Technology 
court112 seems to share the view that bank should not pay against documents it knows to 
be a nullity, otherwise the security of the bank might be in jeopardy. More recently, a 
learned commentator113 lent support to the Court of Appeal’s view. It is conceded that 
this is a fundamental attribute of the principle that the bank promises to pay against 
genuine documents; this carries the corresponding promise of the seller beneficiary, if it 
desires to demand payment under the credit, to present genuine documents. As admirably 
stated in the Sztejn case itself, “[t]he bank is vitally interested in assuring itself that there 
are some goods represented by the documents.”114Besides, Lord Diplock in United City 
Merchants115 did not reverse the Court of Appeal on this point. But the merit of this 
proposition ought not to be overly exalted so as to justify the establishing of a nullity 
exception.  
 Indisputably, in letters of credit the bank substitutes its credit, solvency, and 
reputation for the relatively unknown reliability of the buyer. But is it true that the bank 
invariably extends credit facility to the buyer in such transactions without adequate 
collateral dehor the credit transaction? In the majority of the cases, where credit is 
extended, the reality is that the bank does not rely merely on the security of the goods, a 
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fortiori the documents, as its source of recoupment. Not infrequently, the bank will 
ensure that the buyer account party furnishes adequate collateral to safeguard the bank 
against payment that might be made under the credit transaction.  
 However, in rare cases the bank may well tie its hope of reimbursement to the 
goods and the documents representing them. In such a case, it is usual for the bank to 
agree with the buyer that the bank will retain the documents as his security, and will only 
release them on certain conditions, e.g. to enable the buyer to clear the goods on arrival, 
and reimburse the bank after resale. However, the question is why should this 
arrangement be inextricably linked to the credit contract between the bank and the seller 
beneficiary that is innocent of forged documentation under the credit? At any rate, the 
seller is a stranger to the loan arrangement between the bank and the buyer. The credit 
contract he has with the bank contemplates presentation of specified documents that 
answer to the terms of the credit, not the tender of documents that the bank might hold as 
security in respect of a loan transaction that is unrelated to him. Even if, by a strained 
argument, this is unacceptable, still it must not be forgotten that a seller beneficiary that 
is not complicit in the fraudulent documentation will have supplied goods which, 
conceptually, ought to entitle it to be paid under the credit.  
 One final point, however, remains. Let us assume that a forged or fraudulent 
document should not trigger payment under a letter of credit, and that a seller beneficiary 
has a duty to tender documents that are in order, i.e. free from every vitiating infirmity. 
There is one practical barrier that will have to be surmounted. Often, in letters of credit 
transactions, the documents called for emanate from sundry sources. As regards the 
invoice and certain other documents prepared by the seller beneficiary, it would be 
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legitimate to expect that such documents are free of forgery.  It seems that there is no 
good reason to extend such expectation to cases where the documents are prepared by 
persons that are absolutely not under the control of the seller beneficiary. To be sure, why 
should the seller beneficiary be taken to warrant the genuiness of documents prepared by 
a third party who merely handed them over to him after their creation?116 It may be 
necessary to illustrate the problem with at least two decided cases. 
 In the Canadian case of Global Steel Ltd v Bank of Montreal,117 as noted above, 
the seller beneficiary was itself deceived by the mill certificate fraudulently prepared by 
the manufacturer of the goods the seller beneficiary shipped to the buyer account party. 
In United City Merchants, the seller beneficiary was as much as the bank a victim of the 
fraud of a third party. In both these cases, it would seem difficult to expect the seller 
beneficiary to ensure that the fraudulent documents were uninfected with falsehood. It is 
difficult to see any good reason why the law should not—as it does in the Canadian and 
the UK jurisdictions and some jurisdictions in the United States, which we have thus far 
considered—exonerate a seller beneficiary from blame in such circumstances as are 
indicated in those cases. At the end of the day, between an innocent account party and an 
innocent seller beneficiary, the question is: who must bear the loss resulting from 
fraudulent documentation by a third party? In my view, the chief candidate is the former. 
There may be marginal cases, though, where the conduct of the seller beneficiary insofar 
as the preparation of fraudulent documents is concerned, was purely reckless or not 
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completely satisfactory, albeit free of dishonesty.118 In such a case, it stands to reason that 
he should bear the loss. 
 Often, the account party, the issuing or confirming bank only discovers fraud in 
the presentation documents well after payment has been made. Rather than argue for 
restraining payment, the focus will then turn on claiming back what has perhaps been 
mistakenly paid out against the infected presentment documents. It is proposed now to 
consider the relative strength of an action at the instance of any of those parties to make a 
claim in restitution or redress the loss suffered by claiming damages in the tort of deceit. 
 
IV. RECOVERY OF MONEY PAID AGAINST FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS 
Where payment has been made against fraudulent documents, either of two cases may 
arise. The first arises where the confirming or negotiating bank pays against presentation 
documents that are subsequently discovered by the issuing bank to be fraudulent; the 
latter bank may deny reimbursement to the former. Second, the issuing bank reimburses 
the confirming bank but subsequently discovers that the presentation documents are 
fraudulent. Either way, the paying bank is entitled to raise an action in restitution to 
recover the money as paid under a mistake of fact. Thus, generally, “if the documents are 
presented by the beneficiary himself, and are forged or fraudulent, the bank is entitled to 
refuse payment if it finds out before payment, and is entitled to recover the money as paid 
under a mistake of fact if finds out after payment.”119 For convenience, it is proposed to 
discuss the two situations in turn.  
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 If a confirming bank has paid under the letter of credit, and subsequently realizes 
that payment ought not to have been made because the presentation is fraudulent, it may 
claim restitution of the money paid from the recipient, including every person to whom 
the money can be traced either at common law or in equity.120 The policy basis for a 
claim in restitution is that it would be unconscionable or inequitable, and thus unjust, to 
allow a person who has received another’s money to keep it when such recipient knows 
or should know that by paying, the payer made a mistake. Thus, the basis of restitutionary 
claim in letter of credit is to prevent unjust enrichment, at the expense of the payer, of the 
beneficiary who knowingly presents fraudulent documents to draw down on the credit. 
 Under the Revised Article 5, an issuer is only precluded from restitution of money 
paid or value given by mistake against presentation documents that are apparently 
defective, inconsistent or nonconforming with the credit terms and condition. So, at 
common law, restitutionary relief is still available to the issuer against the beneficiary if 
the presentation is tainted by forgery or fraud.121As regards the presenter beneficiary that 
receives payment in good faith without notice of any fraudulent taint in the presentation 
documents, restitutionary claim may fail: it might be difficult for the claimant to establish 
that the recipient will be unjustly enriched if the claim is disallowed.122 
                                                                                                                                                 
mistake, that is, upon the supposition that a specific fact is true, which would entitle the other to the money, 
but which fact is untrue, and the money would not have been paid if it had been known to the payer that the 
fact was untrue, an action will lie to recover it back, and it is against conscience to retain it.” 
120
 Bank Tejarat v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp (CI) Ltd [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 239, 245: The 
significant difference between the right of tracing at common law and in equity is that the latter can follow 
money as well as chose in action, and the money does not cease to be identifiable by being mixed with 
other money in the bank account from other sources. See also, Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v 
Hambrouck [1921] 1 KB 321; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1Ch 265, affd [1991] Ch 547, leave to 
appeal to the House of Lords, refused, and petition to the Appeal Committee for leave to appeal dismissed. 
121
 James J White and Robert S Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, Practitioner Treatise Series, vol 3(4 
th ed., West Publishing Co, 1996), 175.  
122
 Cf the Singapore case of Mees Pierson NV v Bay Pacific (S) Pte Ltd [2000] 4 SLR 393, where the 
claimant failed precisely on this ground. See now Standard Chartered Bank v Sin Chong Hua Electric & 
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 It is significant to note that the paying bank will also have a claim for damages in 
the tort of deceit against the beneficiary and any party who has issued a presentation 
document knowing that it contains a false statement and that it is to be presented to the 
bank under a letter of credit.123In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping 
Corp124the ship-owners and shipping agents agreed with the seller beneficiary to issue a 
bill of lading which was falsely antedated to make it comply with the terms of the credit. 
It was held that the confirming bank was entitled to succeed in damages and that although 
the fraudulent misrepresentation by the director of the beneficiary company was 
attributable to the company, such director could not escape the personal liability for his 
fraud. Further, the Law Lords decided that, in relation to fraudulent misrepresentation 
there was no common law defence of contributory negligence. Similarly, in KBC Bank v 
Industrial Steels (UK) Ltd125the negotiating bank claimed in deceit against the seller 
defendant on the grounds that the beneficiary’s certificate falsely stated that a set of non-
negotiable documents had been sent to the account party within ten days of the date of 
shipment, when the beneficiary either knew of the falsity or was reckless as to its truth. 
Finding that all the ingredients of the tort of deceit126 had been established against the 
beneficiary defendant, David Steel J held that the bank was entitled to the damages it 
claimed. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trading Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 863: Restitutionary claim allowed because the recipient was itself implicated 
in the fraud.  
123
 Gutteridge and Megrah’s Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credits, Richard King (ed) (8 th ed., London: 
Europa Publications, 2001), 173. Cf Revised Article 5—110, UCC.   
124
 [2003] 1 AC 43. 
125
 [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 409. 
126
 These are that, a statement or representation was made; (ii) the maker of the statement knows it to be 
false or is reckless as to whether the statement is true; (iii) the false statement is relied upon by the plaintiff; 
and, (iv) the plaintiff relying on the false statement suffers loss. 
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 In relation to the second situation, there are a considerable number of conceptual 
problems regarding a restitutionary claim initiated by either the issuing bank or the 
account party against recipient of the money paid under a mistake of fact. The first 
difficulty is the question concerning the right to claim in restitution. Quite evidently, if 
the confirming bank, in good faith, pays against fraudulent documents, it has immediate 
right to claim reimbursement from the issuing bank; the latter is in turn privileged to 
assert similar right against the account party, by debiting its account with the payment 
made under the letter of credit. It would seem to follow logically that the proper person to 
make a restitutionary claim is the account party. But the authorities appear to go in the 
contrary direction. 
 In an extensive and insightful analysis of the leading cases127 on the point, 
Professor Ellinger points out that an action for the recovery of money paid by the bank 
under a mistake of fact may be brought either by the bank itself or by the customer 
(account party), but cautions that in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, Fox LJ actually 
observed that the customer’s action in restitution may be available only where he is not 
entitled to demand that the debit entry in his account be reversed by the bank.128Certainly, 
this is the better view for at least two reasons. 
 In the first place, in the context of letters of credit, when the bank pays against 
fraudulent documents in circumstances that entitles it to debit the account of the account 
party, it is not really the bank that is defrauded. On the contrary, it is the account party. 
The result is that it is the account party that has the cause of action for a claim in 
restitution. Second, and for nearly the same reason, a claim in restitution will be defeated 
                                                 
127
 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547, CA; Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, HL. 
128
 E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka & Richard Hooley, Modern Banking Law (3 rd ed., Oxford: OUP, 2002), 
417 et seq. 
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if the claimant is unable to show that the recipient would be unjustly enriched at its 
expense. It is difficult to see how the claimant bank can surmount this hurdle, when 
albeit notionally it has had its recoupment. At any rate, to assert that both the issuing 
bank and the account party are entitled to sue the beneficiary will be to insist that the 
beneficiary is invariably exposed to double restitutionary claims on the same delict,129a 
ridiculous situation that ought to be eschewed. 
 The issuing bank or the account party may, rather than pursue the fraudulent 
beneficiary, elect to recover from the confirming bank money paid out under a mistake of 
fact. Such a course may be taken because the beneficiary recipient has vanished soon 
after receiving payment or that he can be found, but has become insolvent. The 
confirming bank payor may seek to defeat the claimant’s action in restitution by 
establishing that its position is so changed that he will suffer an injustice if called upon to 
repay or to repay in full, what it has received from the claimant, such that the injustice of 
requiring him to repay outweighs the injustice of denying the claimant restitution.130The 
principle has been explained as follows: 
 If the plaintiff pays money to the defendant under a mistake of fact, and the 
 defendant then, acting in good faith, pays the money or part of it to charity [or 
 fraudulent beneficiary], it is  unjust to require the defendant to make restitution to 
 the extent that he has so changed his position…In other words, bona fide  change 
 of position should of  itself be a good defence in such [a] case.131  
 
 The precise scope of the defence of change of position is yet uncertain; much 
seem to depend upon the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the onus lies on the 
                                                 
129
 A N Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (Pretoria: 
Interlegal, 1997), 413. 
130
 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 581 per Lord Goff. 
131
 “[Change of position] defence is not open to one who has changed his position in bad faith, as where the 
defendant has paid away the money with knowledge of the facts entitling the plaintiff to restitution.”: 
[1991]2 AC 548, 582, per Lord Goff. 
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claimant to rebut assertions of good faith change of position, by, for example, showing 
that, in point of fact the defendant acted recklessly or without reasonable 
care.132Remarkably, the interesting case of Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone 
Trading Ltd,133recently decided by the English courts, has offered some insight into what 
good faith change of position may well embrace. The facts of that case were that C Bank 
presented, among other documents, bill of lading and inspection certificate to S Bank for 
payment. These documents represented goods which C Bank knew had been disposed of 
elsewhere prior to receiving payment from S Bank for the account of the seller 
beneficiary. In an action for damages for deceit, rejecting C Bank’s reliance on change of 
position defence, Moore-Bick J noted that lack of good faith was capable of embracing a 
failure to act in a commercially acceptable way. Where the payee, the learned judge 
reasoned, had grounds for believing that the issuing bank might have made the payment 
by mistake, but could not be sure, good faith may well dictate that inquiry be made of the 
payer. In any event, the court found that C Bank had not acted in good faith in paying 
away the funds it had received from S Bank, when it had reason to believe that the goods 
to which the payment related were no longer available. The Court of Appeal affirmed. If 
the confirming bank, in good faith, sets off the funds it received under letter of credit 
transaction against the debt accruing due from the fraudulent beneficiary, probably the 
defence of change of position will avail. Since the discharge of the bank’s debt is for 
good consideration, a claim in restitution may not stand.134 
 
                                                 
132
 For an excellent discussion see, Paul Key, “Change of Position” [1995] 58 MLR 505. 
133
 [2004] 2 WLR 1415, CA.  See also, Paul Key, “Change of Position” [1995] 58 MLR 505. 
134
 Cf Aiken v Short (1856) 1 H & N 210, extensively reviewed in Barclays Bank v W J Simms Ltd [1980] 1 
QB 677, 688 per Robert Goff J. The act constituting change of position must be legal: Barros Mattos v 
MacDaniels Ltd [2004] 3 All ER 299. 
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                V. CONCLUSION 
The fraud exception is firmly entrenched in the law of letters of credit in the jurisdictions 
examined in this chapter. As has been shown in the preceding in the foregoing discussion, 
the extension of the fraud exception beyond the traditional grounds of fraudulent 
documents and mis-performance of the underlying sales contract, to embrace fraudulent 
inducement to contract, is supportable and, indeed, consistent with the fundamental 
policy underpinnings of the establishing of the exception. If the premier role of letters of 
credit in international commerce is to be preserved and protected, then fraud of whatever 
kind must be frustrated. 
  In spite of the broad provision of the UCC Article 5, some American courts 
accept the proposition that payment will be restrained only if, in order to draw down on 
the credit, the beneficiary presents documents which to its knowledge are materially 
fraudulent. A fortiori, when presentation documents are shown to contain false 
information emanating from the beneficiary, the answer to the question whether payment 
ought to be withheld lies in establishing the beneficiary’s bona fides. In this connection, 
the approach taken in some American courts accords with the position in England, 
Canada, and it is applauded in this chapter.  However, the establishing of the nullity 
exception appears to have made an inroad into the chief attribute of the letter of credit, 
which is that payment to the seller beneficiary will be prompt and certain. What has been 
advocated in this chapter is that that bank must withhold payment if it knows that the 
tendered documents are a nullity by reason of fraud, but the bank should only do so if it 
has clear knowledge of the seller beneficiary’s participation in the forgery, a situation that 
already have an answer in the House of Lords decision in United City (Merchant).  This 
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view is strengthened by the fact that an innocent seller beneficiary in possession of such 
documents is not in the least likely to be liable for non-performance under the underlying 
sales contract. If this is correct, why should the bank not pay him according to the tenor 
of the letter of credit, and then subsequently institute an action (either jointly with the 
buyer account party or on its own) for damages in the tort of deceit against the 
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                                                   CHAPTER THREE 
 
                    STRICT COMPLIANCE OF THE PRESENTATION DOCUMENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is settled law that the beneficiary under a letter of credit transaction is not entitled to 
exact payment unless he presents regular documents. This necessarily entails the 
fulfillment of two requirements. First, the documents tendered must not be affected by 
fraud, i.e. to the extent of the beneficiary’s knowledge and complicity.1Second, the 
presentation documents must strictly comply with the terms of the letter of credit. The 
latter partly constitutes the focus of this chapter.  
 Once a beneficiary presents the documents specified in a letter of credit, the duty 
of the issuing or confirming bank is twofold. In the first place, the bank must pay if the 
presentation documents meet the terms of the credit. If it wrongfully dishonours the 
presentation, it may be liable to the presenter in damages in the full amount of the 
dishonoured draft together with interest and, probably, attorney’s fees. Secondly, the 
bank is obligated to the account party to dishonour non-complying presentation; if it 
wrongfully takes up discrepant documents, it forfeits its right to request reimbursement 
from the account party. Thus, the bank has a razor-edged duty of navigating between the 
Scylla of making payment against conforming documents and the Charybdis of 
withholding payment when a presentation is non-conforming. 
  In the last two decades, litigation on these principles has grown exceedingly, as 
are the controversies regarding the appropriate standard for determining the question 
whether or not a presentation document conforms to the terms of a letter of credit. The 
                                                 
1
 This hints at the ambit of the fraud exception as defined by the House of Lords in United City Merchants 
(Investments) v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168. 
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vast majority of decided cases has recognized strict documentary compliance as the 
overriding criterion, but insists that the standard does not require literal, mirror image 
conformity with the requirements of the credit. Significantly, though, in certain cases, it 
does! The problem, therefore, is one of striking a balance between cases where literal 
adherence will undermine business common sense and cases where it would not. This 
article will extensively critique this problem. 
 The practical offshoot of the doctrine of strict documentary compliance concerns 
the principle that a bank that has decided to dishonour a presentation on the grounds of a 
discrepancy must furnish the presenter appropriate rejection notice. In this connection, 
what has emerged in the cases is a complex interplay of principles and concomitant legal 
consequences for all the parties under a letter of credit transaction. For example, where a 
presentation is rejected for a discrepancy, and it is not waived by the account party, the 
presenter may still be able to realize the proceeds of the credit by pleading that the 
rejecting bank has not strictly complied with the rejection notice requirements under the 
UCP 500 (i.e. assuming that the letter of credit transaction incorporates the rules).2 In 
contrast, where a beneficiary alleges that dishonour is unjustified, the rejecting bank may 
seek reliance on the doctrine of strict compliance. Not surprisingly, such instances just 
mentioned have been the hotbed of a huge volume of letter of credit disputes. In the main, 
this article concerns itself with an evaluation of the applicable principles as well as 
emerging trends. It is necessary to point out, however, that, save for a gloss in the 
footnotes below, we will not consider the question of documentary compliance based on 
                                                 
2
 It is evident from the marketplace of letter of credit, supported by the volume of litigated cases in major 
letter of credit countries, that the UCP enjoys over ninety per cent patronage. Indeed, in the United States, 
where the Uniform Commercial Code, Reversed Article 5 has been enacted into law in virtually all the 
constituent states, the UCP are predominantly incorporated in letters of credit transactions. 
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whether or not a presentation document qualifies as “original” or requires to be marked 
“original”. This is because the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kredietbank Antwerp v 
Midland Bank Plc 3 has effectively cut down to size the decision of the same court (with 
a different panel) in Glencore International AG v Bank of China4which had, regrettably, 
misinterpreted article 20(b)5 of the UCP 500 as requiring that all reprographic, 
automated, or computer generated documents be stamped “original”. Second, on July 12, 
1999, the ICC Banking Commission furnished a Decision6 on the appropriate 
interpretation of article 20 (b) of the UCP 500.7 It is seriously arguable, therefore, that the 
last of the original document controversy has been heard, and that the eyebrows 
previously raised in the letter of credit community by the Glencore decision have since 
been justifiably lowered.   
                                                 
3
 [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 801, 813—815. Delivering the sole judgment of the court, Evans L J reasoned 
that article 20 (b) of the UCP does not require an obviously original document, albeit produced in one of 
the ways there specified to be marked as original unless the document is ostensibly or actually a copy of 
another copy, e.g. a photocopy or a carbon copy. His Lordship considered that the contrary view of Sir 
Thomas Bingham, MR in Glencore was obiter because the document there considered was a photocopy 
which, in any event, needed to have been marked as original. For detailed discussions on Kredietbank and 
Glencore cases, see Howard N Bennett, “Original Sins under the UCP” [2002]LMCLQ 88; Adam Johnson, 
“Letters of Credit and Original Documents—Again” (1999) 14 JIBL 287. 
4
 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 135, 153 affg [1996] 1 Lloyd Rep 147. For insightful notes, see Howard N Bennett, 
“Strict Compliance under UCP 500” [1997] LMCLQ 7; Diana Wright (1995) 10 JIBL (Supplement); 
Richard Morris, (1996) JIBL 404; Charles Chatterjee, [1996] JIBL 570.  
5
 Article 20 (b) of UCP 500: “[B]anks will accept as an original document(s), a document(s) produced …i 
by reprographic, automated or computerized systems; ii as carbon copies; provided that it is marked as 
original.”  
6
 Decision of the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and Practice, adopted unanimously on 12 July 
1999: “Banks treat as original any document bearing an apparently original signature, mark, stamp, or label 
of the issuer of the document unless the document itself indicates that it is not original. Accordingly, unless 
a document indicates otherwise, it is treated as original if it (A)appears to be written, typed, perforated, or 
stamped by the document’s issuer hand; (B) appears to be on the document issuer’s original stationery; 
…Consistent with sub-paragraph (A) above, banks treat as original any document that appears to be hand 
signed by the issuer of the document. For example, a hand signed draft or commercial invoice is treated as 
an original document, whether or not some or the [entire] document[s] are preprinted, carbon copied, or 
produced by reprographic, automated, or computerized systems.” See, generally, James E Byrne, The 
Original Documents Controversy—From Glencore to the ICC Decision (Montgomery Village, MD: IIBL& 
P, 1999). 
7
 For a valiant judicial effort to reconcile the decisions in Kredietbank Antwerp and Glencore, see Credit 
Industriel et Commercial v China Merchants Bank  [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 427. As regards an excellent 
note on Credit Industriel, see Alexia Ganotaki, “Documentary Credits: Another Original Story” [2003] 
LMCLQ 151.  
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 This chapter is divided into five sections. Besides the introduction, section two 
examines the conceptual and practical nature of strict compliance. Section three evaluates 
the policy underpinnings of strict compliance doctrine. Proceeding from the assumption 
that a presentation has been dishonoured for a valid reason of discrepancy, section four 
will extensively critique the circumstances under which payment may be exacted where 
the dishonouring bank fails to strictly comply with the rejection notice requirements 
under the UCP. Section five concludes that adhering to the tenets of strict compliance is 
as much a necessary condition for a healthy letter of credit scheme as does the 
requirement that, to be effective, a rejection notice must strictly comply with articles 13 
(b) and 14 of the UCP 500. 
 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF STRICT COMPLIANCE 
The principle of strict compliance is the linchpin of letters of credit; it operates in the 
contractual relationships between (i) the account party and the issuing bank; (ii) the 
issuing bank and advising bank, confirming bank, or negotiating bank; and (iii) the 
confirming bank or negotiating bank and the beneficiary. Typically, a letter of credit 
crystallizes the instructions of an account party to an issuing bank, setting out, among 
other things, the terms under which the issuing bank may honour a draw on the credit. 
Such terms constitute the issuing bank’s mandate to which the bank must strictly adhere.  
 Ideally, the account party is required, in giving his instructions to the issuing 
bank, to state precisely the documents against which a request to realize the proceeds of 
the credit may be honoured.8The merit of precise specificity on the requisite documents 
is, first, that it enhances the primary attribute of letters of credit, which is dealings only in 
                                                 
8
 UCP 500, art 5 (b). 
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documents, and not in goods or other extrinsic facts to which the credit may be related. 
Second, it enables the beneficiary to know exactly what documents he must present to the 
bank in order to realize the proceeds of the credit. Additionally, to eschew confusion and 
misunderstanding, banks are encouraged to discourage inclusion of excessive details in a 
letter of credit.9However, if the requirement of the credit is ambiguous, the bank10 and the 
beneficiary11 are entitled to act upon a reasonable meaning of the ambiguity.12 
 Conceptually, though, the obligation of the account party to furnish an explicit, 
unambiguous mandate to the issuing bank is matched with the obligation of the 
beneficiary, if he desires to draw down on the credit, to present documents which strictly 
answer to the requirements of the letter of credit, so that if presentation documents do not 
strictly comply with the stipulations in a letter of credit, the bank is not obligated to make 
payment, and if it pays, cannot claim reimbursement from the account party.13 
 In English, Scottish and Australia Bank Ltd v Bank of South Africa14, Bailhache J 
captured the well established principle precluding payment against nonconforming 
presentation documents as follows:  
 It is elementary to say that a person who ships in reliance on a letter of credit must do so in 
 exact compliance with its terms. It is also elementary to say that a bank is not bound or 
                                                 
9
 UCP 500, art (a) (i). See also, E & H Partners v Broadway National Bank, 39 F Supp 2d 275(1998). 
10
 Commercial Banking Co v Jalsard [1973] AC 279 (PC); Credit Agricole Indosuez v Muslim Commercial 
Bank Ltd [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 275, 280 per Sir Christopher Staughton. 
11
 E & H Partners v Broadway National Bank, 39 F Supp 2d 275 (1998). 
12
 See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v Federal National Bank & Trust Co, 622 F Supp 6 (WD Okla.) (1984), 
where an internal inconsistency in the letter of credit was rightly resolved against the bank . [“Blow Out 
Products Ltd”  and “Blow Out Prevention Ltd,” in the first and second paragraph respectively.]  
13
 Cf the much latter case of Kydon Compania Naviera SA v National Westminster Bank Ltd, “The Lena” 
[1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68, where in the course of adjudicating dispute arising from a credit made subject to 
the UCP 222, 1962 Revision, Parker J took the view that the duty to pay against conforming documents is 
owed by the issuing bank to the account party, and by the confirming or negotiating bank to the issuing 
bank: Ibid., 78.  
14
 [1922] 13 Ll L Rep 21. Cf Fidelity National Bank of South Miami v Dade County, 371 So 2d 545, 546 
(Dist Ct App, Fa) (1979): “Compliance with the terms of a letter of credit is not like pitching horseshoes. 
No points are awarded for being close.” 
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 indeed entitled to honour drafts presented to it under a letter of credit unless those drafts 
 with the accompanying documents are in strict accord with the credit as opened.15 
 
This view was echoed four years later in Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson 
Partners Ltd.16 There, in an oft-quoted passage, Viscount Sumner said:  
 It is both common ground and common sense that in [letter of credit] transaction the 
 accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorized to 
 accept are in the matter of the accompanying documents strictly observed, There is no 
 room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as well. Business 
 could not proceed securely on any other lines. The  bank’s branch abroad, which knows 
 nothing officially of the details of the transaction thus financed, cannot take upon itself 
 to decide what will do well enough and what will not. If it does as it is told, it is safe; if 
 it declines to do  anything else, it is safe; if it departs from the conditions laid down, it acts at 
 its own risk.17  
       
The implication of Bailhache J’s statement together with Viscount Sumner’s dictum was 
taken in subsequent cases to require the bank to dishonour a draw on a letter of credit if 
the bank spots any defect in a presentation document. Put differently, and more directly, a 
draft and the supporting documents that do not totally replicate the requirements of the 
letter of credit are discrepant, and, on this account, the bank must dishonour the 
presentation. A fortiori, a plea that dishonour is wrongful because the alleged discrepancy 
was committed bona fide will be unavailing. Nor does it matter that dishonour is 
motivated by bad faith, or that the defect is a mere technicality.18Arguably, this position 
spawned the proposition that the beneficiary could not exact payment unless the 
presentation documents convey a mirror image of the credit.19 Consequently, if the 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 24. (Emphasis added). 
16
 (1927) Ll L Rep 49. 
17
 Ibid., 52. 
18Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp v FDIC, 872 F 2d 971, 973(1989); Banco General Runinahui SA v Citibank 
International, 97 F 3d 480, 484 (1996); Fidelity National Bank of South Miami v Dade County, 371 So 2d 
545, 548 (1979); Banque de L’Union Haitienne, SA v Manufacturer Hanover International Banking Corp, 
18 UCC Rep Serv 2d 856 (1991). 
19
 See, e.g., Voest-Alpine International Corp v Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F 2d 680, 683 (1983): “Literal 
compliance with the credit…is…essential so as not to jeopardize the bank’s right to indemnity from its 
customer”; Venizelos SA v Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F 2d 461, 465 (1970): “Documents and shipping 
description must be as stated in the letter”; Courtaulds North America Inc v North Carolina National Bank, 
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instruction of the account party as exemplified by the letter of credit is clear, then the 
documents tendered under it must conform absolutely.  
 In contrast, by article 13 (a) of the UCP 500, bank must examine all presentation 
documents to determine whether they conform, ex facie, to the requirements of the credit; 
the criterion for determining conformity is “international standard of banking practice as 
reflected in [the UCP provisions.]” The UCP compliance test just quoted was the butt of a 
stream of considerable criticisms20 within the first few years following 1994 when the 
Rules took effect.  
 Currently the UCP 500 have been in operation for well over a decade: it does not 
seem necessary to go back to the trenches over the wisdom of entrenching such a 
problematic test.21 However, it may be useful to advance some seemingly pedestrian 
propositions. First, presentation documents must, on their face, be consistent with one 
another; documents not so conforming are deemed to be non-complying with the credit. 22 
                                                                                                                                                 
528 F 2d 802, 805-6 (1975):“[T]he beneficiary must meet the terms of the credit –and precisely”; 
Philadelphia Gear Corp v Central Bank, 717 F 2d 230, 236 (1983): “The documentation necessary to 
support payment…must conform exactly to the requirements of the credit”; Banque Paribas v Hamilton 
Industries International Inc, 767 F 2d 380, 384(1985): “Issuing bank is entitled to insist upon literal 
compliance”; American National Bank v Cashman Brothers Marine Contracting, 550 So 2d 98, 100 
(1989): “whether and to what extant[a]…[d]eviation did or did not [affect the credit terms] is irrelevant.”   
20
 See, e.g., Ross P Buckley, “The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary 
Credits” (1995) 28 Geo Wash J Int’l L & Econ 265, esp 278-279; Joseph Gustavus, “Letters of Credit 
Compliance under Revised UCC Article 5 and UCP 500” (1997) 114 Banking L J 56, 62 et seq; A N 
Oelofse, The Law of Documentary Letters of Credit in Comparative Perspective (Pretoria: Interlegal, 
1997), 271-273. But there had been expression of optimism about the introduction of the provision in the 
Revision, i.e. UCP 500, as to which, see, e.g. E P Ellinger, “The Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documenatry Credits—the 1993 Revision” [1994] LMCLQ 377, 390-392. Cf E P Ellinger, “The Doctrine 
of Strict Compliance: Its Development and Current Construction” in Francis D Ross (ed) Lex Mercatoria: 
Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (London: LLP, 2000), 187, esp 
193. 
21
 Essentially, the problem is that the practice of bankers is not uniform in the international banking 
community. Further, the words “as reflected in these articles” following “international banking practice” 
under article 13 (a) denote the exclusion of practice not exemplified in the UCP, such that expert evidence 
is liable to be shut out in legal or arbitration proceedings. The result is that the UCP have a monopoly on 
what is, and what is not, international banking practice. 
22
 Article 13 (a), UCP 500. See, e.g., Bank Melli Iran v Barclays Bank [1951] 2 KB 367, the credit called 
for documents evidencing the shipment of “100 new trucks”. Tendered invoice stated “trucks in new 
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Second, contrary to the literal wording of article 13 (a),23 international standard banking 
practice is not only derived from the four walls of the UCP 500, but also from ICC 
publications, including opinions of the ICC Commission on Banking Technique and 
Practice,24 ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operations, and especially in the United 
States, the International Financial Services Association Standard Banking Practice for the 
Examination of Documents. Further, the court may also resort to the practice rules 
published by national and regional banking associations as well as the opinion of experts 
in letter of credit practice.25 Third, although banking practice and opinions of experts tend 
to vary in their finer details from place to place and even from bank to bank,26 by 
adopting the words “international banking standard,” the UCP implicitly prescribe the 
standard of a reasonably knowledgeable and diligent bank documents checker.27 
Consistent with this standard is the exercise of commercial common sense, on a cases-by-
case basis, such that a minor deviation of a clerical, typographical nature will, generally, 
not justify dishonour.28  
                                                                                                                                                 
condition”; certificate described trucks as “new, good”; delivery order bore “new-good”. McNair J held 
that documents were not only inconsistent with one another but also non-conforming with the credit; J H 
Rayner & Co Ltd v Hambro’s Bank, Ltd [1943] 1 KB 37, bill of lading indicating shipment of “machine-
shelled groundnuts” was inconsistent with invoice for “Coromandel groundnuts.” See also the American 
case of Osten Meat Co v First of America Bank-Southeast Michigan, 205 Mich App 686 (Ct App, Mich) 
(1994): The invoices indicated “paid” whilst the affidavit showed that “all the attached invoices were 
unpaid”. It was held that the documents were rightly rejected.    
23
 Article 13 (a). 
24
 For an example, see above, n 6 and accompanying text. 
25
 Gustavus, above, n 20, 62. 
26
 Ellinger, “The Doctrine,” above, n 21, 193. 
27
 The standard of reasonableness is that of the issuing bank’s place of business, as to which see below, n 
42 and the passage there referenced.   
28
 See, generally, Flagship Cruises Ltd v New England Merchants, 569 F 2d 699 (1 st Cir, CA)(1977), 
where the credit required all drafts to be marked “Drawn under NEMNB Credit No 18506” is satisfied by a 
draft marked “No 18506”; Tosco Corp v FDIC, 723 F 2d 1242 (6st Cir, CA) (1983), legend on a 
presentment draft showed “Drawn under Bank of Clarksville, Clarksville, Tennessee letter of Credit N0 
105” rather than “Drawn under Bank of Clarksville Letter of Credit Number 105”. Three discrepancies 
were alleged: (i) change of “L” in “Letter” to “l”; (ii) the use of “N0” as opposed to “Number”; and (iii) the 
addition of the words “Clarksville, Tennessee”; First National Bank of Atlanta v Wynne 149 Ga App 811 
(CA, Ga) (1979), a certificate and a draft were required to indicate “credit N0 S—3753.” It was held that 
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 Notably, there are two classes of case where the character of a discrepancy may 
not matter. One instance is where the information required in the letter of credit is 
omitted in the presentation documents. In this regard, one view is that “[w]here it can be 
shown that [a] supposed discrepancy results from a patent error or obvious typographical 
mistake, it is unrealistic to treat the…tender as invalid by reason only of a technical slip 
or mistake.”29Further support for this view is that many of the documents tendered under 
a documentary credit are prepared not by the beneficiary but by a third party, such as a 
shipping agent, surveyor or carrier. The beneficiary has no control over the clerks of such 
a party.30 Even where the documents are authored by the beneficiary’s own staff, such 
persons cannot be expected to be infallible.31 
  Apparently, this view is attractive. But it has one major hurdle to surmount: 
Assuming it is the requirement of a letter of credit that the requisite documents must 
each32 contain a specific piece of information. 33 Assuming also that one particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
notwithstanding the omission of this information, beneficiary’s covering letter adequately identified the 
draft; New Braunfels National Bank v Odiorne, 780 SW 2d 313 (1989), legend on a presentment draft 
stated “Number 86—122—5” instead of “Number 86—122—S” was held conforming; First Bank v Paris 
Savings & Loan Association, 756 SW 2d 329 (Tex App) (1988), where it was held that the tendered 
documents were conforming since they contained the requisite legend irrespective of the addition of the 
words “dated June, 12, 1986, i/a/o $250, 000”; American Airlines Inc v FDIC, 610 F Supp 199 (1985), the 
incorrectly stated legend in the draft was not misleading to the bank because the accompanying cover letter 
correctly contained the requisite number.    
29
 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (6 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), para 23—195. 
30




 This position should be distinguished from cases where the letter of credit does not specifically require 
each document to bear the specified information, in which case the tendered documents will have to be 
examined as a whole; the tender strictly complies if the documents collectively meet the terms of the credit. 
See, generally, Guaranty Trust Co v Van Den Berghs Ltd (1925) 22 Ll L Rep 58, where the bill of lading 
evidenced the shipment of “coco-nut oil” as opposed to “manila coco-nut oil” stipulation in the credit. 
Roche J held that this imperfection “was…sufficiently cured” by the precise description of the shipment in 
a certificate of origin; Midland Bank v Seymour [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 147. For erudite discussions, see E P 
Ellinger, “The Doctrine of Strict Compliance: Its Development and Current Construction” in Francis D 
Rose (ed) Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds 
(London: LLP, 2000), 187, 191-192, nn 22—23 and the cases there cited; Anu Arora, “The Dilemma of an 
Issuing Bank: To Accept or Reject Documents Tendered under a Letter of Credit” [1984] LMCLQ 81.    
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document, e.g. the packing list, fails to bear the specified information, and that it was 
obviously a mistake, is the issuing bank entitled to dishonour a draw on this ground? Can 
it be argued confidently that in such a case a patent mistake or slip should not avail 
simply because there seems to be no ostensible reason for inserting the term in the credit? 
It is submitted that the discrepancy should avail, whether or not there appears to be no 
discernible “commercial or business object”34 behind its stipulation in the credit. 
Otherwise, the parties’ freedom to enact consensual terms in their contract will be torn 
apart with the consequence that the materiality of a term specifically incorporated in a 
credit and accepted by the beneficiary would depend on the view of a third party 
attempting an analysis of the term. If this proposition is unacceptable, then the question 
remains whether it is desirable to form a new contract for the parties, by disregarding an 
otherwise valid term specifically inserted into, and indeed accepted by the parties to, the 
credit transaction. 
 Another instance of documentary discrepancies that may not displace literal 
adherence to the terms of a letter of credit arises where the tendered documents are 
discordant with the terms of the credit on the ground that the requisite designation of a 
party, name of a person or place, or number has been mis-transcribed in the presentation 
documents and the mis-transcription is such as would invite a reasonable bank document 
checker to make inquiry beyond the tendered documentations,35mislead the bank,36 
                                                                                                                                                 
33
 See, e.g., Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 236, where the credit required 
that all the documents should indicate the letter of credit number and the name, “Deputy Ministry of 
Defence for Logistic.” In the majority judgment of the court, Lloyd LJ said: “It is no good asking why the 
credit required the letter of credit number and the buyer’s name to appear on each of the documents” Ibid., 
239. For an interesting commentary on Seaconsar case, see E P Ellinger, “New Cases on Documentary 
Credits” [1994] JBL 32, 35-36 where the learned commentator queried the “commercial or business object” 
of the credit requirement. 
34
 Cf E P Ellinger, ibid., loc cit. 
35
 United Bank Ltd v Banque de Nationale de Paris [1992] 2 SLR 64. 
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necessitate the solicitation of legal advice,37 or raise the likelihood of non-performance or 
fraud by the beneficiary.38For example, in Bank of Cochin Ltd v Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Co,39the issuing bank disclaimed its reimbursement obligation against a set of 
documents bearing “St. Lucia Enterprises” instead of “St. Lucia Enterprises Ltd”, and 
insurance cover note number “4291” rather than “429711.” The Southern District Court 
of New York held that the discrepancy relating to the beneficiary’s name could only 
possibly be evidence of forgery. Further, the failure to provide the correct insurance 
cover note “was not inconsequential as the mistake could have resulted in the Insurance 
Company’s justifiable refusal to honour the account party’s insurance policy. The Second 
Circuit affirmed.40Similarly, in United Bank Ltd v Banque Nationale de Paris,41 the High 
Court of Singapore held that presentation documents bearing the beneficiary’s name as 
“Pan Associated Pte Ltd” as opposed to “Pan Associated Ltd” in the letter of credit 
justified dishonour notwithstanding that the Registrar of Companies would not, except 
with the consent of the Minister, register two companies with such similarity in names, a 
fact that naturally invited the bank document checker to make inquiries outside the 
tendered documentations. 
  In any event, in letters of credit transaction, matters of names, numbers, and 
designation of a requisite party will continue to constitute a matter of critical importance. 
If a misspelling of such appellation would ostensibly create doubt in the issuing bank’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
36
 Flagship Cruises Ltd v New England Merchants National Bank of Boston, 569 F 2d 699 (1 st Cir, 1978). 
For the facts, see above, n 28. 
37
 Osten Meat Co v First America Bank-South East Michigan, 205 Mich App 686, 693 (Ct App, Mich) 
(1994).  
38
 Breathless Associates v First Savings & Loan Association of Murkburnett, 654 F Supp 832, 837-838 
(1986). 
39
 612 F Supp 1533 (1985). 
40
 808 F 2d 209 (1986). 
41
 [1992] 2 SLR 64 
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mind, then the bank is entitled to reject the document (s) in which the error is contained. 
However, the question whether a misspelling or misprint is unmistakably a typographical 
error is determined by having regard to the place or country of the issuing bank.42 The 
much maligned decision in Beyene & Hanson v Irving Trust Co43 is explicable on this 
basis. There, the misspelling of “Sofan” as “Soran” was held by the Second Circuit to be 
a material discrepancy because in the Middle East such misspelling would not be 
recognized as an inadvertent misspelling.44 Fifteen years after Beyene decision, literal, 
mirror image standard of strict compliance was reaffirmed and rejuvenated in Hanil Bank 
v PT Bank Negara Indonesia. 45  
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is important to note that strict documentary 
compliance principle does not require rigid, literal, mirror image replication of the terms 
of the credit in all cases; some margin is permitted for sustaining the integrity and 
efficiency of letter of credit.46 In Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank Plc,47 Evans L J 
perspicuously expressed the position when he said: 
  [T]he requirement of strict compliance is not equivalent to a test of exact literal 
 compliance in all circumstances and as regards all documents. To some extent, 
 therefore, the banker must exercise his own judgment whether the requirement is satisfied 
 by the documents presented to him 48 
 
  It is difficult to be precise as regards cases that will fall into the margin 
compelling the application of tempered, non-literal adherence.49 Admittedly, though, 
                                                 
42
 For similar discussion, see above, n 27 and accompanying text.  
43
 762 F 2d 4 ( 2 nd Cir, 1985). 
44
 Cf Hing Yip Hing Fat Co Ltd v The Daiwa Bank Ltd [1991] 2 HKLR 35. For the facts, see below, n 60 
and accompanying text.   
45
 2000 WL 25007 (S D, NY). The case will be discussed a little later. 
46
 Banque de L ‘Indochine v J H Rayner Ltd [1983] 1 QB 711, 721 per Parker J. 
47
 [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 801. 
48
 Ibid., 806. 
49
 Cases of minor typographical errors obviously fall into the category. Still, it is not always self-evident to 
the bank document checker when an error is obviously minor, especially when it is remembered that the 
 86 
where a discrepancy is alleged by reason of an apparent variance between, for example, 
the requisite certifying body and that actually carried in the presentation documents, it 
appears that the approach that was evolved in Equitable Trust case was to give to the 
credit terms and the tendered documents a commercially reasonable construction. In this 
way, if, in spite of literal variance the presentation documents constitute a functional 
legal equivalent50 of the requirements of the credit, in that it is consistent with the 
reasonable contemplation of the credit, then the tender is good, and strict performance is 
not thereby undermined.  
 In Equitable Trust, a letter of credit required a certificate of quality made “by 
experts who are sworn brokers signed by the Chamber of Commerce” of Batavia. Rather 
than Chamber of Commerce, the certificate was signed for a body known as 
“Handelsvereeniging te Batavia.” It was established in evidence that in Batavia there was 
no body called “Chamber of Commerce.” Rejecting the defendant account party’s 
submission that the certificate in issue was not signed by the Chamber of Commerce, 
Bateson J reasoned that the signature of “Handelsvereeniging te Batavia was 
unimpeachable because functionally the body “more nearly corresponds to the words 
‘Chamber of Commerce’”51 specified in the letter of credit. On appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, Scrutton52and Bankes L JJ agreed with Bateson J.53On further appeal to the 
House of Lords, the course taken in the trial court as well as the Court of Appeal was 
                                                                                                                                                 
status of the error is determined, not from the perspective of the confirming or negotiating bank but that of 
the issuing bank. As to this point, see above, 27. 
50
 Boris Kozolchyk, “Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker” (1990) 56 Brooklyn L R 
45. 
51
 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1926) 24 Ll L Rep 261, 265. 
52
 Dissenting on other grounds, as to which see (1926) 25 Ll L Rep 90, 94-95. 
53
 Atkin LJ expressed no opinion on the point. 
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endorsed in concurring speech by Viscount Cave LC.54 The implication is that, on the 
point under discussion, literal adherence to the requirement of the credit would have 
defeated performance of the terms of the credit, and this, it is submitted, cannot have 
been the intention of the parties to the transaction.55 
 In Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank Plc,56 the lead furnished in Equitable 
Trust case appears to have been consolidated for ever. In Kredietbank Antwerp, the letter 
of credit called for, among other things, a “Certificate of quality” and “Draft survey 
report” issued by “Griffith Inspectorate.” The plaintiff bank paid against a set of 
documents tendered by the beneficiary. Among the documents were the certificate of 
quality and draft report issued in two papers with the letterhead “Daniel C Griffith 
(Holland) BV”; both documents were duly signed for that company. Further, at the foot 
of each document, as part of the printed notepaper was a logo “Inspectorate,” and the 
caption “Member of the Worldwide Inspectorate Group—dedicated to the elimination of 
risk” was legibly printed underneath the logo. One of the issues for determination was 
whether the presentations were conforming since the certificate of quality and survey 
report were not issued by “Griffith Inspectorate” as required in the letter of credit. After 
an extensive review of a long line of authority advocating the propriety of strict 
documentary compliance, Anthony Diamond, QC (sitting as a judge of the Commercial 
Court, Queens Bench Division) offered some guidance as to the marginal cases in which 
the functional standard of document verification might be utilized with profit:  
                                                 
54
 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1927) 27 Ll L Rep 49, 51—52. Viscount 
Sumner felt it was not necessary to deal with the issue; and, the point did not feature in the speeches of 
Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw, and Lord Carson (dissenting). See, generally, E P Ellinger, “The Doctrine of 
Strict Compliance: Its Development and Current Construction” in Francis D Rose (ed) Lex Mercatoria: 
Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis Reynolds (London: LLP, 2000), 187, 198.  
55
 Westwind Exploration Inc v Homestate Savings Association, 696 SW 2d 378, 382 (S Ct, Tex) (1985): 
Court should eschew construction that makes performance of an agreement impossible. 
56
 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 173. 
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 Where [the credit] requirements are ambiguous, it is permissible, and indeed…essential in 
 practice, for the banker to adopt a reasonable interpretation of those requirements. In 
 considering what is reasonable interpretation a banker is not precluded from having regard to 
 the commercial function of the document required by the credit if that function is or should be 
 apparent to a banker examining the document with reasonable care. It is in this sense that in 
 my view a banker’s approach to document verification should be functional rather than literal 
 or rigid.57 
 
In the instant case, there was no entity existing as “Griffith Inspectorate.” But there was 
an Inspectorate Group consisting of individual companies having affiliation with it; 
Griffith Company was a member of this Group. Considering these facts which the court 
found would be a matter of common knowledge to a reasonable bank document checker, 
his Honour concluded that  
 a bank on a reasonable examination of the documents would form the view that what the 
 letter of credit called for was a document issued by a Griffith company, a member of the 
 Inspectorate Group…[A] bank examining the documents on there face would have realized 
 that there was an obvious misnomer in the latter [sic] of credit.58 
 
On appeal, his Honour’s conclusion was upheld.59 
 At first glance, the decision in Kredietbank Antwerp might be taken to represent a 
departure from “literal, mirror image” standard of strict compliance of presentation 
documents.60 Certainly, this is not the case. The reality is, however, discernible from the 
opening statement of the trial court quoted above. 61 So, where the requirement of the 
credit is clear and the spotted defects in the presentation documents are not of trivial 
                                                 
57
 [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 173, 179. 
58
 Ibid., 184. 
59
 Kredietbank Antwerp v Midland Bank Plc [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 801, esp 815—816, per Evans L J 
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal. See also the American case of Vest v Pilot Point National 
Bank, 996 SW 2d 9 (Ct App, Tex) (1999). The credit required a certificate executed by “the judge of 
Denton County.” But the issuing bank paid against a certificate signed by the “acting judge of Denton 
County.” It was by held by the Court of Appeal of Texas the certificate reasonably complied with the 
credit, probably an alternative way of saying that the document was a functional equivalent to that required 
in the credit. Further, in Bhojwani v Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd [1990] SLR 128, the tendered document was a 
marine policy providing cover “from warehouse, West Germany to warehouse Singapore“instead of “from 
shippers’ warehouse to buyers’ warehouse.” The Court of Appeal of Singapore held that the document 
strictly “conformed to the true intention of the letter of credit.” (Ibid., 134) (Emphasis added).  
60
 Cf E P Ellinger, “The Doctrine of Strict Compliance: Its Development and Current Construction” in 
Francis D Rose (ed) Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of Francis 
Reynolds (London: LLP, 2000), 187, 197. 
61
 See above, n 47 and the passage there referenced. 
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nature,62the stringent standard of documentary compliance must operate untempered by 
the functional legal equivalent standard. Considered from this standpoint, it is easy to 
reconcile the United Bank, Beyene, Bank Cochin, Hanil Bank line of cases with such 
cases as Seaconsar and Voest-Alpine. 63   
 From the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the decision in Equitable 
Trust, besides reaffirming the pre-existing common law standard of strict compliance, 
stands for the proposition that commercial reality and reasonableness should be brought 
to bear on the process of determining whether a tendered document is or is not 
conforming to the terms of a letter of credit. In a sense, the essence of ‘functional 
equivalent standard’ is rooted in the ostensible commercial intention of a credit. This 
approach is consistent with the well established presumption in law that the object of a 
contract is intended to be realized by the parties thereunder, and a construction that will 
sustain that object is preferable to the one that will defeat it.64Considering the facts in 
Equitable Trust, Kredietbank, and Vest cases as regards the point under focus, a non-
commercial approach would have unavoidably rendered performance impossible. This 
                                                 
62
 Answer to the question whether a discrepancy is trivial, depends on the facts in each case. But see above, 
n 49 and accompanying text. Cf Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Irani [1993] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 236, 240, per Lloyd LJ.   
63
 In Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank of China, 167 F Supp 2d 940 (2000): the presentation 
documents bore “Voest-Alpine Trading USA” whereas the credit listed the beneficiary’s name as “Voest-
Alpine USA Trading” (Emphasis added). Contrasting this with the facts in Bank of Montreal(see above, n 
11), Beyene ,and Bank of Cochin cases, Judge Gilmore concluded that “the inversion of geographical 
locator [in the instant case] does not signify a different corporate entity” nor raise a reasonable doubt about 
the entity intended to receive payment under the credit. Ibid., 948. See also Hing Yip Hing Fat Co Ltd v 
Daiwa Bank Ltd [1991] 2 HKLR 35 (High Court, Hong Kong): the letter of credit specified “Cheergoal 
Industries Limited” as the account party, but the tendered documents indicated “Cheergoal Industrial 
Limited” (Emphasis added). Kaplan J held that the mistake was clearly a minor typographical error because 
there was no evidence that the bank had been misled by the mistake in question; and the error could easily 
be seen as a mistake in Hong Kong, the business place of the issuing bank, in that English is not the native 
language of ninety-eight per cent of the population. 
64
 Venizelos SA v Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F 2d 461, 465 (2 nd Cir, Ct App) (1970). 
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was what Bateson J appears to navigate by determining whether the “business meaning”65 
of “Handelsvereening te Batavia” satisfied the intention of the credit.66A fortiori, implicit 
in the course taken by Judge Diamond as well as the Court of Appeals of Texas was a 
conscious effort to eschew a construction that would defeat the overall purpose of the 
credit transaction.     
 
 III. THE BASIS OF STRICT DOCUMENTARY COMPLIANCE   
The conceptual and practical rationale for strict compliance may be considered from three 
distinct perspectives. From the standpoint of the account party, the doctrine of strict 
compliance functions as a safeguard against the possibility of dishonesty of the seller and 
some third party whose services the seller might enlist in the course of performance of its 
obligations under the underlying contract. Often, in letters credit transactions the account 
party does not have a reasonably firm business relationship with the seller so as to 
generate a comfortable measure of confidence in the latter’s integrity. Naturally, 
therefore, to achieve some degree of assurance that the seller will deliver the goods he 
has promised in the sales contract, the account party may instruct the bank to pay only 
against the presentation of a certificate made or executed by a designated body, usually in 
the seller’s country, attesting that the merchandise the seller is minded to ship meet some 
specified quality and quantity. The account party may also require the designated body to 
compare the seller’s invoices which purports to itemize the goods ordered, and 
                                                 
65
 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1926) 24 Ll L Rep 261, 265 
66
 See, generally, Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance Ltd [2005] 1 All ER 117: 
“There has been a shift from literal methods of interpretation towards a more commercial approach… if 
detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of …a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that 
flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense,” Ibid.,123-124, per 
Lord Steyn in a concurring speech, citing Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB [1985] AC 
191, 201 per Lord Diplock. See also Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 
AC 749, 771 per Lord Steyn. 
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accordingly certify them. For example, in Equitable Trust, the credit was opened to 
finance the purchase of a consignment of vanilla beans. The buyer stipulated for the 
production of “a certificate of quality issued by experts who are sworn brokers, signed by 
the Chamber of Commerce” of Batavia.67Rather than the goods he promised the buyer, 
the seller shipped a quantity of wood and iron. In a concurring opinion, considering the 
buyer’s stipulation, Viscount Cave, LC stated that the buyer “desired to be protected by 
the opinions of not less than two experts…who would …be severally responsible for the 
exercise of care and reasonable skill in giving the certificate of quality,68adding that “it is 
at least possible that if a second expert had been employed, he would have exercised 
more care than [just one expert] and would have satisfied himself that the goods which he 
had inspected and certified were actually shipped.” 69Similar conclusion has been reached 
in a considerable line of distinguished cases.70 
 It seems that the insistence of the court in refusing to permit a tender of 
“document which are almost the same, or which will do just as well” is, in large measure, 
anchored in a fervent desire to preserve what might essentially be the buyer’s protection 
under a letter of credit transaction. Thus, allowing a less than strict compliance strikes at 
the heart of this objective.71  
                                                 
67
 See also Bank Melli Iran v Barclays Bank [1951] KB 367.   
68




 See, e.g., Overseas Union Bank Ltd v Chua Teng Hwee (1964) 30 MLJ 165 (Singapore High Court): the 
tendered “inspection certificate” omitted the word “tengusa” to describe the seaweed shipped to the buyer. 
Giving judgment for the bank, Winslow J dramatically described the facts of the case as “the mysterious 
affair of the missing word.” Ibid., 173. For an excellent note on the case, see E P Ellinger, “Strict 
Compliance with the Terms of a Documentary Credit” (1964) 6 Malayan L Rev 417. For American cases, 
see, e.g., Courtaulds North America Inc v North Carolina National Bank, 528 F 2d 802 (1975), where it 
was held that invoices describing goods as “imported acrylic yarn” instead of “100 % acrylic yarn” 
specified in the credit were non-conforming.  
71
 In this regard, the so-called bifurcated standard of documentary compliance is evidently not supportable. 
Under this standard, whilst the account party will have to live with certain measure of discrepancies in a 
reimbursement action against the issuing bank, such discrepancies will justify a denial of payment in a 
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 Another support for strict compliance is discernible from the perspective of the 
beneficiary. It is true that presentation documents must strictly comply with the 
requirements of a letter of credit. But then, such requirements are not a Holy Grail which 
the beneficiary might seek by a conjecture. But the fact of the matter is, in the vast 
majority of cases, upon being notified of the opening of a letter of credit, the beneficiary 
has ample opportunity to review the terms and conditions under which he would be 
entitled to make a draw. He must, then, consider whether he is able to comply with them, 
or whether the terms there contained are consistent with his arrangement, if any, in the 
underlying contract with the account party. Such a consideration also permits him to 
make a timely request, if desired, for amendments, and to withhold shipment of the goods 
if he cannot meet the stipulations in the credit.72 
 Not infrequently, though, after a painstaking and thorough review of the credit, 
the beneficiary may not spot in the letter of credit advised to him any error or 
typographical mistake through no fault of his or his staff. In such a case, the problem is 
determining whether or not the beneficiary should be paid. Finding answer to this 
question has engaged the attention of the American and Singapore courts. The emerging 
position seems to be that once the credit has been advised and a presentation is made, 
absent ambiguity in the credit, the beneficiary must live with the terms of the credit as 
                                                                                                                                                 
dishonour action. This standard was evolved in New York, but appears never to have been applied in that 
jurisdiction: Bank of Cochin Ltd v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co, 612 F Supp 1533, 1539 (Dist Ct, SD 
NY) (1985), affd 808 F 2d 209 (1986). For a fuller discussion of the case, see above, 11. Notwithstanding 
its possible merit, it is undesirable to gloss on the inherent capacity of the bifurcated standard to erode the 
very protection an account party may have provided for in its instruction to an issuing bank. For an erudite 
survey, see Boris Kozolchyk, “Strict Compliance and the Reasonable Document Checker” (1990) 56 
Brooklyn L R 45, 69-72, 79. Contra, John F Dolan, “A Principled Exception to the Strict Compliance Rule 
in Trilateral Letter of Credit Transactions” (2002/2003) 18 BFLR 245, where the learned commentator 
advocates the thesis that in the context of account party/issuing bank litigation, the Canadian courts should 
ask “Are the documents almost the same, or will they do just as well?” This is an offshoot of the bifurcated 
standard doctrine, which is here discredited.  
72
 Coral Petroleum Inc v Tradax Petroleum Inc, 878 F 2d 830, 833 (1989), citing John F Dolan, The Law of 
Letters of Credit, paras 6-03, (Suppl 1989). 
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notified.73For instance, in Tradax Petroleum American Inc v Coral Petroleum Inc74 the 
credit simultaneously called for documentation evidencing shipment of “sweet oil” and 
“sour oil.” The court held that the contradictory requirements in the credit, rendering 
performance impossible, did not excuse strict compliance and it was not open to the court 
to reform the credit because the terms at issue were free of ambiguity.  
 This may appear rather harsh on the beneficiary. But then, hard cases do not make 
good law: the unenviable circumstance of the beneficiary is the natural consequence of 
his omitting, recklessly or innocently, to catch the mistake in the credit. Otherwise, it will 
be necessary to ascertain the shoulders more deserving of bearing the effect of the 
mistake in the credit, a task that is evidently chimerical and perplexing. What cannot be 
denied, however, is that the concept of strict compliance makes the beneficiary to be 
acutely aware well in advance of making a request for payment, of the kind or nature of 
the documents he is expected to tender, and to bear in mind that there would be no 
payment if the documents he wishes to present are non-conforming. 
 In Hanil Bank v PT Bank Negara Indonesia,75a buyer instructed an issuing bank 
to open a letter of credit in favour of “Sun Jun Electronics Co., Ltd.”76 But the issuing 
bank advised the beneficiary of the opening of the credit for “Sun Jin Electronic Co Ltd.” 
The plaintiff bank negotiated documents bearing “Sun Jun Electronics Co Ltd.” The 
Southern District Court of New York held that the beneficiary who negotiated the credit 
to the plaintiff bank had an obligation to examine the credit for possible errors and this 
had not been discharged. 
                                                 
73
 Dolan, ibid. 
74
 878 F 2d 830 (1 st Cir, Ct App) (1989). 
75
 2000 WL 254007 (SD NY) (2000). 
76
 Emphasis added. 
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 It is easy to sympathize with the beneficiary as well as the negotiating bank in the 
Hanil Bank type of case: they are being made to suffer the effect of a mistake committed 
by the issuing bank who drafted the credit. It is not clear, however, whether an issuing 
bank owes a duty to the beneficiary and other presenters to draft the correct information 
in a letter of credit; this point is yet to arise in the cases; it remains a grey area in the law. 
Conceptually, it is arguable that such duty exists between an issuing bank and an account 
party. This too, is still a moot point. One likely instance where an account party will 
proceed against the issuing bank for damages or repudiation of reimbursement liability 
concerns the misadvising of a term of a credit that relates to quantity and quantity of 
goods ordered under the sales contract. It is suggested that, in such a case, save the 
presence of extenuating circumstances, the account party is entitled to succeed in the 
action. 
 The inescapable commercial reality, however, is that our sympathy for the 
beneficiary in Hanil Bank can only be skin-deep: one likely argument would be that in 
determining whether a presentation conform to a credit, the issuing bank has no 
obligation to scrutinize collateral papers, and to have considered the account party’s 
application letter which correctly conveyed the beneficiary’s name would have violated 
this rule.77 More importantly, though, as the Hanil Bank court rightly discerned, the 
variance between the words “Jin” and “Jun” in Korea would not be recognized as 
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 Obviously, this argument cannot be pressed with confidence: in a number of cases it has been held that a 
bank could not claim to be misled by a discrepancy since a presentation covering letter, an apparent 
surplusage, contained the requisite information: see, e.g., First National Bank of Atlanta v Wynne, 149 Ga 
App 811 (Ct App, Ga)(1979); Travis Bank & Trust v State of Texas, 660 SW 2d 851 (Ct App, Tex) (1983); 
New Braunfels National Bank v Odiorne, 780 SW 2d 313 (Ct App, Tex) (1989). If a bank is permitted to 
look at a covering letter, why should it be precluded from consulting an application letter which lies in its 
own file? This point ought sufficiently to tip the scales in favour of the negotiating bank in the instant case. 
Otherwise, it is seriously arguable that the autonomy doctrine preaches insular formalism. Indeed, suppose 
the application letter the issuing bank refused to consult carried a hint of fraud, could it be argued that such 
should be ignored because it formed no part of the documents the issuing bank is required to examine?    
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obviously typographical error; the alphabetical difference will apparently provoke some 
inquiry to determine whether “Sung Jin Electronics Co., Ltd” is one and the same with 
“Sung Jun Electronics Co., Ltd.”78 In this regard, the documents affected by the defect 
could occasion difficulties for the account party in clearing the goods from the customs 
department due to local regulatory enactments regarding clients claiming to be entitled to 
clear certain merchandise; there might also be difficulties in negotiating such discrepant 
documents to another buyer. The result is that the decision in Hanil Bank is supportable 
on this ground.     
 Finally, the quintessential attribute of letters of credit is the assurance that 
payment will be available and quick. The doctrine of strict compliance furthers these 
objectives. The virtues of predictability, reliability, and promptness will be destroyed79 if 
the bank, in determining whether a presentation document complies with the 
requirements of a credit, is obliged to take account of extrinsic matters other than the 
letter of credit and the documents tendered by the beneficiary. Consequently, it is for 
good reason that the bank is presumed to know nothing about practices of the trade, 
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 For a comparable discussion on this point, see above, 9-12.  
79
 See, e.g., Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Jalsard Pty Ltd [1973] AC 279, 286 (PC): “Both the 
issuing bank and his correspondent bank have to make [quick] decisions as to whether a document 
…complies with the requirements of a credit,” per Lord Diplock. See also Toyota Tsusho Corp v Comerica 
Bank, 929 F Supp 1065, 1071 (SD, Mich) (1996); Osten Meat Co v First of America Bank—South 
Michigan, 205 Mich App 686, 689-90 (Ct App, Mich) (1994). 
80
 J H Rayner & Co Ltd v Hambro’s Bank Ltd [1943] 1 KB 37, as to the facts, see above, n 21.  Cf Marino 
Industries Corp v Chase Manhattan Bank, 686 F 2d 112, 115 (1982). 
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IV. CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NON-CONFORMING PRSENTATIONS CAN 
OCCASION A DRAW DOWN 
As has been seen, a presenter, including a beneficiary who wishes to draw on a letter of 
credit must meet the requirements of such credit; he cannot exact payment unless his 
presentation documents are precisely complying. However, this is only one half of the 
strict conformity picture: in certain circumstances, non-conforming presentment 
documents can trigger the payment obligation of a bank, in which case, depending on a 
consideration of the circumstances, at law or in equity, the account party will be entitled 
to repudiate his reimbursement obligation under the credit. We propose to evaluate the 
possible circumstances in the ensuing discussions. 
 
 A. Consultation with the Account Party 
Once an issuing bank has decided to reject a presentation on the ground of a discrepancy, 
it may exercise its discretion to solicit from the account party a waiver of the spotted 
defects. Such a bank (though entitled to consult with the account party to ascertain 
whether it desires to waive any discrepancy) must adhere strictly to the reasonable time 
period for examination of documents enshrined in article 13 (b).81The receipt of the 
account party’s waiver of a discrepancy does not, however, alter the issuing bank’s right 
to require the beneficiary to tender strictly conforming documents.82In the majority of 
cases, though, the bank is obliged to solicit for the account party’s waiver as a matter of 
banking etiquette, for instance where the account party is a big customer. Another, and 
                                                 
81
 Article 14 (c), Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, 1993 Revision, ICC Publication 
N0 500 (Hereafter UCP 500). The provision of article 14 (c ) is a new innovation under UCP 500, and 
indeed crystallized the decision in Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443, affg 
[1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 587.   
82
 Bombay Industries Inc v Bank of New York, 32 UCC Rep Serv 2d 1155 (S Ct, NY) (1996). 
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perhaps more important, reason for permitting consultation with the account party is that, 
since the issuing bank acts on the instructions of the account party, it is commercially 
prudent to consult with him upon noted discrepancies in a presentation. As has been 
succinctly stated in one case, 
 some discrepancies apparently of minor importance, may in fact be crucial to the 
 [account party]: others, apparently major discrepancies, may in the particular 
 circumstances be of no importance at all to the [account party]. The issuing bank knows 
 none of these matters. Its concern will be not to pay out under the letter of credit without 
 the [account party’s] mandate.83  
 
In the same vein, in Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India,84 the Court of Appeal 
accepted without doubt that where discrepancies are found in a presentation documents, 
the practice of the issuing banks in London (and probably global market place of letter of 
credit) is to consult the account party as to whether, on the spotted discrepancies, it would 
or would not wish the issuing bank nevertheless to pay against the documents.85Indeed, in 
Bankers Trust, the expert witnesses for both parties to the proceedings appear to have 
conceded that the practice of consultation is in the interest of all parties to the credit 
transaction, in that it saves everyone money, time and trouble.86 
 Often, in the guise of consulting with an account party, an issuing bank would 
completely shift the responsibility for deciding whether or not to reject a presentation to 
the account party.87 This practically arises where the issuing bank releases the 
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 Co-operative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boereleenbank BA v Sumitomo Bank Ltd, “The Royan”[1987] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 345, 348. This point was left undisturbed by the Court of Appeal, as to which see [1988] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 250. 
84
 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443. 
85
 Ibid., 456, per Sir John Megaw L J. 
86
 Ibid., 449, per Lloyd L J.  
87
 See, e.g., Toyota Tsusho Corp v Comerica Bank, 929 F Supp 1065 (ED, Mich) (1996), where the notice 
advising rejection stated: “Documents rejected by applicant…” and in another notice, “Applicant has 
rejected documents…” (Emphasis added). Significantly, however, the case was decided based on UCP 
400 which did not have article 14 (c) UCP 500 equivalent, as to which, see above n 81. 
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presentation documents to the account party to enable such a party to sift the documents 
to find further discrepancies upon which to base dishonour.88 
 This practice clearly violates article 14 (b)89and, a fortiori, attracts the preclusion 
sanction under article 14 (e), which disentitles such issuing bank from claiming reliance 
on a discrepancy to dishonour a presentation. Unfortunately, the emerging picture in the 
cases is disturbing.  Perhaps, the most illustrative of such cases is Bayerische 
Vereinsbank v Bank of Pakistan.90There, the plaintiff negotiated under a letter of credit 
incorporating the UCP 500 certain presentation documents and forwarded them to the 
defendant bank for payment. The defendant dishonoured the presentation on the ground 
that the documentations were discrepant, which the plaintiff argued could not be asserted 
by reason of non-compliance with article 14. Notwithstanding a finding that the 
defendant issuing bank “did act effectively as no more than a postbox” (which is in 
breach of article 14 (b)) and that “if the defendant [bank] had formed [its] own 
independent judgment, and only resorted to the [account party] for a waiver of 
discrepancies which the exercise of such judgment had yielded, matters would in all 
probability have proceeded considerably quicker than they did,”91 Mance J reasoned: “I 
would be inclined to accept that, if an issuing bank, without unreasonable delay, gives 
notice of a decision to refuse…documents, it is irrelevant whether the process by which it 
has reached such a decision complies with article 14 (b).”92Obviously, the learned judge 
overlooked the clear wording of article 14 (e) which provides in part that “if the issuing 
                                                 
88
 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 587, where the account party 
combed the documents for 48 hours, looking for defects that will justify refusal to make payment.  
89Article 14 (b) of UCP 500: “[T]he issuing bank…must determine [conformity]” (Emphasis added). See 
also Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443, 445.  
90
 [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 59. For a fascinating commentary, see Howard N Bennett, “Stern Doctrine and 
Commercial Common Sense in the Law of Documentary Credits” [1999] LMCLQ 507.  
91
 Ibid., 69. 
92
 Ibid., 68. 
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bank…fails to act in accordance with the provisions of this article,”93 then it shall be 
precluded from claiming that the documents are not conforming to the credit. The 
consequence is that the acts of the defendant bank were caught by the provisions of 
article 14 (b), and thus triggered the preclusion provision of article 14 (e). The conclusion 
is, therefore, inevitable that this point constitutes a separate basis for sustaining the 
plaintiff bank’s claim.94  
 In Amixco Asia (Pte) Ltd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd,95GP Selvam JC took 
the view that “article 1696 does not preclude the issuing bank from referring the 
documents to the customer to look for discrepancies97 and adopt the discrepancies as its 
own…as long as the bank does it within reasonable time.”98Although GP Selvam JC 
decided the case based on UCP 400 which did not contain the equivalent of article 14 (c), 
interestingly, though, the provision of article 16 (b) is equivalent to that of article 14 (b). 
Secondly, the reasoning of GP Selvam JC was discordant with the practice that had 
explicitly been acknowledged in Bankers Trust.99 
 The essence of article 14 (b) of the UCP 500 is clear: an issuing bank is not entitled to 
abdicate the responsibility of determining conformity of a presentation; the responsibility 
is primarily his, and, what is more, failure to meet it automatically triggers the preclusion 
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 Emphasis added. 
94
 In the event, Mance J rested his conclusion on another ground. 
95
 [1992] 2 SLR 943. For an interesting note, see Hsu Locknie, “Documentary Letters of Credit: the Bank’s 
Duty to Bring up all Discrepancies” [1993] Sing J Legal Studies 226. 
96
 UCP 400, 1983 Revision. 
97
 Cf Bankers Trust, a case equally based on the 1983 Revision, where the Court of Appeal deprecated such 
relinquishment of the duty to examine presentation documents.  
98
 Ibid., 957 (Emphasis added). 
99
 At the time Amixco was decided, the Privy Council was the highest appellate court for Singapore. This 
position only changed on 8 April, 1994, when appeals to the Privy Council were abolished, with the Court 
of Appeal of Singapore emerging as the final appellate court for the country. 
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provision of article 14 (e).100 There are good reasons to justify the imposition of this duty 
and the creation of a penalty for its breach. For example, if an issuing bank is permitted 
to rely on the judgment of the account party, and the underlying bargain turns awry, it is 
almost certain that such account party may be minded to avoid its credit obligation 
altogether. To achieve this, it is likely that he will dig into facts extraneous to the 
documents, and raise matters which a reasonable document checker could not have 
conceivably raised in the performance of its task. The result will be an unenviable 
position that undermines the autonomy doctrine, which is the very heart of letters of 
credit. 
 Evidently, therefore, objectionable consultation with an account party cannot be 
excused by the fact that the consultation process did not breach the reasonable time 
requirement under article 13 (b); the discrete provisions of article 13 (b) and 14 (b) 
require equal but separate adherence. To accept otherwise would be to play ostrich.   
 
 B. Untimely Rejection Notice 
Article 14 (d)(i) stipulates that if an issuing bank decides to reject presentation 
documents, it “must give notice to that effect by telecommunication or, if that is not 
possible, by other expeditious means, without delay but not later than the close of the 
seventh banking day following the day of receipt of the documents.” Further, such notice 
must be advised to the presenter of the documents. Failure to comply with these 
requirements attracts the preclusion sanction in article 14 (e). As will be seen shortly, the 
benchmark of seven days is merely the utmost limit; it does not furnish the examining 
                                                 
100
 It is important to note, however, that a breach of article 16 (b) did not attract any sanction under the 
preclusion provision under sub (e), and indeed in the UCP 400.  
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bank an opportunity to wait a week.101Put differently, a rejection notice may be advised 
prior to the expiry of the seven-day deadline and still be untimely because it violates the 
“without delay” criterion. Conversely, a rejection notice issued after the seven-day time 
limit is in apparent violation of the law but may or may not simultaneously constitute a 
breach of article 13 (b) and the other requirements.102  
 The requirement that notice be given “by telecommunication or, if [this] is not 
possible, by other expeditious means,” has been held satisfied if a bank utilized a 
telephone.103Nevertheless, a rejection notice may be advised orally if in the 
circumstances it is the fasted and most convenient medium of reaching the presenter.104 
 The duty to give notice without delay is triggered once a bank, having examined 
the presentation in accordance with article 13 (b),105have taken a decision to refuse to 
make payment; without delay clock literally begins to tick upon the taking of such a 
decision and stops upon the handing in of the rejection notice.106Thus, answer to the 
question whether “without delay” rule has been violated is determined by a consideration 
of the time lag between the conclusion of examination of the documents and the advising 
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 James G Barnes and James E Byrne, “Letters of Credit: 2003 Cases” (2003-2004) 59 Bus Law 1619, 
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106
 The remitting of a rejection notice does not, ipso facto, warrant that it would be received by the person 
to whom it is. From the point of view of the rejecting bank, liability does not attach if the notice is not 
delivered.  
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of a rejection. Self-evidently it all depends on the circumstances in each case. For 
example, in Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran,107Sir 
Christopher Staughton considered that a telex notifying a rejection in the morning of 
Tuesday December 8, 1987 was not a notice sent “without delay,” having regard to the 
evening of Friday December 4, 1987 when a decision to reject the presentation had been 
taken. Similarly, in United Bank Ltd v Banque Nationale de Paris,108it was established in 
evidence that the examination of the presentation documents was completed on 
November 30. Chao Hick Tin J in the High Court of Singapore determined that an advise 
of rejection on December 4 “must necessarily suggest that there was delay” since there 
was, in the circumstances, no justification for not handing in the notice on November 
30.109  
 The razor-edged weapon of untimely rejection notice is often missed by many a 
claimant in legal proceedings. It is true that a claim may fail because the presentation is 
deficient. But it is seldom realized that such failure invites the consideration of an 
alternative claim, i.e. whether the rejection notice is strictly timely as already discussed. 
For example, in Hanil Bank, under a letter of credit incorporating the UCP 500, the 
plaintiff negotiating bank made a tender of documents to the issuing bank on Wednesday, 
August 2, 1995. On Wednesday, August 16, 1995, the issuing bank communicated its 
decision to reject the presentation on the grounds of discrepancies. 110 In addition to other 
claims, 111the plaintiff sought recovery for breach of the UCP 500. Regrettably, there is 
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 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 36. 
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 [1992] 2 SLR 64. 
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 Curiously, November 30, 1980 was a Sunday. It is not clear whether the bank has any obligation to 
examine documents on non banking days.  
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 As regards the specific defects, see above 21-22. 
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nothing in the report of the case indicating the formulation, for the court’s determination, 
of the issue of validity of the issuing bank’s rejection notice; the case seems to have been 
contested on the sole ground of strict compliance of the presentation documents in 
respect of which the claimant lost the action. It is surprising that a claim for breach of 
UCP 500 missed out altogether the question of compliance with articles 13 (b) and14 (d) 
(i). Intriguingly, these articles did not receive even a passing mentioned in the plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment.112 At any rate, there was nothing precluding the presiding 
judge from raising it in the course of its summary judgment, and possibly remanding the 
case for trial of the factual issue. Short of non-conformity of the presentation, it is 
doubtful what conclusion the Hanil court would have reached. The upshot of it, though, 
is that the issuing bank’s rejection notice did not appear to comply with article 14 (d) (i), 
so that the plaintiff might have succeeded by pleading the preclusion provision of article 
(e).  Hence, although the court found the presentation documents to be non-conforming, 
the negotiating bank could have prevailed on the grounds of invalid rejection notice. 
 Admittedly, the chief commercial policy underpinning the provisions of article 14 
(d)(i) is discernible from the general attributes of letters of credit: Letters of credit are 
usually expressed to be open within a specific time. True, they may sometimes be 
revolving or evergreen credit.113 Still, their lifespan cannot be perpetual. A beneficiary 
who is required to present documents to draw down on a credit often have to procure a 
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 In jurisdictions in the US, motion for summary judgment constitutes a request, made to the court that 
judgment be entered without trial in favour of the movant because there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact to be decided and that the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law: 
Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 250 (Supreme Court of the US) (1986). See also Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 8 th edition, (1999), 1038, col 2.  
113
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 104 
variable number of documents of varying degrees of complexity.114This feature renders 
such documents susceptible to equally varying degrees of clerical errors; documentary 
errors or mistake are almost inevitable. So, once the requisite documents are tendered, it 
is vitally important that the beneficiary be advised of such spotted errors so that he may 
take steps to regularize the creases, cure the defects and thereafter make a re-tender115 
before the expiry of the credit, in which case an untimely notice of rejection may have the 
practical effect of denying the beneficiary an opportunity to rectify a discrepancy. 
Considered from this standpoint, it seems that the preclusion provision of article 14 (e) 
serves to punish the issuing or confirming bank for denying this opportunity to the 
beneficiary.116 
 Incidentally, the earlier Revisions of the UCP, for instance 1962 and 1974 
Revisions, 117imposed on the issuing bank a duty to notify a rejection without prescribing 
remedy for its breach. In the event, the court resorted to the common law of contract for a 
remedy if the issuing bank is in breach of its notification obligation.118 It so happened that 
in many cases a beneficiary could not recover for failure to advise it of a rejection unless 
he was able to prove that he suffered actual damage thereby. One such instance is where 
the beneficiary could not have cured the discrepancy before the expiry of the credit. 
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Additionally, a failure to notify a rejection attracted no remedy if the beneficiary had 
actual knowledge of the discrepancy before making a tender of the documents.119  
 It is regrettable that in spite of the clear entrenchment in the 1983 and 1993 
Revisions120 of a remedy for a breach of the duty to notify, some American cases decided 
under these Revisions121 seem to mistake an old law for a different animal by denying 
recovery to otherwise legitimate claims. The implication is that, where a presentation is 
made on the last day of a credit, and some defect is spotted in the tendered documents, 
the issuing bank will be relieved of any obligation to notify it to the beneficiary 
expeditiously since, at any rate, the defect cannot have been remedied, the credit having 
expired!  
 The trend is best exemplified in LeaseAmerica Corp v Norwest Bank Duluth.122In 
this case, a presentation made on 31 May, the last day of a credit subject to UCP 400, was 
dishonour two days later and notified, without stating the defects, by telephone the same 
day. Holding for the bank, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit said: “There is no 
dispute that the Bank did not notify LeaseAmerica [of the discrepancy]… [F]ailure to so 
notify LeaseAmerica does not preclude the Bank from dishonour, as the defect was 
incurable.”123It is worrisome, though, that in the relatively recent case of Heritage Bank v 
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Redcom Laboratories Inc,124the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejuvenated the 
LeaseAmerica curability of defects tenet as well as its detrimental reliance offshoot.   
 To be sure, a trickle of cases that have allowed recovery in the context of 
incurable of discrepancies seem to be anchored in the distinction between issuing bank 
and confirming bank action as opposed to issuing bank and beneficiary dispute.125Unlike 
in the latter case, so it has been reasoned,126 the confirming bank is never in a position to 
cure any discrepancy. 
 There is no basis for this distinction. In letters of credit, there is no such thing as 
incurable discrepancies relieving the issuing bank of the strict obligation to notify a 
rejection. Nor is there any contemporary practice that requires the beneficiary to establish 
that the issuing bank’s failure to advise him of a discrepancy resulted in detriment to the 
beneficiary. If a breach of the duty to give notice of rejection is alleged, it is irrelevant 
that at the time the dishonour should have been advised the credit has expired, thus 
rendering unavailable the opportunity for a cure; liability for breach of the provisions of  
article 14 (d) (i) is strict. This may sound stern. But the truth is that letter of credit law 
has to be strictly adhered to by the contracting parties, and rigorously enforced by the 
courts when called upon to adjudicate disputes arising therefrom. It is reassuring to note 
that in large measure, on this point, the English court is unlikely to accept the 
LeaseAmerica reasoning and conclusion. Indeed, none of the English cases decided under 
the 1983 and 1993 Revisions has attempted to offer a shield to an issuing bank that has 
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failed to live up to its strict obligation to advise a rejection under the beguiling sophistry 
of discrepancy incurability.127 
 Thus, if a credit specifies, say 30 June as the expiry date, and a presentation is 
made on the last day, i.e. 30 June, the issuing or confirming bank is obligated to strictly 
comply with the notice requirements of article 14, including the reasonable time criterion 
of article 13 (b). Another way of putting the matter is to state that the expiry date of a 
credit subject to the UCP only concerns the last date for making a presentation to realize 
the proceeds of the credit.128A bank that takes solace in the fact that the expiration of the 
credit furnishes it with an excuse to eschew compliance with the UCP notice 
requirements does so at its peril. 
 In practice, though, the sad irony is that, where the lifespan of a credit has 
virtually run out, a beneficiary who knows that his documentations are incomplete to 
draw down on the credit, may desire to take a chance by making a tender,129 bearing in 
mind that the bank could commit a slip under article 14, and thus trigger the mine in 
article 14 (e). But then, absent fraud,130 it is not the concern of the law of letter of credit 
to investigate the bona fides of a beneficiary; it is the obligation of the bank documents 
checker to examine a presentation in a most professional and diligent manner, and advise 
the beneficiary of any spotted defects in accordance with the rules.131Such is part of the 
                                                 
127
 Cf Toyota Tsusho Corp v Comerica Bank, 929 F Supp 1065, 1074 (ED, Michigan) (1996), ostensibly 
remains a lone case that courageously rejects this doctrine, and held that a beneficiary is not obligated to 
show detrimental reliance or ability to cure a defect before he can base a claim on article 16 (d) and (e) of 
the UCP 400 (now article 14 (d) and (e) of UCP 500). 
128
 See article 42 (a) and (b) of the UCP 500. 
129
 It is noteworthy, however, that a presentation is made on the date it is received, not the date on which it 
is mailed or sent, e.g. by courier: Todi Exports v Amrav Sportswear Inc, 1997 WL 61063 (SD, NY), citing 
Second National Bank of Toledo v M Samuel & Sons, 12 F 2d 963, 966 (2 Cir, 1926).  
130
 In relation to a detailed consideration of the fraud exception, see Chapter Two above. 
131
 See, generally, John F Dolan, “Strict Compliance with Letters of Credit: Striking a Fair Balance” (1985) 
102 Banking L J 18. 
 108 
quintessential uniqueness of letter of credit as an efficient and reliable device for 
financing international commerce. 
 
 C. Inadequate Rejection Notice 
The provision of article 14 (d) (ii) imposes a duty on a rejecting bank to state in its 
rejection notice “all discrepancies” in respect of which a presentation is dishonoured, 
“and must also state whether it is holding the [presentation] documents at the disposal of, 
or is returning them to, the presenter.” If the rejecting bank fails to comply with these 
obligations, it “shall be precluded from claiming that the documents do not meet the 
requirements of the credit.”132 
 Essentially, a rejection notice must in plain words give the reasons for 
dishonour.133Such notice must not leave the beneficiary with the burden of speculating on 
the various possible interpretations to be given to the language or words there 
employed.134Thus, a notice advising that “documents rejected for various non-
conformities” is imprecise and, on this account, defective under article 14(d)(ii).135 
Where a defect is noticed in a specific presentation document, e.g. incorrect entry in the 
requisite bill of lading an erroneous designation of the account party, a rejection notice 
citing this as a ground for refusal to pay, must make specific reference to the document in 
which the discrepancy is contained. 
 More importantly, the stating in a rejection notice of one ground for dishonour 
constitutes a waiver of all other grounds not specified; a rejecting bank is not entitled to 
                                                 
132
 Article 14 (e) UCP 500. 
133
 Occidental Fire & Casualty Co v Continental Bank, 918 F 2d 1312, 1318 (7 th Cir, 1990). 
134
 Toyota Tsusho Corp v Comerica Bank, 929 F Supp 1065, 1075 (SD, Michigan) (1996), where a notice 
was held inadequate for failing to identify the document alleged to be deficient. 
135
 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (6 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), para 23—155. 
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rely on a ground in subsequent dishonour if it did not raise that ground in its initial 
rejection notice. According to one case,136 it would be an unfair treatment of the 
beneficiary if a bank, having rejected a presentation based only on a specific discrepancy, 
is allowed subsequently to raise fresh objections for dishonour.  
 But this proposition provokes a critical question: If a bank raises in a subsequent 
presentation a valid discrepancy that was not raised to dishonour initial presentation and 
it turns out that the initial ground for rejection is invalid, is the bank entitled to rely on the 
later objection to deny payment? One view, favoured by the English137 and Singapore138 
courts, is that the bank can only rely on new grounds for rejecting a presentation within a 
reasonable time139 after the initial rejection, so that when a rejection notice is deficient, 
the rejecting bank may cure the defect by a supplementary notice. Perhaps sharing this 
perspective, in Toyota Tsusho Corp v Comerica Bank,140the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan considered valid a follow-up telex of rejection “notice received just 
one day after the original notice141was received.” 142 
 Contrastingly, in Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp v Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 143on Monday, December 30, 1985 the issuing bank dishonoured a 
presentation stating three grounds. Subsequently, the beneficiary re-tendered the 
documents. Again, these were dishonoured on Thursday, January 2, 1986, via a notice 
stating two grounds neither of which had been raised in the previous rejection. The 
                                                 
136
 Amixco Asia (Pte) Ltd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [1992] 2 SLR 943, 953-954, citing Case Studies 
in Documentary Credits (1989), Case 53. 
137
 Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of India [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 587, affd [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443 (CA). 
138
 Amixco Asia (Pte) Ltd v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [1992] 2 SLR 943, 953. 
139
 It may be stated with confidence that a reasonable time means a period of three banking days. 
140
 929 F Supp 1065 (1996). 
141
 The court determined that the original notice was insufficient to satisfy article 16 (d) of the UCP 400.  
142
 929 F Supp 1065, 1075 (1996). 
143
 872 F 2d 971 (11 th Cir, 1989). 
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Eleventh Circuit held that the two objections in the later dishonour, albeit valid were 
unavailing. Put differently, the issuing bank was entitled to rely only on the initial 
grounds, which, in the event, the court found to be invalid. Further, in Hamilton Bank v 
Kookmin Bank144a presentation was rejected on Wednesday, July 24, 1996.145 The 
negotiating bank re-tendered the documents on Friday, August 2, 1996. On Tuesday, 
August 6, 1996 the issuing bank again dishonoured the presentation on a valid ground not 
stated in the initial rejection of Wednesday, July 24, 1996. The court found in favour of 
the negotiating bank because, among other reasons, the issuing bank was not entitled to 
rely on the subsequent, albeit valid ground. 
 In the ultimate analysis, the cases appear to hold that a rejecting bank is precluded 
from relying on a valid ground to dishonour a subsequent presentation if such ground was 
not advised in the rejection notice regarding an initial tender. Quite apart from the 
moderating notion of reasonableness evinced by the English and Singapore146  
jurisdictions, it must be right to re-engineer the confines of this proposition. 
 To begin with, the initial rejection of a presentation for a stated reason does not of 
itself warrant or represent that the documents are otherwise in order, save circumstances 
where the stating in the initial rejection notice of the spotted defects amounts to a 
representation that payment would be made upon a re-tender of rectified 
documentation.147 An alternative argument would be to regard the various presentations 
                                                 
144
 245 F 3d 82 (2 nd Cir, 2001). See also Esso Petroleum Canada v Security Pacific Bank, 710 F Supp 275 
(D, Oregon) (1989): An inadequate notice was given on Friday, November 13, 1987. On Monday, 
November 16, 1987 the bank handed in a notice sufficiently stating the grounds for rejection. The 
subsequent notice was held unavailable for the bank to rely upon.   
145
 At trial court found that the reasons for the initial rejection were invalid. 
146
 As to this point, see above nn 137 and 138, including the discussion there referenced. 
147
 H C Gutteridge and Maurice Megrah, The Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credits (6 th ed., London: 
Europa, 1984), 190. Interestingly, one American case endorses this view: Occidental Fire & Casualty Co of 
North Carolina v Continental Bank, 918 F 2d 1312, 1322 (7 th Cir, 1990).  
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as distinct from each other, in which case the rejection of one presentation creates a 
tabula rasa, entitling a bank to treat a subsequent presentation as a fresh tender, as 
regards which objections may be raised whether or not such objections existed in the 
initial presentation, but was in fact not raised. A contrary proposition, implicitly favoured 
in the cases, is to regard the first and subsequent presentations as a continuum such that 
dishonour on one specific ground precludes reliance on another ground to reject 
subsequent tenders.   
 It is submitted, however, that the latter proposition constitutes reading into the 
UCP what the rules do not contemplate. To be sure, the UCP only require the bank to 
examine tendered documents and, where they are rejected, to state all discrepancies there 
spotted. It cannot be that by so stating the rejecting bank is representing that a subsequent 
tender will be honoured if the spotted discrepancies are corrected. As succinctly put by 
Parker J, 
  [t]o hold that [the bank] thereby made any representation would…seriously  undermine the 
 whole system of documentary credits, for banks would be obliged,  for their own protection 
 and the protection of their customers, always to scrutinize  with utmost care every document 
 presented from beginning to end, notwithstanding that they may find in the first few lines of 
 the document…one or  more good and sufficient reasons for refusal to pay.148  
 
Surely, in the context of the present discussion, to consider all the tenders under a 
particular credit as a continuum, necessitating fixing the bank with the obligation to 
furnish an exhaustive list of all available defects in the very first presentation will 
invariably increase the cost of operating letters of credit, and make the determination of 
conformity in the initial presentation, a nightmare for the bank documents checker.  
 At any rate, if a beneficiary is entitled to take advantage of a subsequent 
presentation to rectify discrepancies pointed out to him, why should the bank not be 
                                                 
148
 Kydon Compania Naviera SA v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68, 79. 
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similarly entitled to rely on a discrepancy which may have escaped its circumspection in 
the initial examination of the documents? Indeed, there is no good reason to consider the 
bank as waiving unspotted defects, having regard to its obligation to determine 
conformity of presentation within a reasonable time, a space of time that can hardly 
assure thoroughness. This is another way of saying that the UCP do not sanction the 
seemingly conventional wisdom currently enjoying, in varying degrees, the support of the 
courts illustrated by the cases noted above.  The ineluctable conclusion is that a notice 
needs only state the discrepancy in respect of which a presentation is rejected on that 
particular occasion, so that a statement of a particular reason or reasons for rejecting the 
presentation is not alone sufficient to found a representation, waiver, or promissory 
estoppel in respect of other discrepancies.149 
  It is legitimate, though, to enter a caveat: A rejecting bank may be precluded 
from relying on grounds not raised in an initial presentation if (a) the occasion for raising 
a fresh ground is not in a subsequent presentation, e.g. in the course of litigation or 
arbitration proceedings; (b) the rejecting bank can in the circumstances be regarded to 
have represented to the beneficiary upon the initial presentation that payment will be 
made against a re-tender, e.g. where the beneficiary specifically request the bank to state 
defects which he would have to cure as a matter of urgency, and the bank responded 
accordingly; (c) the initial and subsequent presentations could in the circumstances be 
treated as a continuum, i.e. one presentation, e.g. where the subsequent presentation 
constitutes an attempt to cure the discrepancies noted in the previous tender. One such 
instance is where a presentation is dishonoured due to a specific non-conforming 
document, and the beneficiary is requested to rectify this particular document whilst the 
                                                 
149
 Paget’s Law of Banking (11 th ed., London: Butterworths, 1996), 692. 
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other documents are retained by the bank; and (d), a discrepancy is unavailing if the 
relevant circumstances antecedent to the purported notification of rejection amounts to an 
estoppel or a waiver, with the result that allowing the rejecting bank to rely on a 
discrepancy to withhold payment will be inequitable and prejudicial to the party 
requesting payment.150In this case, the incidence of proof together with the trouble such 
entails is on the claimant presenter.     
 Besides such grounds just mentioned, and in addition to the halfway house 
palliative151 favoured by the English and Singapore courts, it is difficult to agree with the 
proposition that a rejecting bank is in any event disentitled to justify dishonour by relying 
on deficiencies not raised in an initial rejection notice.  
 
 D. The Requirement to Advise of the Fate of Dishonoured Documents  
The UCP requires that a notice communicating a rejection must state whether the 
rejecting bank holds the dishonoured documents to the order of, or is returning them to, 
the person from whom it received the documents.152To meet this requirement, the UCP 
                                                 
150
 See, e.g., Floating Dock Ltd v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 65: The 
issuing denied payment in reliance upon discrepancies noted in the tendered documents. The seller 
beneficiary argued that the former had previously agreed that it would accept and pay against documents in 
the form in which they were tendered. Evans J, as he then was, found for the seller presenter on the basis 
that the prior agreement constituted a representation which the seller presenter reasonably relied upon when 
it tendered the documents. See also Crocker Commercial Services v Countryside Bank, 538 F Supp 1360 
(1981): Under a credit made subject to UCP 1974, a certificate and accompanying invoices were in the 
name “Crocker United Factors, Inc” instead of “Crocker Commercial Services, Inc” arising from the fact 
that the latter company was the former’s successor-in-title. Holding that all the essential ingredients of 
estoppel were established, Shadur J determined that the rejecting bank could have placed “an urgent 
telephone call” to enable the beneficiary presenter to remedy the discrepancy; US Industries Inc v Second 
New Haven Bank, 462 F Supp 662 (1978): Upon inquiry about the presented documents, the beneficiary 
was informed that “there did not appear to be any problems” with the documents, and that if any problem 
arose he would be contacted. After the expiry of the credit, the issuing bank rejected the documents because 
the certificate failed to indicate that demand for payment had been made and not received. Daly J held in 
favour of the beneficiary because the conduct of the issuing bank “effectively precluded the plaintiff from 
presenting a complying” certificate. (Ibid., 665).  
151
 See above, nn 137 and 138, including the discussion there referenced. 
152
 Article 14(d) (ii) of the UCP 500. 
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have not laid down any formula that approximates to mathematical precision. Once a 
notice conveys the impression that a bank has rejected a presentation (i.e. have refused to 
make payment) based on specified grounds, and that the presenter is at liberty to take 
from the bank the dishonoured documents, it may confidently be argued that the UCP 
criterion is satisfied. This is so even if the notice in question indicates that the issuing 
bank is contacting the account party thereby leaving open the possibility that it would 
make payment upon a waiver of the discrepancies.  
 At one time, it was thought, or so it seemed, that this position had become settled. 
Two recent cases decided by the English and American courts have enacted a disturbing 
trend: The presence of a rider in a notice advising a discrepancy that the issuing bank is 
contacting or soliciting the account party for a waiver of irregularities renders such notice 
defective. The logical place to commence a probe is the case of The Royan.153 
 In The Royan, one of the issues for determination was whether a telex notice, 
“Please consider these documents at your disposal until we receive our principal’s 
instructions concerning the discrepancies,” constituted a rejection notice. Gatehouse J 
took the view that it was not “a notice complying with art. 8(e),” because “[i]t was not 
clearly intimating a… rejection of the [tendered] documents [having regard to] the 
qualifying words—‘Until we receive our principal’s instructions concerning the 
discrepancies.’” 154On appeal, Lloyd LJ reversed Gatehouse J in the following words: 
 The effect of [the] telex…was that the documents were being held  unconditionally at the 
 disposal of the sellers. The reference to ‘until we receive our principal’s instructions’ was 
 no doubt reflecting the hope [for a resolution of the discrepancies]. I cannot read that 
 expression of hope as meaning that the documents were not at the disposal of the sellers.155 
                                                 
153
 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345. 
154
 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345, 349. 
155
 Co-operative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boereleenbank v Sumitomo Bank Ltd, The Royan [1988] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 250, 254. Nicholls and O’Connor L JJ agreed with Lloyd LJ. See also Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank 
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This refreshing conclusion plainly demonstrates that such words as “We are contacting 
the applicant” or “Until we receive our principal’s instructions” does not render 
ambiguous a telex conveying the fact of rejection. Admittedly, such words do not suggest 
that an obstruction lies in the way of a presenter that is desires to take away the rejected 
documents from the issuing bank.156 
  Arguably, the American case of Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank of 
China157 sowed the seed of uncertainty and confusion on the point under present 
discussion. In that case, the telex in issue read, inter alia, “We are contacting the 
applicant of the relative discrepancy [sic]. Holding documents at your risks and 
disposal.” The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that 
the telex notice was defective for failing to “convey refusal,” adding “[t]his omission is 
only compounded by the statement that the Bank of China would contact the applicant to 
determine if it would waive the discrepancies. [And], this additional piece of information 
holds opens the possibility of acceptance …and indicates that the Bank of China has not 
refused the documents.”158By a unanimous decision,159 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, endorsed the finding and reasoning of Gilmore J.  
 The decision in Voest-Alpine is startling. The finding by the trial court that the 
critical telex did not constitute a notice of refusal because of the absence in the telex of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 236, 240. See also United Bank Ltd v Banque 
Nationale de Paris [1992] 2 SLR 64, 76 (HC, S’Pore). 
156
 See, e.g., Bankers Trust v State Bank of India[1991] 1Lloyd’s Rep 587 where Hirst J held that the words 
“Documents held at your risk and will be at your disposal after payment to us” did not comply with article 
16 (d) of the UCP 400 because they imported conditional disposition.  
157
 167 F Supp 2d 940 (2000). 
158
 Ibid., 945. 
159
 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank of China, 288 F 3d 262 (2002). 
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“clear statement of refusal”160 is patently unsound: Article 14 (d) (i) has not prescribed 
any semantic formula to convey a rejection. On the contrary, its clear stipulation is that a 
rejection notice is good if it is to the effect that161 the bank has dishonoured the 
presentation, i.e. the issuing or confirming has rejected the tendered documents. It was 
undisputed that the confirming bank and the beneficiary were aware thorough the telex 
that payment would not be made because of discrepancies. If such a notification of 
discrepancies does not convey the fact of rejection, then what is? 
 The dust raised by the Voest-Alpine courts had scarcely settled before an English 
court handed down a decision in Credit Industriel et Commercial v China Merchants 
Bank.162There, the issuing bank’s SWIFT 163message to the confirming bank notifying 
the latter of discrepancies concluded in the following words: 
  “We refuse the documents according to Art. 14 UCP.500. Should the disc  being 
[sic] accepted by the applicant, we shall release the docs to them without  further  notice 
to you unless yr instructions to the contrary received prior to our  payment. Documents 
held at yr risk for yr disposal.” 164 
David Steel J took the view165 that the foregoing excerpt did not show that the issuing 
bank was holding the dishonoured documents to the order of the presenter. With respect, 
this view completely misconceives the SWIFT message in issue. Earlier in his judgment, 
                                                 
160
 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp v Bank of China, 167 F Supp 2d 940, 944 (2000). 
161
 The phrase “to the effect that” and its equivalents “to that effect” employed in the UCP article 14 (d) (i) 
refers to the fact that a tender is rejected. 
162
 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 427. 
163
 Founded in 1973 and Headquartered in Brussels, Society for the Worldwide Inter-bank Financial 
Telecommunication operates a standardized messaging service for financial messages, such as letters of 
credit, payments, securities transactions among its over 7,800 member financial institutions in more than 
200 countries:< http://www.swift.com> 
164
 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 427, 431.(Emphasis added). 
165
 Ibid., 445. 
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166
 the learned judge quoted in full the SWIFT message, including the words 
“Documents held at yr risk for yr disposal.” Some fifteen pages later in his judgment, 
in considering the rejection issue, David Steel J re-quoted a portion of the SWIFT 
message without those critical words, and then, curiously, proceeded to the conclusion 
just mentioned. Additionally, his Lordship’s citation to the observations of Lloyd L J in 
The Royan167is open to objection. According to David Steel J,  
 [Lloyd L J’s proposition] merely concludes that, where the contracting parties are in 
 negotiation, a statement by the bank that it will hold the documents at the disposal of the 
 sellers pending a resolution of the dispute is not a conditional rejection.168 
 
 This interpretation seems to pigeonhole the fascinating reach of the observations 
under reference. As Lloyd L J himself explained in Bankers Trust Co v State Bank of 
India,169a telex , or SWIFT message as in Credit Industriel, “saying that documents are 
being held at the disposal of the sellers until something happens [denotes that] the 
documents are held unconditionally at the disposal of the sellers.”170 
 The decisions in Voest-Alpine and Credit Industriel are blatantly bizarre. The 
point must be made that a rejection notice is not defective by reason only of an implicit or 
explicit indication in such notice that the rejecting bank is consulting the account party 
for a waiver, provided that nothing in the notice convey the impression or inference that 
the documents are being held conditionally. Given the obvious misconceptions of facts 
and principles regarding rejection point in the Voest-Alpine and Credit Industriel courts, 
it is legitimate to conclude that both cases were wrongly decided.   
 




 Co-operative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boereleenbank v The Sumitomo Bank Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 250, 
254. 
168
 [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 427, 447. 
169
 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 443. 
170
 Ibid., 452. (Emphasis in the original). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The doctrines of strict compliance of presentation documents and a rejection notice are 
two sides of the same coin. The concern of this article has been to examine the intriguing 
interplay of the principles of strict compliance of presentation as they impinge upon the 
bank’s strict obligation to give a rejection notice once it has decided to dishonour the 
presentation. In the main, this article concerned itself with an extensive examination of 
the emerging trend in the context of litigation; we made firm suggestions where it was 
felt that the courts have unjustifiably ignored the relevant principles or unsatisfactorily 
applied them. 
 A bank that has decided to reject a presentation occupies a position akin to that of 
a beneficiary that desires to draw down on a credit; both positions impose obligations the 
parties must strictly discharge. Where a bank denies payment or reimbursement on the 
ground of non-conformity of a presentation, the primary focus is on the terms of the 
credit, whilst in relation to the rejecting bank’s notice obligation, the provision of article 
14 of the UCP takes the centre stage. Essentially, both spheres constitute closely related 
doctrines. As has been argued in the article, if there is a finding that an alleged 
discrepancy adequately justifies dishonour, it then becomes necessary to consider the 
question of validity of rejection notice. Thus, a consideration of validity of rejection 
notice raises the implicit assumption that the alleged irregularity did warrant dishonour. 
Where an examining bank dishonours a presentation on the ground of an alleged 
discrepancy, it would be wise for the presenter or beneficiary’s counsel to consider 
whether the functional legal equivalent standard may avail, if not, then he may seek to 
rely on the alternative ground of strict conformity of rejection notice. As has been argued 
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in this chapter, the latter ground was clearly available in Hanil Bank. Unfortunately, the 
counsel for the plaintiff-negotiating bank appeared to have missed the rejection notice 
point; they neither raised nor argued the issue before the court.  Contrastingly, in Bank of 
Cochin, the confirming bank who inadvertently, and perhaps without want of 
professional diligence, negotiated discrepant documents succeeded because the issuing 
bank failed to meet its strict rejection notice obligation under the credit. 
 It might seem that the doctrine of strict compliance of rejection notice has a ring 
of harshness: In practice, it tends to ride roughshod over a rejecting bank. Further, no 
ameliorating principles exist to tame its rigours as opposed to the principle of strict 
compliance of presentation documents that frown upon zero tolerance of discrepancies in 
all circumstances. This chapter notes that this may well be true, but insists that it 
constitutes a significant part of the intriguing uniqueness of letters of credit as 
international trade financing device.  
 Finally, it is worth reiterating that article 14 (b) imposes on the bank the 
obligation to determine conformity of presentation documents; the remedy for its breach 
is automatic preclusion of a claim based on discrepancy. The seeming tolerance by the 
courts of the bank’s abdication of its document examination duty constitutes a refusal to 




                                               CHAPTER FOUR 
                 APPLICATIONS FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been noted in the preceding discussions that a bank to whom conforming 
documents are tendered must pay in accordance with the stipulations in the letter of 
credit. The courts will not intervene by injunction to interrupt the natural run of the credit 
unless there is a fraud committed by the beneficiary or by a third party to the 
beneficiary’s knowledge. Thus, where an account party considers that the beneficiary has 
committed, or is complicit in the commission of, a fraud he may apply to a court for a 
perpetual or permanent prohibitory injunction or quia timet injunction to restrain either 
the issuing bank from honouring its payment obligation under the credit or to prevent the 
beneficiary from making a request for payment; in either case, though, the criteria for 
granting the injunction is the same.1 In practice, the crushingly stringent character of the 
criteria has been the undoing of otherwise meritorious claims. The aim of this chapter is 
to evaluate the emerging trends in the courts.  
 An interlocutory injunction2  is a court order to a person to whom it is addressed 
to do or refrain from doing something. Interlocutory injunctions vary in form, but 
uniform in purpose, which is to preserve the state of affairs that existed immediately 
before the issue of a writ seeking a permanent injunction. Injunctive relief granted by a 
                                                 
1
 The contrary proposition accepted in the Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] QB 84 (CA) is not now an accurate 
statement of law. As to this, see, e.g., Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 
4 All ER 180, 197; affd sub nom, Group Josi v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345, 361; 
Dong Jin Metal Co Ltd v Raymet Ltd [1993] CA Transcript 945. See also Brody, White & Co Inc v Chemet 
Handel Trading (S) Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 65, 73 (CA, S’pore). For insightful discussion, see Agasha 
Mugasha, “Enjoining the Beneficiary’s Claim on a Letter of Credit or Bank Guarantee” [2004] JBL 515.   
2
 See, generally, Hanbury & Martin, Modern Equity (17 th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), ch 25; 
(hereafter Hanbury & Martin); Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and Remedies (4 th ed., 
Australia: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), ch 21; Alastair Hudson, Equity & Trust (3 rd., London: 
Cavendish Publishing, 2003), ch 31. 
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court upon an interlocutory application is usually expressed to be in force for a short 
specified period or until the final hearing of the substantive case; the court may make it 
permanent at the latter stage. 
 Ordinarily an application for an injunction is made with notice to the defendant 
sought to be enjoined thereunder, so that after due consideration of the merit of the case, 
the court may grant the relief requested. Often, a final decision may not come until after a 
few months or even years when all the parties might have been heard, in which case the 
claimant may consider that the urgency of his claim requires the immediate restraint of 
the bank from honouring a call or the beneficiary from receiving payment under the letter 
of credit transaction. In this regard, the most expedient course the claimant may take will 
be to apply for and obtain an ex parte interlocutory injunction, although the interlocutory 
action will subsequently be heard inter parte, in which case the defendant will then have a 
chance to request the court to set aside or vary the injunction.3 An interlocutory 
injunction may be discharged by the court pursuant to the exercise of its inherent 
jurisdictional power, notwithstanding that the defendant (or a person affected by the 
injunction but had not been a party to the proceedings) has not requested for the 
discharge.4  
 Currently, in England the courts will not grant an application for an interlocutory 
injunction to interrupt payment or request for payment under a letter of credit or 
performance guarantee transaction without a showing by the claimant of a clear fraud of 
                                                 
3
 Hanbury & Martin, para 25—006. 
4
 RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] QB 146. cf Bolivinter Oil SA v 
Chase Manhattan Bank [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251, where Sir John Donaldson, M.R., omitted to take a 
similar course. 
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which the bank had notice.5 Section two provides the conceptual background to the thesis 
extensively argued in section three that such a requirement in interlocutory proceedings 
cannot be right. Section four investigates the rationale behind the requirement of a cause 
of action to found an application for an interlocutory injunction in proceedings initiated 
against the issuing bank. Section five considers the propriety of the application by the 
English courts to letters of credit or performance guarantees interlocutory proceedings the 
balance of convenience guidelines formulated by the House of Lords in the American 
Cyanamid case. The section concludes with a suggestion that the American Cyanamid 
balance of convenience guidelines are inherently at odds with the policy foundation of 
the fraud exception to the inviolability of the bank’s payment obligations.  
                                             
II. A STONG PRIMA FACIE CASE VERSUS A SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE TRIED 
 The jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction is discretionary. The essence 
of the injunctive remedy is to forestall the perpetration of injustice by one party to 
another.6 The jurisdiction to grant the remedy was originally enshrined in s 25 (8) of the 
Judicature Act 1873; the provisions were re-enacted under s 45 (1) of the Supreme Court 
of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. This section authorized the court to grant an 
interlocutory or final injunction “in all cases in which it appeared to the court to be just or 
convenient that such other should be made.” Notably, this provision, or at least its 
substance, remains a part of the remarkable heritage of all common law jurisdictions.  
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 
202: The courts will not intervene by injunction “unless the fraud [alleged] comes to the notice of the bank, 
i.e. [the fraud is of such a character that ] it can be said that the bank had knowledge of [it]”. See also n 29 
below.   
6
 Smith-Kline Beecham plc v Apotex Europe Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 137, para 18 per Aldous, L.J; Bath and 
North East Somerset District Council v Mowlem plc [2004] EWCA Civ 115. 
 123 
 In England, the extant provision is to be found under s 37 (1) of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981, re-enacting with slight literal fine-tuning the 1925 legislation. Neither 
the 1981 Act nor the previous legislation provided the criteria the court may utilize when 
exercising the jurisdiction there conferred on it, so that the question in what circumstance 
it would be “just and convenient”7 to grant an interlocutory or final injunction inevitably 
continued to vary from case to case.  
 The practice, prior to the 1975 House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co v 
Ethicon8was that a plaintiff who sought an interlocutory injunction needed to make out a 
prima facie case, i.e. a case which he had a real prospect of winning at the trial. 9This 
constituted a primary hurdle the plaintiff had to overcome to entitle the court to consider 
the side the balance of convenience tipped.10 
 In American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd,11the accustomed practice on the 
criterion of a prima facie case, for good or ill, underwent a radical transformation in the 
House of Lords. In that case, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
the defendant from launching in England a suture which the plaintiff claimed infringed 
their patent covering certain sterile absorbent surgical sutures. In the course of delivering 
the sole judgment of the House, Lord Diplock said that there was no requirement that 
                                                 
7
 The 1981 Act modified version is “just and convenient”. 
8
 [1975] AC 396. 
9
 Fellow & Son v Fisher [1976] 1 QB 122, 131. 
10
 JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley [1964] 3 All ER 102 (HL), 111, per Lord Pearce : “The question now to 
be decided is whether the appellant have made out a prima facie case”; see also the concurring speeches of 
Lord Reid, 106; Viscount Radcliffe, 108-109; Lord Upjohn, 115-116; Lord Donovan, 117. As to cases to 
similar effect, see, e.g., Preston v Luck (1884) 27 Ch D 497, 505-506, where Cotton, L.J., stated that it was 
a matter of course that the court should be satisfied that “there is a probability that the plaintiffs are entitled 
to relief”; Cavendish House (Cheltenham) Ltd v Cavendish-Woodhouse Ltd [1970] RPC 234, 235, Harman, 
L.J.: “Therefore you start off with a prima facie case. That, of course, is the essential prelude to the 
granting of interlocutory relief”; Smith v Crigg Ltd [1924] 1 KB 655, 659, where Atkin, L.J., considered 
that it was a truism that an applicant for interlocutory injunction “must establish to the satisfaction of the 
court a strong prima facie case”; DC Thomason & Co Ltd v Deakin (1952) Ch 646, 660, 671. 
11
 [1975] AC 396. 
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before an interlocutory injunction was granted the plaintiff should satisfy the court that 
there was a “probability”, a “prima facie case,” or a “strong prima facie case” that if the 
action goes to trial he would succeed. Rather, a court that has to consider an application 
for an interlocutory injunction is only required, before considering the question of 
balance of convenience, to satisfy itself that the party seeking the injunctive relief shows 
that his claim is not “frivolous nor vexatious; in other words, that the evidence before the 
court discloses that there is a serious question to be tried.”12 
 It is significant to note that the American Cyanamid test of “a serious question to 
be tried” or its “arguable case” variant, is not a rule of universal application; it does not 
apply in certain special cases. One of such special cases, it is submitted, concerns letters 
of credit (or performance guarantees) interlocutory proceedings. The reason is that the 
threshold test formulated by Lord Diplock is self-evidently discordant with the essential 
attribute of letters of credit, according to which a claim of fraud against the beneficiary 
cannot interdict the bank’s payment unless the fraud is sufficiently material. If the fraud 
alleged by a claimant does not infect the entire transaction, but merely raises a question as 
to the bona fides of the beneficiary to realize the credit, the bank’s obligation to pay 
thereby remains undisturbed. 
 In the next section it is proposed to contrast the criterion of “a strong prima facie 
case” with the conventional English courts’ standard of “established fraud” in the sphere 
of letters of credit interlocutory litigation. As shall be seen, the merit of the former over 
the latter is virtually self-revealing.   
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 407. Reaffirmed five years later in substantially the same words in Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan 
[1980] AC 331,337 (PC), per Lord Diplock.  
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III. ESTABLISHING FRAUD 
When an account party under a letter of credit or performance guarantee raises an 
application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain payment to, or receipt of payment 
by, the beneficiary, what standard of proof of fraud13 is he obliged to discharge? Early 
English cases14 were content to accept that the application would fail unless the 
applicant’s claim of fraud was obvious and clear to the knowledge of the bank. In the 
event, the cases probably unwittingly scarcely realized that they were making a departure 
from the threshold guideline established in a long line of cases dating back to well over a 
century and a half. No explanation was ever offered to justify the preference of 
conclusive evidence of a “clear fraud” test as opposed to the threshold criterion of a 
strong prima facie case.15 Only that a high standard of proof was necessary to preclude 
frequent interference by the courts with the obligations of parties under a letter of credit 
or performance guarantee transaction, seeing that these instruments are the lifeblood of 
international commerce, and thrombosis will occur if, unless fraud is involved, the courts 
intervene and thereby disturb the mercantile practice of treating rights thereunder as 
being the equivalent of cash in hand.16 
 The genesis of the stringent standard of proof of fraud embraced by early English 
cases beginning with Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd17 and later endorsed and 
extensively developed by the Court of Appeal in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v 
                                                 
13
 In the Singapore jurisdiction the ground for raising such an action has been extended to include 
unconscionability. It is noteworthy that the same standard applies, whether the claim is founded on fraud or 
unconscionability, as to which see below, section four. 
14
 See, e.g., Discount Records Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 315, 319: “Fraud must be clearly 
established”; RD Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd [1978] 1 QB 146, 155: 
“Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which the banks have notice, the courts will [not intervene by 
injunction]”; Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 166, 
172 per Lord Denning, M.R.: Applicant must show “clear fraud of which the bank has notice”; Browne, 
L.J. : A claim of fraud must be “very clearly established” (173); Geoffrey Lane, L.J.: “Fraud obvious or 
clear to the bank” (174); Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251, 257 per Sir 
John Donaldson, M.R.: “The evidence of fraud must be clear, both as to the fact of fraud and as to the 
bank’s knowledge”. 
15
 cf Group Josi v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345, 361: “It [did] not appear to have 
troubled the courts that [Edward Owen] doctrine might involve a departure from the general rules 
applicable to interlocutory injunction as stated in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396”. The 
first part of this statement is clearly correct, but the reference to the American Cyanamid guidelines 
destroys the attraction in the entire remark, as to which see above section two, and below, section five. 
16
 Intraco v Notis Shipping Corp of Liberia, The Bhoja Trader [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 256, 257 per 
Donaldson, L.J. 
17
 [1975] Lloyd’s Rep 444. As regards the test of fraud, see above n 18. 
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Barclays Bank International Ltd18has been partly discussed in chapter two above. For 
present purposes, it is necessary to posit that the standard adopted by these cases 
consisted in a misconception of the reasoning of Shientag, J., in the famous American 
case of Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp.19There, the account party’s complaint 
that crates of cow hair and other worthless material and rubbish were shipped rather than 
a merchandise of bristle was deemed established pursuant to a New York rule of 
procedure.20It was only the plaintiff’s complaint as exemplified in the pleadings that was 
before the court, and it was the allegations in such pleadings the court was obliged to 
assume as proved. So, when Shientag, J., concluded21 that the seller was on a mission to 
defraud the account party buyer of which the bank had a clear notice, it can hardly be said 
that the learned judge was laying down an overly high standard of proof that would in 
effect render illusory the fraud exception to the autonomy of the bank’s payment 
obligation. 
 By and large, the proposition that in interlocutory proceedings an account party 
must establish clear evidence of fraud of which the bank had clear notice is self-evidently 
problematical. To be sure, an application for interlocutory relief is often made ex parte. 
Such an application may be decided summarily, and sometimes without the court having 
sufficient time or submission to allow deep reflection and a well reasoned decision.22In 
the event of the court hearing the action inter partes, the proceedings are conducted on 
                                                 
18
 [1978] QB 146. For the standard of proof, see above n 18. 
19
 177 Misc 719, 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941). 
20
 Under the then New York Rules of Civil Practice, rule 106, where a defendant to an action  moved a 
motion for summary judgment on the pleadings, the court must deem established the allegations of the 
complaint as verified by the pleadings, and every intendment and fair inference is to be drawn in favour of 
such pleadings: Madole v Gavin, 215 App Div 299, 300 (Sup Ct, NY ) (1926); McClare v Massachusetts 
Bonding & Insurance Co, 266 NY 371, 373 (Ct App) (1935); Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp, 
above, 721. See also, above, ch 2.  
21
 177 Misc 719, 722; 31 NYS 2d 631, 633 (1941). 
22
 Gordon B Graham and Benjamin Geva, “Standby Credits in Canada” [1984] Can Bus L J 180, 203. 
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affidavit evidence. In truth, the parties to the proceedings may be examined and cross-
examined on their claims. Still, the available evidence is necessarily incomplete; to 
require the claimant at that stage to furnish evidence of obvious fraud is to equate pre-
trial proceedings with a full trial, and thus implicitly set the odds against him. In a sense, 
the defrauded claimant is being surreptitiously denied the remedy of interlocutory 
injunction, which as has been seen, is a creature of equity with the primary object of 
preventing injustice by one party to another.  
  It is, therefore, not surprising that save in two cases23 many a defrauded claimant 
has consistently failed to scale the Edward Owen hurdle since the past two score and a 
decade when the fraud exception was accepted as part of the English law. It is not clear 
whether this stringent approach in the English jurisdiction (in contradistinction to the 
American, Canadian, and Singapore jurisdictions)24 necessarily invests letters of credit 
and performance guarantees with a higher mercantile patronage.  
 Second, and most importantly, the proposition that the court will not grant an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain payment under letters of credit and performance 
guarantees in the absence of “fraud of which the bank is clearly aware” 25 is a piece of 
legal fiction. From a practical point of view, once interlocutory proceedings have reached 
inter partes stage, the evidence of fraud will have to be put before the court and the bank, 
not least because in the vast majority of cases, the bank is a party to the proceedings. The 
duty of the court will be to consider the whole evidence made available to it. Thereafter, 
                                                 
23
 Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank plc [1998] QB 446; Themehelp Ltd v West [1996] QB 84 
(CA) 
24
 The position in these jurisdictions is discussed a little below, main text. 
25
 See, e.g., Czarnikow-Rionda v Standard Bank [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187, 202 per Rix, J: Fraud claim 
does not avail “unless the fraud comes to the notice of the bank”. 
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if the court concludes that there is a clear evidence of fraud, it will necessarily conclude 
that the evidence of fraud is clear to the knowledge of the bank.26  
 Thirdly, the Edward Owen test necessarily assumes that it is every kind of fraud 
that is capable of proof to the bank’s knowledge and, possibly, satisfaction. In my view, 
this is not so. For example, suppose an account party’s claim of fraud involves fraudulent 
inducement to enter into a contract of sale, so that the letter of credit or performance 
guarantee transaction issued to finance it is thereby materially tainted by the fraudulent 
inducement. Could it be seriously argued that an interlocutory injunction would not issue 
unless it was shown that the bank had clear notice of the allegation of fraud? In other 
words, is the bank competent to determine what amounts to fraudulent inducement, 
assuming this charge is made by the account party? Indeed, when can it be said that the 
bank has a clear notice of, for example, fraudulent inducement? It must not be forgotten 
that this is not the easy case where shipment of worthless goods and rubbish27 is claimed 
or where fire bricks are shipped instead of Daihatsu generators ordered by an account 
party.28 It may be useful to illustrate with two cases what can go wrong with the courts’ 
ostensibly rigid insistence on the bank’s knowledge of fraud. 
 First is the case of Themehelp Ltd v West.29The facts were that the claimant 
buyers agreed to purchase the sellers’ business. To secure his payment obligations under 
the sale agreement, the buyer caused a performance guarantee to issue in favour of the 
sellers. The buyers applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the sellers from 
calling on the guarantee on the ground that they had been fraudulently induced to execute 
                                                 
26
 See Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 181, 196. 
27
 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp, 117 Misc 719, 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941). 
28
 Standard Chartered Bank v Sin Chong Hua Electric & Trading Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 863. 
29
 [1996] QB 84. 
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the purchase agreement. In the event, no call had yet been made, and the bank was not a 
party to the proceedings, with the effect that the bank’s knowledge of fraud did not arise. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held for the buyers. Specifically, Waite, L.J., with 
Balcombe, L.J., concurring,30 accepted the finding of the trial court that the buyers had 
made out a strong prima facie case of fraudulent inducement. In his dissenting judgment, 
Evans, L.J., ruled that since it was not shown that the bank would have refused to honour 
its payment obligation based on the buyers’ claim of fraud, an interlocutory injunction 
should not be issued.31  
 No doubt certain aspects of the majority’s reasoning in Themehelp may be open to 
objection.32But thus far, a plausible argument has yet to be raised in the cases or learned 
commentaries and texts against the majority’s ultimate decision on the fraudulent 
inducement point. By the Edward Owen standard as expounded in the cases,33 it is almost 
certain that the buyers in Themehelp would have failed, and thus undermine the wider 
objectives of the fraud exception. On this ground, the majority’s approach should be 
applauded. A similarly admirable course commended itself to Cresswell, J., in Kvaerner 
John Brown Ltd v Midland Bank plc.34There, to obtain payment under a standby letter of 
credit, the beneficiary was required to present a certificate stating that (i) the account 
party was in default under a construction contract, and (ii) a notice of intention to draw 
down on the credit had been given to the account party. The beneficiary presented 
                                                 
30
 Ibid., 105-107. 
31
 Ibid., 102-103. 
32
 E.g., the view that a different criteria applied when injunction is sought against the beneficiary rather 
than the bank: This is generally agreed to be a wrong statement of the law, as to which, see, e.g., Deutsche 
Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 180, 197; affd sub nom, Group Josi v 
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1Lloyd’s Rep 345, 361; Dong Jin Metal Co Ltd v Raymet Ltd [1993] 
CA Transcript 945. See also Brody, White & Co Inc v Chemet Handel Trading (S) Pte Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 
65, 73(CA, S’pore).  
33
 As to the cases, see above n 18. 
34
 [1998] CLC 446. 
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complying certificate for payment. An interlocutory injunction was granted on the basis 
that the purported fulfillment of the second requirement of the credit was “manifestly 
untrue”. The beneficiary’s application to discharge the injunction was dismissed. In the 
event, it seemed (rightly in my view) unnecessary for the court to consider whether it was 
clear to the knowledge of the bank that the beneficiary’s demand for payment was made 
fraudulently. Otherwise, the decision would go the other way, and thereby result in an 
injustice and a denial of protection to the account party. 
 However, in United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd,35the Court of 
Appeal made a bold effort to arrest the unbearably high standard of proof exemplified by 
the Edward Owen line of cases.36In that case, the plaintiffs, through their English 
bankers, requested Rafidain, an Iraqi bank, to issue performance bonds in favour of A (an 
agency of the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture). The plaintiffs applied for and obtained an ex 
parte injunction restraining their English bankers from honouring a request for payment 
under the bonds. Subsequently, Neil, J., discharged the injunction. And the Court of 
Appeal affirmed.37 Delivering the judgment the court, Ackner, L.J., declared:  
 The claim before us is a claim for an interlocutory judgment. The first question is 
 therefore—following the principles laid down in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon 
 Ltd38…Have the plaintiffs established that it is seriously arguable that, on the 
 material available, the only realistic inference is that [the beneficiary] could not 
 honestly have believed in the validity of its demands on the performance  bonds?39 
 
                                                 
35
 [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554. 
36
 An ancient Italian deity, reputed guardian of doorways and gates and protector of the state in time of war, 
usually represented with two faces, so that he looks both forwards and backwards: The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English, Judy Pearsall (ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 977, col 2. 
37
 Slade and Sir John Megaw, L.JJ., agreed with Ackner, L.J. 
38




In applying what he felt the House of Lords propounded in American Cyanamid, Ackner, 
L.J., determined that the answer was in the negative.40 
 There is much to be said of the test formulated by Ackner, L.J. Quite correctly, in 
Solo Industries UK Ltd v Canara Bank,41Mance, L.J., expressed “reservations” about the 
wisdom in the words “seriously arguable,” standing with  the words “only realistic 
inference”. In similar vein, Philips, J., described as “puzzling” the threshold test 
formulated by Ackner, L.J., not least the conflation of “two very different standards of 
proof.”42 A more plausible proposition is that Ackner, L.J.’s realistic inference test is not 
supported by the authority from which it purports to derive strength, not least because 
American Cyanamid enunciated a lower standard of a seriously arguable case. Moreover, 
when Ackner, L.J., declared that he was “following the principles laid down in American 
Cyanamid”, could it be that he had in mind the lower threshold criterion? An affirmative 
answer is so manifestly undesirable in the context of letter of credit or performance 
guarantee interlocutory proceedings that it would be bizarre if he did.  
 Besides the inappropriateness of Ackner, L.J.’s “only realistic inference” standard 
of proof, the obvious ambivalence in his Lordship’s proposition is a recipe for confusion 
For example, in Turkiye IS Bankasi AS v Bank of China43 Hirst, L.J, refused to accept the 
counsel’s submission that Ackner, L.J.’s test opened “the door to a somewhat less 
stringent test,” nor was it in any “way diluting the Owen test,” which represents “the 
proper criterion.”44Swinton Thomas and Mantell, L.JJ., concurred45.  
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 565. 
41
 [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 578, 586. 
42
 Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 181, 195. 
43
 [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 250. 
44
 Ibid., 253. 
45
 Ibid., 255. 
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 Conversely, in Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v Walbrook Insurance Co 
Ltd,46the account party re-insurers sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
beneficiary re-insureds from, among other things, presenting documents or drawing down 
on a letter of credit. In the course of his judgment in a passage headed “The correct 
approach”, Philips, J., considered among other leading cases in point, the threshold test 
propounded in United Trading. Philips, J., said: 
 What is, in my view, clearly established by the authorities is that the court will not 
 grant an injunction restraining a bank from paying under a letter of credit unless the 
 court is satisfied that there is a clear prima facie case that the beneficiary is  acting 
 fraudulently in drawing on the credit.47 
 
In applying this approach to the issues formulated for his determination, Philips, J., felt 
“that there [was] a clear prima facie case that the defendant re-insured’s [employees] 
acted fraudulently as alleged.”48 It is firmly submitted that this reassuring approach is to 
be welcome. It is to be regretted that, in the course of considering an appeal on Deutsche, 
the Court of Appeal offered no opinion on the standard of proof adopted by the trial 
court. 
 It is significant to note that since 1980, Canadian courts have consistently 
accepted that the courts will intervene by interlocutory injunction to impede the natural 
run of letter of credit or performance guarantee upon the establishment of a strong prima 
facie case of fraud on the part of the beneficiary.49 Jurisdictions in Canada equally 
consider it unnecessary to require a claimant to demonstrate that the fraud he claims is to 
                                                 
46
 [1994] 4 All ER 181. 
47
 Ibid., 197 (Emphasis added).  
48
 Ibid., 198. The ultimate conclusion of the court was based on other grounds. 
49
 CDN Research & Development Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia (1980) 18 CPC 62, 1980 CarswellOnt 415; 
CDN Research & Development Ltd v Bank of Nova Scotia (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 656 (Ont Div Ct), revg on 
other grounds (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 485; Rosen v Pullen (1981) 126 DLR (3d) 62, para 31: “In my opinion, 
it is not logical to refer to ‘established fraud’ or ‘clear fraud’ on an interlocutory motion …[The account 
party] has made out a good prima facie case of fraud”; Henderson v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(1982) 40 BCLR 318. 
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the bank’s notice. Significantly, in the classic case of Angelica-Whitewear Ltd v Bank of 
Nova Scotia,50 the Canadian Supreme Court remarkably utilised an opportunity to affirm 
the principles accepted in the earlier cases. This has consistently remained the trend ever 
since.51  
 In the United States, the applicable criterion in letter of credit or standby letter of 
credit interlocutory injunction proceedings is a far cry from the Edward Owen 
“established fraud” standard. 52 Specifically, the Uniform Commercial Code, Revised 
Article 5—109(b) (4)53 provides that a court may grant an interlocutory injunction if, “on 
the basis of the information submitted to the court, the applicant is more likely then not to 
succeed” on his claim of fraud at the trial.54 This standard refreshingly typifies the 
“strong prima facie case” criterion, which in my view, the English courts should accord a 
great deal of attention.   
 The Singapore courts have taken the robust approach adopted by the Canadian 
and American courts. For example, in Chartered Electronics Industries Pte Ltd v 
                                                 
50
 (1987) 36 DLR (4 th) 161. 
51
 See, e.g., Platinum Communications Systems Inc v IMAX Corp (1989) 41 BCLR (2d) 175 (British Col Ct 
App); Landmark Leaseholds Ltd v Royal Bank (1989) 46 BLR 284, 79 Sask R 38 (Sask Ct, QB); 69971 
Manitoba Ltd v National Bank of Canada (1992) 1 WWR 492; North American Trust Co v Hospitality 
Equity Corp [1995] AJ N0 1306, 1995 CarswellAlta 1171 (Alta); Cineplex Odeon Corp v 100 Bloor West 
General Partner Inc, 1993 WL 1450994, 1993 CarswellOnt 2358; Century Property & Casualty Insurance 
Corp v London Guarantee Insurance Co, 1999 WL 33197295, CarswellOnt 3897; Johannese (Re) (2002) 
11 WWR 516; New Home Warranty of British Columbia Inc (Re), 2004 ACWSJ 4953, 2004 ACWS  
LEXIS 2973. 
52
 See, e.g., APV Baker Inc v Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 761 F Supp 1293, 1298 (WD, Mich) (1991): 
“The factors to be considered by a district court  in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, are 
whether [the] plaintiff has shown a strong or substantial likelihood of success [at the trial]”; Friendship 
Materials Inc v Michigan Brick, Inc, 679 F 2d 100, 102 (6 th Cir, 1982); Mid-America Tire Inc v PTZ 
Trading Ltd, 95 Ohio St 3d 367, 768 NE 2d 619 (Sup Ct, Ohio) (2002); Union Export Co v NIB 
Intermarket, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (Sup Ct, Tenn.).  
53
 Uniform Commercial Code—Reversed Article 5 Letter of Credit, 1995. The 1995 reversion of Article 5 
of the Uniform Commercial Code was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and the American Law Institute. There has been no substantial amendment since that year. 
54
 Emphasis added. 
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Development Bank of Singapore,55the question was whether or not to discharge two ex 
parte interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendant from making payment under a 
performance guarantee. After a detailed review of the English cases in point, especially 
United Trading, and in holding that the injunctions would be continued until trial of the 
substantive case, Chan Sek Keong, J., stated that  
 there is no reason why the plaintiff [should be] required, at interlocutory stage, to 
 establish fraud or to prove that the only realistic inference that can be drawn from 
 the materials before the court is that of fraud.56 
 
The learned judge considered that the less onerous test of a ‘strong prima facie case’ 
sufficed. Interestingly, his Lordship’s conclusion was rested on dicta expressed in the 
decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in CDN Research & Development Ltd v Bank of 
Nova Scotia.57 
 In Singapore, it is now settled that, besides fraud, unconscionability on the part of 
the beneficiary constitutes a sufficient ground for granting an application for an 
injunction restraining the bank from making payment under a performance guarantee or 
to prevent the beneficiary from making a call thereunder. The question arises is whether 
the standard of proof of fraud enunciated in the foregoing discussion is applicable when 
unconscionability is claimed in interlocutory proceedings.58 
                                                 
55
 Although the case was decided on 30 April 1992, strangely enough, it was only reported seven years 
later: [1999] 4 SLR 655. It is intriguing why such an important case suffered this fate. 
56
 Ibid., 668. 
57
 (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 656, 662 (Ont Div Ct) per Smith, J: “The test …of strong prima facie case appears 
to be more apt and less onerous than that of Lord Denning in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays 
Bank International Ltd ([1978] 1 All ER 976) of clear or established fraud.” Krever and Potts, JJ., 
concurred with Smith, J.  
58
 Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v A-G (N0 2) [1995] 2 SLR 733 (CA); Dauphin Offshore Engineering & 
Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan [2000] 1 SLR 657 (CA); McConnell Dowell 
Constructors (Aust) Pty Lt v Sembcorn Engineers and Constructors Pte Ltd [2002] 1 SLR 199; Anwar Siraj 
v Teo Hee Lai Building Construction Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR 394 (CA). For earlier cases, see Royal Design 
Studio Pte Ltd v Chang Development Pte Ltd [1990] SLR 1116; Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v UDL 
Shipbuilding (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1993] 3 SLR 350. The latter two cases began the departure of the 
Singapore jurisdiction from the position in England, America, Canada, and the vast majority of the 
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 The concept of unconscionability like fraud is inherently elusive; its ambit is 
infinitely variable, as are the classes of case that would fall within its coverage; much 
depends on the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, the courts have held that a call 
would be unconscionable where the beneficiary’s failure to open a letter of credit in 
favour of the account party occasioned the latter’s default on his obligations to perform 
under the contract which gave rise to the credit or guarantee.59Further, the beneficiary’s 
conduct is unconscionable where his act under the underlying contract is so reprehensible 
or lacking in good faith or bona fides as to justify a court of conscience intervening by an 
injunction to restrain the party from realising the credit or guarantee. 60 
 After shilly-shallying in earlier cases,61 the Singapore Court of Appeal found its 
bearings in GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd.62The facts were that 
an account party under a performance guarantee raised an application for an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain the beneficiary from receiving money under the guarantee on the 
grounds that the beneficiary’s call would be unconscionable. The Court of Appeal held 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. Interestingly, the foundation for the departure was evolved in dicta in the 
English Court of Appeal case of Potton Homes Ltd Coleman Contractors (Overseas) Ltd (1984) 28 Build 
LR 19, 28—29, per Eveleigh, L.J. 
59
 Kvaerner Singapore Pte Ltd v UDL Shipbuilding (Singapore) Pte Ltd [1993] 3 SLR 350. See also Royal 
Design, above: The court granted an injunction to restrain the beneficiary from realizing a performance  
guarantee upon a prima facie showing that the account party’s default was caused by the beneficiary’s 
failure to meet his own obligation under the underlying construction contract; Min Thai Holding Pte Ltd v 
Sun label Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 368: An injunction was granted because non-delivery of the goods ordered 
by the buyer was due to floods caused by typhoon and there was a ‘force-majeure’ clause in the sale 
contract. cf KMW International v Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F 2d 10 (1979), where the United States 
Court of Appeal Second Circuit vacated an ex parte injunction because supervening impossibility of 
performance arising from the political turmoil in Iran did not justify non-performance.  
60
 Raymond Construction Pte Ltd v Low Yang Tong (Unreported) Suit N0 1715 of 1995, 11 July 1995. 
61
 See, e.g., the earlier case of Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v Attorney General (N0 2) [1995] 2 SLR 733, 
747 per Karthigesu, JA:  “The applicant [is] required to establish a clear case of fraud or unconscionability” 
in interlocutory proceedings. In the event, the court did not consider the requisite level of proof. 
62
 [1999] 4 SLR 604. cf the earlier cases of Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v Attorney General (N0 2) [1995] 
2 SLR 733, 747 per Karthigesu, JA:  
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for the account party. In the course of delivering the judgment of the court, LP Thean, 
J.A., noted that  
 in the event that a beneficiary calls [for payment] in circumstances where there is 
 prima facie evidence of fraud or unconscionability, the court [would] …intervene 
 at the interlocutory stage until the whole…circumstances of the case [have] been 
 investigated.63 
 
Similarly, in Dauphin Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of 
HRH Sheikh Sultan,64the Court of Appeal affirmed the correctness of the standard of 
proof advocated by the High Court in the 1992 case of Chartered Electronics,65in the 
following words: “In our opinion, what must be shown is a strong prima facie case of 
unconscionability.”66It must not be forgotten, though, that the specific mention of 
unconscionability in the words just quoted does not exclude the applicability of the same 
standard when the claim in an interlocutory proceedings is based on fraud. This much is 
discernible from the same court’s judgment in Anwar Siraj v Teo Hee Lai Building 
Construction Ltd.67 
 The cases considered thus far by the Singapore courts only concern performance 
guarantee interlocutory litigation. The question that remains is whether a different 
standard will apply in the context of letter of credit interlocutory proceedings. The 
Singapore jurisdiction accepts that both performance guarantee and letter of credit are 
similar in character and equally governed by similar principles, although 
unconscionability as a self-sufficient ground for enjoining payment has been restricted to 
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performance guarantees.68In Chartered Electronics, Chang Sek Keong, J., seemed to 
agree that the Ackner, L.J.’s realistic inference test would appropriately apply to 
documentary letters of credit rather than performance guarantees because, unlike 
documentary letters of credit, performance guarantee is merely a security for 
performance, so, a temporary restraining order does not affect its value; rather, it merely 
postpones the realization of the security until the plaintiff has utilised an opportunity to 
establish his case at the trial. Second, and more importantly, a performance guarantee can 
easily be an oppressive instrument if abused. Such abuse is encouraged if the court is 
often unable to grant relief by reason of the laying of a high standard of proof which the 
plaintiff can seldom, if ever, meet. The Court of Appeal is yet to have an opportunity to 
affirm the validity of these observations.  
 In my view, notwithstanding their differing commercial functions, extending the 
standard preferred by the Chartered Electronic court to documentary letters of credit 
interlocutory proceedings is hardly likely to occasion harm to the inherent promise the 
instruments represent to the beneficiary any more than it does to the beneficiary’s right to 
make a call under a performance guarantee. The primary purpose of a performance 
guarantee is to provide a security which is to be readily, promptly, and assuredly 
realizable upon a simple demand. Similarly, the chief commercial objective of 
documentary letters of credit is the assurance to the beneficiary that payment will be 
prompt and certain upon the tender of requisite documents. In either case, in reliance 
upon the commercial value of the instrument, a third party may have become an assignee 
of the interest of the original beneficiary. In this regard, a temporary restraining order is 
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 Dauphine Offshore Engineering & Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan [2000] 1 
SLR 657, 668: “In Singapore ‘unconscionability’ …is a separate ground …for granting injunctive relief in 
so far as a performance guarantee is concerned.” 
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unlikely to have greater effect on the third party under the one than the other. Finally, the 
potentiality of abuse under both instruments is implausibly differentiated. Thus, it 
suggested that the reasons advocated by the Chartered Electronic court for its acceptance 
of the United Trading standard of proof in performance guarantee interlocutory action is 
more apparent than real. It is further suggested that whether or not the interlocutory 
action is initiated to enjoin payment under a documentary letter of credit or performance 
guarantee, the standard of a strong prima facie case is sufficient. If the plaintiff is able to 
establish this, there is no reason why the court should not grant an injunctive order. 
Before we leave the discussion of standard of proof, though, a final word or two on the 
Edward Owen test is justified. 
 The Edward Owen test, including the only realistic inference doctrine certainly 
has its appeal: it seems particularly appropriate in other spheres of letter of credit 
litigation, rather than in the arena of interlocutory proceedings, in which case its treasure 
would be the better harnessed. One such instance arises where the account party disputes 
its liability to reimburse the issuing bank on the grounds that such a bank honoured a 
request for payment under the letter of credit notwithstanding that it was in possession of 
a notice of fraud or that the beneficiary’s call was fraudulent. In such a case, the account 
party must show that the notice was clear or obvious to the knowledge of the bank, or 
that, considering the evidence put before the bank, the only realistic inference to draw 
was that of fraud. In this connection, the beauty of Edward Owen test as well as the 
United Trading standard becomes self-evident. Two respectable authorities illustrate the 
position. The first is the famous Canadian case of Bank of Nova v Angelica-Whitewear 
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Ltd.69The second is Turkiye IS Bankasi AS v Bank of China.70 These cases will now be 
examined. 
 Angelica-Whitewear concerned a draft that had been paid under a letter of credit, 
despite the furnishing of a notice by the account party that the signature on one of the 
tendered documents was a forgery. Speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada Le Dain, 
J., considered that the bank was only relieved of its obligation to make payment against a 
confirming request for payment if it had notice of a clear or obvious fraud by the 
beneficiary or by a third party to the knowledge of the beneficiary. In the instant case, 
since the account party failed to establish that the alleged fraud had been clearly and 
sufficiently brought to the bank’s knowledge prior to payment of the draft, the appeal was 
dismissed. It is to be noted that, on this point, Le Dain, J., distinguished the instant case 
from a situation where an application is made for an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
the bank from honouring its payment obligation or to prevent the beneficiary from 
requesting payment under a letter of credit (or performance guarantee). In the latter case, 
where payment has yet to be made, the interlocutory application needs only disclose a 
strong prima facie case of fraud, whilst in the instant case, where payment has already 
been made, the test is much higher, which, of course, is the Edward Owen test or United 
Trading only realistic inference test.  
 There are good reasons for the distinction. First is the reality of the circumstance 
in which an issuing bank has to function in the letter of credit chain. An issuing bank, in 
contradistinction to a court in interlocutory proceedings, has no obligation to probe or 
verify the allegations of fraud by the account party against the beneficiary. Otherwise, it 
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will be in breach of the autonomy rule, and thus imperil the very foundation of letter of 
credit. Second, once the issuing bank has in its possession the requisite draft and, if such 
is the credit’s requirement, accompanied by conforming documents, the crystallisation of 
the obligation to pay is presumed. To displace the presumption at the banking hall, it is 
appropriate that nothing short of clear or obvious fraud will suffice. Otherwise, if 
payment is there withheld on spurious claim of a fraud, the bank will be risking a lawsuit 
from the beneficiary; more importantly, its business reputation will be put in jeopardy. 
 In Turkiye, on the instructions of CSC, the defendant bank requested the plaintiff 
bank to issue first demand guarantees in favour of ETA to secure the obligations of CSC 
under certain building contracts. The plaintiff bank honoured ETA’s call on the 
guarantees, and thereafter initiated recovery proceedings against the defendant issuing 
bank. The latter argued that the former was not entitled to reimbursement because it had 
notice that ETA’s call was fraudulent. Holding for the plaintiff confirming bank, Waller, 
J., applied the Edward Owen test. His Lordship took the view that in the circumstance of 
the instant case, it is not sufficient for the party denying reimbursement liability to show 
an arguable case that the beneficiary was practising fraud by calling on the guarantees. 
Rather, he “must put the irrefutable evidence [of fraud] in front of the bank”.71The Court 
of Appeal72 upheld the reasoning and conclusion of Waller, J. The underlying 
justification for Waller, J.’s requirement is that, where an issuing bank has exercised its 
discretion to withhold payment on account of a notice of fraud, and the bank is sued for 
failing to pay, it would then have an unshakeable defence.  
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 [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 617 (Emphasis added). 
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 It should is worth noting that Hirst, L.J., pointed out that the “irrefutable evidence of fraud” standard 
“epitomized the [Edward] Owen test”: [1998]1Lloyd’s Rep 250, 253 (CA). 
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 It seems that the question whether the material before the bank establishes clear 
fraud or makes it obvious that the beneficiary is dishonestly seeking to realise the credit 
of or guarantee, is to be determined by the standard of a reasonable banker. Probably, 
Neil, J., also had this in mind in United Trading when he stated that the appropriate 
standard of proof is that of a reasonable banker in possession of all the relevant facts, so 
that unless such a banker could say, “this is plainly fraudulent, their cannot be any other 
explanation,” interruption of the bank’s payment obligation would be unjustified. Ackner, 
L.J., rejected this test. It must be emphasised, however, that it is certainly less than self-
evident that Neil, J.’s “reasonable banker’s standard” is necessarily inconsistent with the 
“only realistic inference” test Ackner, L.J. himself formulated. At any rate, it is submitted 
that both tests inherently mean the same thing. In my view, the application of both tests 
should be restricted to the context under focus, rather than in the sphere of interlocutory 
proceedings seeking to enjoin payment. 
 It appears, though, the English courts are yet to be attracted by the distinction 
drawn between interlocutory proceedings initiated to enjoin payment under a letter of 
credit or performance guarantee, on the one hand, and proceedings raised post-honour of 
the bank’s payment obligations. If the distinction drawn by Angelica-Whitewear is 
justifiable, as it should be, it is suggested that the English courts should embrace it, so 
that the strong prima facie standard is only applied in the context of an interlocutory 
action. As has been seen in the first instance case of Deutsche, some steps appear to have 
been taken in this direction. It is to be hoped that this will be endorsed by the Court of 
Appeal at the earliest opportunity in the future.  
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IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION 
The rule that a claimant for an injunction must show that he has a substantive cause of 
action justiciable in England against the defendant sought to be injuncted emerged from 
judicial conception of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Parliament to grant an 
injunction in any case in which it appeared to the court to be just and convenient to do 
so.73 In the leading case of The Siskina, Lord Diplock observed that a  
  right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is…dependent upon there being a pre- existing 
 cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or  threatened by 
 him, of a legal or equitable right of the plaintiff for the enforcement of which the 
 defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.”74 
 
Where a claimant raises an action for an injunction to enjoin payment under a letter of 
credit or performance guarantee, the question whether he has a substantive cause of 
action may arise either in relation to (i) the issuing bank, or (ii) the confirming bank. For 
clarity of exposition, it is proposed to consider the respective positions.  
 
  A. An Interlocutory Application against an Issuing Bank  
In the context of an interlocutory application for an injunction to prevent an issuing bank 
from honouring its payment obligation under a letter of credit, what cause of action could 
the claimant have to support the application? In Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan 
Bank, Court of Appeal, pointed out, quite correctly, that the plaintiff’s right to apply for a 
court order precluding payment is founded on grounds other than on the express terms of 
the bank’s contract with the account party; the foundation lies elsewhere. In his 
submission before the Bolivinter court, Nicholas Philips, QC, (as he then was) advanced 
the proposition that the court should grant an injunction restraining payment under a 
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letter of credit or performance guarantee where the result of a denial of an injunction 
would be to permit the ultimate beneficiary to profit from his own fraud, so that the 
applicant did not have to establish that the payment sought to be enjoined would 
constitute a breach of a contractual duty owed to him by the issuing bank; rather, all he 
“has to show is that his legal rights are threatened by the fraud of the beneficiary.”75 If 
these were correct, an action seeking an injunction to restrain payment under a letter of 
credit of performance guarantee would then constitute an exception to The Siskina 
principle. But it is unclear whether the instant court accepted those propositions, although 
some ten years later Nicholas Philips, QC (then sitting as a judge of the Queen’s Bench 
Division) in Deutsche Rucker thought that the Bolivinter court agreed with his 
submission.  
 In Czarnikow-Rionda, the plaintiff sought to utilise Nicholas Philips’ propositions 
when he argued, among other things, that an interlocutory injunction against an issuing 
bank is justified if it established a good arguable case of fraud. An injunction against such 
a bank would then proceed on the basis that the bank is merely mixed up in the fraud. 
Consequently, it would be unnecessary to establish the existence of a substantive cause of 
action against that bank. Rix, J. rejected these arguments. Relying heavily on Harbottle 
as well as the “cast-iron claim” doctrine espoused in Tukan,76 his Lordship determined 
that even if the plaintiff had otherwise established fraud, an injunction would not issue 
because either the bank was entitled to pay in accordance with its mandate (in which case 
there would be no cause of action against the bank), or if the threatened payment is 
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outside the bank’s mandate, then the plaintiff would be entitled to adequate damages at 
law for breach of contract, in which case an injunction would be inappropriate.77  
 After an extensive analysis of the propositions advanced in Bolivinter, Rix, J., 
refused to accept that a cause of action was not required in injunction proceedings against 
the bank.  Let us concede this view is correct. But then it must not be forgotten that The 
Siskina rule has been significantly modified by the House of Lords in Castanho v Brown 
& Root (UK) Ltd.78Now, the power of the court to grant an injunction is not displaced by 
reason only that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the defendant; it is 
enough if the plaintiff establishes a sufficient legal or equitable right or interest, the 
enforcement or protection of which justifies the granting of an injunction. 79In the sphere 
of injunctive litigation under focus, it is submitted that since the account party will 
ultimately be debited with any payment the bank might make in the absence of an 
injunction restraining it from doing so, it logically follows that the account party does 
have a sufficient interest in the injunctive action which warrants the granting of relief 
against the issuing bank.     
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 In United Trading, Ackner, L.J., in support of his doubt about the wisdom of the 
requirement in England80 of a cause of action in letter of credit and performance 
guarantee interlocutory proceedings against the bank, noted that in the United States 
where “concern to avoid irreparable damage to international commerce is hardly likely to 
be lacking,” a claimant is not required to show a cause of action in such proceedings. 
Finally, his Lordship lamented: 
 There is no suggestion that [America’s] more liberal approach has resulted in the 
 commercial dislocation which has, by implication at least, been suggested would  result 
 from rejecting the [bank’s] submission as to the [requirement of a cause of action] from 
 the plaintiff. Moreover, we would find it an unsatisfactory position if, having established 
 an important exception to what had previously been thought an absolute rule, the  courts 
 in practice were to adopt so restrictive an approach to the evidence required as to prevent 
 themselves from intervening. Were this to be the case, impressive and high-sounding 
 phrases such as ‘fraud unravels all’ would become meaningless.81 
 
These lamentations seem to be crocodile tears, however, since, by adopting the threshold 
test of “only realistic inference of fraud”, his Lordship himself did not in the instant case 
adopt a less restrictive approach to the standard of proof of fraud. Such has been the 
obvious acknowledgement of the problem without the concomitant courage to re-
engineer the law. 
 It is worth reiterating that an application for an interlocutory injunction seeking to 
restrain an issuing bank from honouring its obligation under a letter of credit or 
performance guarantee need only show a cause of action in fraud, not a breach of 
contractual right against the bank. An injunction should be granted if the underlying 
interest to which the action for injunctive relief is but ancillary is subject to the 
                                                 
80
 See, generally, Group Josi v Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 345, where Staughton, 
L.J. opined that in Elian & Rabbath v Matsas [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep the Court of Appeal was concerned 
with  a bank guarantee interlocutory proceedings. In his Lordship’s view, [if a cause of action [was] not 
required [there], I do not see why it should be in [letter of credit or performance guarantee cases]”. Ibid., 
359. 
81
 United Trading Corp SA v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 554, 561. 
 146 
jurisdiction of the English court.82 Put differently, and more directly, insofar as the 
claimant’s claim of fraud under a credit or guarantee is justiciable in England, the court is 
entitled to exercise its power furnished by s 37 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981; for 
this purpose, it is immaterial that the claim of fraud is itself not made against the issuing 
bank against whom the claimant seeks an injunction. 
 
  B. A Confirming bank in Interlocutory Proceedings 
Where a claimant seeks an injunction to restrain the confirming bank from honouring its 
payment obligation under a letter of credit or performance guarantee, he will confront 
two formidable obstacles. In the first place, there is no privity of contract between the 
account party and confirming bank. Having given its own payment undertaking, the 
confirming bank’s contractual relations with, on the one hand, the issuing bank, and on 
the other hand, the beneficiary, essentially leaves the account party a stranger; an 
interlocutory application by the account party for injunctive relief against it may fail on 
this ground.83 The consequence is that, unlike what we have seen in relation to an issuing 
bank, the money which a confirming bank undertakes to pay does not belong to the 
account party. On the contrary, it is to the account of the issuing bank that such money is 
paid out.    
                                                 
82
 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291, 306 per Lord 
Mustill, Lords Keith, Goff, Jauncey, and Browne-Wilkinson concurred. 
83
 cf the Uniform Commercial Code, Reversed Article 5—117 (b) and (d) on the right of the account party 
to be subrogated to the right the issuing bank may have against the confirming bank, provided prior to the 
exercise of such a right, the account party has reimbursed the issuing bank. For some cases in point, see, 
e.g., International Trade Relationship and Export v Citibank, 2000 WL 343899 (S.D.NY) ; 41 UCC Rep 
Serv 2d 626 (2000); Tokyo Kogyo Boeki Shokai v United States National Bank of Oregon, 126 F 3d 1135 (9 
th Cir, 1997); Petra International Banking Corp v First American Bank of Virginia, 758 F Supp 1120 (Dist 
Ct, Virginia) (1991). 
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 The second hurdle exemplifies a complex question: Does a confirming bank owe 
a duty of care in tort to the account party, which a court has a jurisdiction to protect by 
granting a quia timet injunction upon the establishing by the account party that a breach 
of the duty is threatened? There are dicta in United Trading84and Czarnikow-Rionda85 
which suggest that an answer in the affirmative is arguable.  
 Besides the doubt expressed in United Trading and Czarnikow-Rionda, the 
question is yet to be squarely decided by the English courts. However, the famous dictum 
of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson86 had formulated reasonable forseeability of 
damage to the plaintiff as the criterion for the existence of a duty of care in tort, so that 
where, for example, a party to a contract assumes a duty to the other party to the contract, 
and it is foreseeable the a breach of the duty will cause injury or a financial loss 
consequent upon such injury, the contracting party owes a duty to all those falling within 
the foreseeable orbit of the risk of harm. In Anns v Merton London Borough Council, 
Lord Wilberforce expounded the proposition as imposing a prima facie duty of care 
unless there was any policy consideration dictating otherwise. Now, Lord Wilberforce’s 
proposition together with the actual decision in Anns has been overruled by the House of 
Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council.87In Governors of the Peabody Donation 
Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd,88 Lord Keith said that in determining whether a 
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, “it is material to take into consideration 
whether it is just and reasonable that it should do so”. In the vast majority of cases, 
though, the “just and reasonable” test has been used mainly to relieve the defendant of 
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liability where alternative remedies exist, with which a negligence action could 
undesirably be in conflict.89From a practical point of view, in relation to letter of credit or 
performance guarantee interlocutory litigation against a confirming bank, it is possible to 
venture the following proposition: the location of a confirming bank is usually in the 
beneficiary’s country, whilst that of the issuing bank is in the account party’s country. If 
the account party must initiate interlocutory proceedings to enjoin payment under the 
letter of credit or performance guarantee, why should he not seek it against the issuing 
bank in his own country? One clear alternative would be for the account party to proceed 
in the confirming bank’s country directly against the beneficiary, with whom he enacted 
the underlying contract and from whom he is entitled to exert proper performance of both 
a contractual duty and a tortuous duty of care. 90The obvious consequence of the 
foregoing, including the overruling of Anns, is that it is highly improbable that an English 
court will grant to a claimant under a letter of credit or performance guarantee an 
injunction restraining the confirming bank from honouring its payment undertaking.  
 In the United States, a string of respectable cases91 has established that a 
confirming bank under a letter of credit owes the account party neither contractual duty 
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nor a tortuous duty to take care in the performance of its duties, although the picture is 
different in relation to the issuing bank (to whom the confirming bank is a customer) and 
the beneficiary.  
 By article 13 (a) of the UCP 500,92 the banks have a duty to “examine all 
documents stipulated in the Credit with reasonable care”. It is by no means indicated to 
whom the duty is owed, so that upon its breach it is unclear who is entitled to raise an 
action for redress. There is, however, authority93 for the proposition that article 13 (a) 
duty of care just mentioned is, on the one hand, owed by the issuing bank to the account 
party, and, on the other hand, by the confirming bank to the issuing bank. On this basis, it 
is seems that an action in the tort of negligence may lie at the instance of an issuing bank 
against the confirming bank, and at the instance of the account party against the issuing 
bank. 
 Thus, if the documents against which the confirming bank demands recoupment 
are forged, the issuing bank may assert failure of the confirming bank to exercise 
reasonable care to detect the forgery. The confirming bank could fend off the action by 
establishing that the forgery was not apparent on the face of the document and that in 
taking up the documents it acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence. 
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 As regards the situation, if the claim is that the issuing bank was negligent in 
accepting a forged or fraudulent document, then the onus of proof (which is in this case 
notoriously difficult to discharge) lies on the account party. Insofar as a defect or forgery 
is not apparent on the face of the requisite documents, the issuing bank is prima facie 
entitled to reimbursement. However, independently of a possible claim in the tort of 
negligence, the account party is entitled to deny reimbursement if the taint rendered the 
document apparently non-conforming, which raises different considerations altogether. 94 
 
V. IRREPARABLE INJURY, INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES AND BALANCE OF 
CONVENIENCE.95 
 The leading case of the American Cyanamid establishes that once the court has 
satisfied itself that the claimant’s claim raises a serious question to be tried, the next stage 
of the inquiry96  is to decide, (i) whether the claimant would suffer an irremediable 
damage or irreparable injury if an interlocutory injunction were not granted in his 
favour.97In other words, if the refusal of an interlocutory injunction would cause to the 
claimant an injury adequately compensatable in damages, and the defendant is in a 
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financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should issue, regardless of the 
strength of the claimant’s claim at that stage;98 (ii) if damages would not provide an 
adequate remedy to the claimant, on the supposition that an interlocutory injunction were 
granted but the claimant lost in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, would the 
claimant’s undertaking as to damages adequately compensate the defendant? If the 
answer is in the negative, an interlocutory injunction should be denied.99 
 Harm or injury is irreparable if damages are unquantifiable,100capable of being 
reasonably estimated, or if the refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction will ultimately 
force the account party into insolvency or immeasurably interrupt his business. A remedy 
is considered inadequate if the claimant’s resort to foreign courts will be futile or where 
access to such courts is practically impossible.101 
 Significantly, though, an injury is not irremediable or irreparable simply because 
a refusal of the interlocutory application would ultimately relegate the claimant to 
undertake an expensive or inconvenient litigation of his claim in a foreign forum. The 
position is the same even if such litigation would be hazardous by reason of supervening 
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political turmoil, upheaval, or war. It has been held that these are inherent risks in 
international business transactions, which parties take when they assume obligations 
under such transactions.102 
 It has been thought that the American Cyanamid guidelines (i) and (ii) are akin to 
a chain, with the result that one is not to be applied unless the one before fails.103Thus, in 
the context of letter of credit or performance guarantee interlocutory proceedings, the 
first major hurdle the claimant has to surmount is the showing that he would suffer 
uncompensatable damage by a refusal of an interlocutory injunction.104 In Harbottle, 
Kerr, J., considered this requirement to constitute an “insuperable difficulty” for a 
claimant105in that he would have adequate damages if it turned out at the substantive trial 
that an interlocutory injunction should have been granted. Expressing similar sentiments 
in Czarnikow-Rionda Sugar Trading Inc v Standard Bank London Ltd106Rix, J., stated 
that the authorities strongly support the proposition that an application for an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain an issuing bank from making payment under a letter of 
credit or performance guarantee “must always fail” to surmount guideline (i) even if a 
case of clear fraud can otherwise be made out.107 A little later in his judgment, Rix, J., 
glossed over the pessimism in that statement when he said:  
 I do not know that it can be affirmatively stated that a court would never, as a matter 
 of balance of convenience, injunct a bank from making payment under its letter of 
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 credit or performance guarantee obligations in circumstance where a good claim  within 
 the fraud exception was accepted by the Court at pre-trial stage. I do not regard  Mr 
 Justice Kerr…logic of his ‘insuperable difficulty’ as necessarily saying that it could 
 never be done. It is perhaps wise to expect the unexpected, even the presently 
 unforeseeable. All that can be said is that the circumstances in which it should be done 
 have not so far presented themselves, and that it would of necessity take  extraordinary 
 facts to surmount this difficulty.108 
 
The premise upon which this line of authorities proceeds may be summarized as follows:  
 
Proposition (i): An application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain an issuing bank from 
making payment would fail because the account party would have adequate damages for breach 
of contract, a remedy which the bank would naturally be in a position to meet. 
 Proposition (ii): An interlocutory injunction against an issuing bank might occasion harm to the 
bank’s reputation; 
 Proposition (iii): An interlocutory injunction may cause to the issuing bank damage 
uncompensatable by the claimant’s undertaking as to damages.  
 
In my view, proposition (i) (which is in substance American Cyanamid guideline (i)) is 
wholly untenable; it proceeds from the fallacious presumption that if the claimant 
succeeds at the trial, and his injury is compensated, the matter necessarily ends there. The 
problem is, after the account party has been compensated, to whom does the issuing bank 
turn for recovery of the amount paid out in damages? The fraudster beneficiary who may 
have in the meantime disappeared? Will this not necessarily shift to the issuing bank the 
hazards of litigating fraud? Indeed, in the context of account party/beneficiary 
interlocutory proceedings, why should a party prima facie shown to be fraudulently 
requesting payment under a letter of credit or performance guarantee be placed in a 
position to realize the proceeds thereunder simply because the loss of the defrauded 
claimant is compensatable? Perhaps, it is on account of the latter point that the Singapore 
Court of Appeal took the view in Brody, White & Co Inc v Chemet Handel Trading 
(S)109that “‘The balance of convenience’ test propounded in American Cyanamid… is 
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generally not applicable in cases involving irrevocable credits.” In Bocotra Construction 
Pte Ltd v Attorney General (N0 2)110the Court of Appeal reaffirmed: 
 The statement in Brody111 that the balance of convenience test does not apply 
 correctly indicates that cases involving [letters of credit and performance  guarantees] are 
 virtually sui generis. …In our opinion, once there is [a prima facie showing of fraud or 
 unconscionability] there is no necessity to expend energies in addressing the superfluous 
 question of ‘balance of convenience’. It does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to 
 claim that damages would still somehow be an adequate remedy. 112      
 
Essentially, the implication of clinging to proposition (i) will be to deny the existence of 
the fraud exception to the autonomy doctrine, seeing that the account party’s potential 
injury will almost always be compensatable in damages. The primary policy objective of 
the fraud exception is the preservation of mercantile trust in letters of credit and 
performance guarantees as valuable financing instruments. This commercial reality 
stands undermined by the insistence that an interlocutory injunction would be refused 
unless there is a showing of uncompensatable harm.  
 Most notably, the critical factor in proposition (i) is adequacy of damages together 
with the financial ability of the defendant to meet them; the status of the claimant’s claim 
does not feature in the equation. But, interestingly, under the traditional conception of the 
fraud rule in the sphere of letters of credit and performance guarantees, the very factor 
relegated in proposition (i) is the most decisive. The result is that proposition (i) is 
inherently contradicted by the commercial and conceptual realities of the letter of credit 
and performance guarantee interlocutory litigation. 
 There is yet another argument that bears out the Singaporean courts’ approach. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it is furnished by the English case of Kvaerner John Brown Ltd v 
                                                 
110
 [1995] 2 SLR 733. 
111
 [1993] 1 SLR 65. 
112
 [1995] 2 SLR 733, 746 (Emphasis added). 
 155 
Midland Bank plc.113There, Cresswell, J., found manifestly fraudulent the beneficiary’s 
certification to the bank that it had given the requisite notice to the account party when 
this was wholly untrue. On this basis the court refused to vacate the ex parte injunction it 
had issued. The learned judge did not have to task himself with the further consideration 
of balance of convenience. If he did, the ex parte injunction would have had to be vacated 
because, in the circumstances, the account party could not have established suffering a 
loss uncompensatable by an award of damages; at any rate, the solvency of the defendant 
was not in doubt. But then, such a course would be assisting a dishonest beneficiary to 
consummate his fraud. 
 In spite of this, in Czarnikow-Rionda, Rix, J., thought that the Kvaerner decision 
was riddled with “difficulty” simply because “there was no consideration of the balance 
of convenience,” usually “a stumbling block in the way of an interlocutory injunction” 
application.114 But why should anyone lose any sleep over Kvaerner if, having satisfied 
itself that the beneficiary’s call was manifestly fraudulent, the court, at least by 
implication, refused to be entangled with the “stumbling block” altogether? Even if all 
that the court is able to find is a strong ground for assuming that the beneficiary is acting 
dishonestly, so that any call that has been, or will be, made will necessarily be fraudulent, 
an interlocutory injunction should be granted at that stage; it would certainly not be right 
for a court to require the claimant to overcome the yet further hurdle of balance of 
convenience, not least because the primary aim of the equitable jurisdiction to grant 
interlocutory relief on a claim of fraud is to do justice and frustrate the taking of undue 
advantage by one party of another. 
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 Proposition (ii) can easily be dismissed by the fact that the business reputation of 
the bank does not suffer any harm if, by withholding payment, the bank is simply 
obeying a court order,115an event the bank did not cause to happen.  
 Proposition (iii) obviously has substantial appeal. An offhand interlocutory 
injunction against an issuing bank could expose it to foreign litigation at the instance of 
the confirming bank, so that the issuing bank’s assets in foreign jurisdiction might be 
liable to seizure to satisfy judgment passed against it. More importantly, if such 
interlocutory injunction is granted against the issuing bank, and the account party 
subsequently fails to establish his claim at the trial, the claim for damages for loss of 
interest in foreign proceedings against the issuing bank may well run into a huge 
sum,116which might be uncompensatable by the claimant’s undertaking as to damages. 
But then, the strength of the foregoing arguments can easily be exaggerated. It cannot be 
in the interest of international commerce or of the banking community to cling rigidly to 
the impregnability of bankers’ payment commitments assumed under the machinery of 
letters of credit and performance guarantees, when the relevant circumstances of a 
specific case virtually unambiguously raise the inference of a fraud. 
 
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
In England, the overly high threshold standards for granting interlocutory injunctions in 
letter of credit and performance guarantee litigation are in evident need of reform. In 
place of the conventional tests, the following criteria are suggested. In the first place, the 
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standard of “established fraud to the knowledge of the bank” should be restricted to post-
honour proceedings, with the result that the court might grant an interlocutory injunction 
if it is satisfied that, on the material before it, there exist a strong or substantial likelihood 
that the claimant would succeed on his claim of fraud. The prospect of success would, of 
course, vary from case to case. If the claimant’s claim is virtually uncontroverted by the 
defendant beneficiary’s affidavit evidence, it should be unnecessary for the court go into 
the question of adequacy of damages and balance of convenience.117 Conversely, where 
the likelihood of success is less than the foregoing, it would be appropriate to take into 
account a number of factors, for example, the claimant’s financial capacity and 
willingness to give an undertaking as to damages to compensate the defendant 
beneficiary should he succeed at the trial, and the fact that the defendant resides outside 
the jurisdiction of the court, without sufficient (if any) assets there. Such considerations 
weighed heavily with the majority in the much maligned case of Themehelp Ltd v 
West.118 The barrage of criticisms the majority decision attracted to itself have thus far 
appear to have left this aspect of the court’s reasoning unscathed. Where it is, however, 
anticipated that the credit or guarantee is likely to expire prior to the conclusion of the 
substantive trial, the court may request, in addition to the undertaking as to damages, that 
the claimant post security by paying the equivalent sum of the instrument into the 
court.119Alternatively, the claimant may be obliged to instruct the issuing bank for an 
extension of the duration of the instrument. 
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 A slightly related consideration (where there is a real prospect of the claimant 
succeeding at the trial) involves the question of irreparable harm. For instance, if a refusal 
of an interlocutory injunction would practically force the claimant into liquidation or 
occasion to him an irremediable injury, such that the claimant’s financial capacity to 
prosecute diligently his claim of fraud to final judgment is at jeopardy, an interlocutory 
injunction should be granted, albeit after taking into account the relative harm to some 
other third party that may have in the meantime become a protected beneficiary under the 
credit or guarantee.120 Where the defendant is an issuing bank, the possibility of the 
granting of an interim injunction exposing the bank to international litigation may not be 
ignored. Ultimately, though, much would depend on the strength of the claimant’s 
likelihood of success on his claim of fraud.      
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